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Abstract
In the first chapter I calculate unemployment multipliers of fiscal policies. As an innova-
tion, I include family firms in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions;
they behave differently in the labor market and are differently managed. Based on Eu-
ropean data I find that both at peak and cumulatively, unemployment reacts least when
consolidation is done by increasing the value-added tax. However, this policy results in the
steepest decline in consumption. Also, ignoring sectoral heterogeneity might lead to incorrect
conclusions.
Next, with Magnus Saxegaard we investigate the macroeconomic impacts of deregulating
the labor and product markets. The novelty of the model, which was jointly developed
with Rahul Anand and Purva Khera, is the inclusion of an underground sector in an open-
economy model. It is a major determinant of the sign and the magnitude of reactions. We
show that in South Africa both reforms increase long-run output, although labor market
reforms are more successful in decreasing unemployment. Nevertheless, there are short-term
costs; which can be mitigated reform packages. Finally, we find that it is usually better to
start with a labor market reform.
The last chapter focuses on southern Europe where high levels of government debt are
coupled with rapid population aging. With Daniel Baksa we examine the macroeconomic
effects of public old-age pension reforms and other policies under conditions of aging. As
a novelty, we incorporate a shadow economy into an overlapping generations model. We
find that a retirement age increase implies the lowest reduction in long-run GDP, although
there are doubts about its feasibility. Impacts, in general, depend on the type of pension
plan. Furthermore, when moving away from the PAYG towards a fully funded regime the
pension-wage replacement rate temporarily sharply drops. The presence of informality and
unemployment are important, in particular for responses of labor income tax hikes.
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Preface
This thesis investigates the macroeconomic impacts, especially those on the labor market,
of fiscal policies in a New Keynesian framework. All aspects of public policies are studied:
expenditure and revenue-side policies, as well structural reforms. Furthermore, not only
unemployment in general, but also shadow employment in particular are examined. So is
aging which is one of the key challenges governments face today.
In the first chapter I calculate unemployment multipliers of fiscal consolidation policies in
a New Keynesian framework with search and matching frictions, and, as an innovation, in
the presence of sectoral heterogeneity. Family and non-family firms behave differently in the
labor market and are differently managed; this latter is modeled by the inclusion of intangible
capital in the family sector. The model is calibrated to match European data on countries
with a large percentage of family firms in employment. I find that fiscal austerity raises
unemployment. Both at peak and cumulatively, unemployment reacts least when the budget
is consolidated by increasing the rate of value-added tax. At peak, the highest increase in
unemployment is induced by a cut in government consumption, but, cumulatively, a hike in
employees’ labor income tax is just as costly. There are trade-offs, however, as the value-
added tax increase results in the steepest decline in consumption. Sectoral heterogeneity is
crucial; multipliers of labor income taxes and government consumption are usually biased
downwards, while the consumption-tax multipliers are often larger without it.
Next, with Rahul Anand, Purva Khera and Magnus Saxegaard, we treat a topic upon which
the literature is strangely silent: what are the macroeconomic impacts of deregulating the
labor and product markets, incorporating a shadow economy into an open-economy dynamic
general equilibrium model? We examine both the long-run effects and the transition towards
the new long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, we study mixed policies and the role of policy
sequence, too. The unofficial sector is a major determinant of the sign and, in particular,
the magnitude of impulse responses. South Africa, an example of the emerging countries,
is considered when Bayesian estimating our model. Regarding the long run, we show that
both labor and product market reforms considerably increase output, although labor market
reforms are more successful in decreasing unemployment. Nevertheless, there are short-term
costs, for example, a decrease in household consumption, net exports or output, or a decrease
in competition. Combining structural reforms, however, tends to mitigate the short-run costs
that inevitably accompany all policies. Finally, we find that it is usually better to start with
a labor market reform than with a product market reform.
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In the last chapter, with Daniel Baksa, we turn our attention towards the fiscal conse-
quences of aging. Southern Europe is experiencing currently a double-whammy: high levels of
government debt coupled with a rapidly aging population. So, the consolidation of (pension)
budgets seems inevitable. In this paper we examine the short- and long-run macroeconomic
effects of public old-age pension reforms and other fiscal policies under conditions of pop-
ulation aging. Filling in a major gap in the literature, we incorporate a shadow economy
into a New Keynesian model with overlapping generations, demography and unemployment.
The model is calibrated to match annual data on Portugal, Italy and Spain. We find that if
population is aging in the long-run the lowest reduction in GDP happens after a retirement
age increase, but we raise some doubts about the feasibility of this policy. Macroeconomic
impacts, in general, depend on the type of pension plan. Moving away from the PAYG
towards a fully funded regime reduces informality in the long-run, however, during the tran-
sition the implied pension-wage replacement rate sharply drops. The presence of informality
and unemployment are important, in particular for responses of labor income tax hikes.
2
Chapter 1
Fiscal Austerity, Unemployment and
Family Firms
1.1 Introduction
Since the onset of the recent crisis, many countries have experienced a rise in government
debt, thus making urgent fiscal consolidation. In particular, in more than half of the EU
countries the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60 percent today.1 At the same time, in many
countries unemployment has risen to historic heights. Fiscal consolidation further affects
unemployment. The question which I address in this paper is how. Notably, I calculate
unemployment fiscal multipliers that show the effects of temporary fiscal policies on the
unemployment rate.
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, there is a debate on the sign
and the magnitude of expenditure-side unemployment fiscal multipliers, while theoretical and
empirical multipliers also differ. Second, as yet there are only a few examples of revenue-
side unemployment fiscal multipliers. Third, in all studies firms are homogenous. In this
paper, however, multipliers are based on a New-Keynesian model with search and matching
frictions, and, as an innovation, with family and non-family firms. Because empirical firm-
level evidence indicates that family firms behave differently in the labor market and are
differently managed than non-family firms.
First, regarding the expenditure side of the budget, several models, Monacelli et al. (2010),
Edelberg et al. (1999), Fatas-Mihov (2001), Gali et al. (2007), Mayer et al. (2010) and
Staehler-Thomas (2012)2, find that loosening fiscal policy implies an increase in hours worked
or employment. An empirical paper which finds the same is, for example, Forni-Gambetti
1Eurostat data.
2In a two-country DSGE model with monetary union and with government investment, employment and
wages permanent shocks are investigated.
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(2010).3 Furthermore, Monacelli et al. (2010)4 claim that an increase of 1 percent of GDP
government consumption decreases unemployment by 0.6 percentage points at peak5, but
their theoretical multiplier is, even though it is still positive, much lower (around 0.2 pp).
In contrast, Bruckner-Pappa (2012) suggest that, empirically, an increase in government
consumption raises unemployment 6, and a model with price rigidity, labor force participa-
tion, as well as short- and long-term unemployment reproduces their empirical findings. At
the same time, Gomes (2011) claims that a shock to government consumption - without the
inclusion of government employment in the model - implies a close-to-zero effect on unem-
ployment. Also, based on European countries’ data Dallari (2014) finds that the sign of the
impact multiplier of a cut in government consumption varies country-by-country.7
Most papers concentrate solely on government consumption, although different govern-
ment expenditure items might imply different employment effects.8 Bermperoglou et al.
(2013) show that a decrease of 1 percent of GDP in government consumption, government
investment and public vacancies increase unemployment by 0.8, 0.8 and 1.8 percentage points
respectively, while a decrease of 1 percent of GDP in public wages reduces unemployment
by 0.1 percentage points.9 A New Keynesian model with labor force participation, short-
and long-term unemployment and public employment provides similar theoretical responses.
However, Gomes (2011) shows that an increase in public vacancies or public wages results
in higher unemployment. Moreover, Pappa (2009) finds that a positive shock to public em-
ployment decreases total employment in several US federal states.10 Also, Dallari (2014)
demonstrates that after cuts in government investment, unemployment multipliers of differ-
ent countries have different signs and magnitudes.11 Campolmi et al. (2011) show that the
unemployment multipliers of government spending are low, while those of a hiring subsidy
policy are large. Lastly, Staehler-Thomas (2012) point out that while a cut in government
consumption, investment or employment increase unemployment, a reduction in public wages
decreases it.
The aforementioned studies rely on aggregate government expenditure data. At the same
time, the narrative approach achieves identification using historical records of the policy
3They provide empirical evidence based on a structural, large dimensional, dynamic factor model.
4A model with search and matching frictions, real wage rigidity and distortionary taxes.
5Based on a VAR of the US.
6A 10 percent increase in government consumption results in an increase of 0.2-0.5 pp in unemployment
at peak in structural VARs of several OECD countries.
7Multipliers vary from −4.5 to 8.7, using a panel structural VAR.
8Some specifically focus on military spending, see e.g. Rotemberg-Woodford (1992), Ramey-Shapiro
(1998), Burnside et al. (2004), Ramey (2011) or Ben Zeev-Pappa (2015).
9Based on a SVAR with sign restrictions of the US.
10Using a structural VAR with sign restrictions on US aggregate and state level data.
11On impact −1.7-4.1 in Europe.
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decision-making process. Both Guajardo et al. (2011) and Ball et al. (2013) suggest that
fiscal tightening increases unemployment.12 Hernandez de Cos-Moral-Benito (2011) also
report similar results.13
Turning to the revenue side, I am aware of two papers only. Staehler-Thomas (2012)
find that a 1 percent of GDP size increase in labor income taxes implies a 0.5 pp hike in
unemployment, which is larger than the 0.3 pp multiplier of a government consumption cut
(no distinction is made between employee and employer taxes, however). Then, Cogan et
al. (2013) investigate the impacts of the US 2013 Budget Resolution, a reform package of
cutting government purchases and transfers and lowering labor income taxes, and they find
that with a labor or with capital and labor tax reductions hours worked significantly go up
compared to a reduction in government purchases. Additionally, Ball et al. (2013) claim that
spending-based adjustments have a more pronounced effect than tax-based adjustments, but
because they adopt a narrative approach they are not able to compare separate tax policies.
Moreover, Canova-Pappa (2007)14 and Caldara-Kampas (2008)15 study a single tax shock,
too.16
Now turning to sectoral heterogeneity in particular, first I need to define family firms: a
family firm is a firm that is owned and/or managed by a family. As Anderson-Reeb (2003)
specify, a family firm is a firm where the fraction of equity owned by a (founding) family is
above a threshold, or one in which family members sit on the board of directors.
The share of family firms in European employment is remarkable (Table 1.1)17. Almost ev-
ery second worker in Europe is employed by a family firm. Family firms are more prevalent in
12Both use a sample of OECD countries. Guajardo et al. (2011) claim that two years after the shock
a fiscal consolidation of 1 percent of GDP implies a 0.3 pp increase in unemployment, while Ball et al.
(2013) find that fiscal consolidation implies an increase in long-term unemployment of about 0.5 pp in the
medium-term.
13Based on a panel of OECD countries.
14Based on a dataset of US states and EU countries, identifying the shocks by sign restrictions.
15Based on a VAR of the US.
16Other streams of literature study the effects of taxes on employment, too. A consensus has not been
reached either and it is unusual for the expenditure side of the budget to be compared to the revenue side
of the budget. Concerning the effects of labor taxation on (cost of) employment, usually based on aggregate
data and econometric methodologies, some researchers find an effect (Alesina-Perotti (1997), Blanchard-
Wolfers (2000)), while others do not (Bean (1994)) or report mixed results (Daveri et al. (2000)). While
a significant share of public finance literature highlights the equivalence between consumption and labor
income taxes (e.g. Auerbach (2006)), others claim the opposite (Blumkin et al. (2012), Sumpson (1986)).
Regarding tax shifts, in particular, microsimulations also show an ambiguous picture, Thomas-Picos-Sanchez
(2012) claim that a shift from social security contribution to consumption taxes only slightly increases hours,
which is not in line with Pestel-Sommer (2013). As regards other effects (growth, efficiency, inequality, reform
implementation), see among others Auerbach (2006) or Pestel-Sommer (2013).
17Sources: Mandl (2008), IEF (2009), IFB (2011), Bjuggren et al. (2011) and Lindow (2013).
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some countries than in others, employing 54.6 and 35.2 percent of labor force, respectively.18
In addition, the level of unemployment is, on average, lower in countries where there are
fewer family firms (Table 1.2), 5.0 percent compared to 8.1 percent otherwise.19
Table 1.1: Percentage of family firms in European employment
Table 1.2: Unemployment rate by share of family firms in European employment
Despite their remarkable labor market share, family firms have not attracted much atten-
tion in macroeconomic research yet. I am aware of a single paper, Caselli-Gennaioli (2013),
which treats this topic. Based on a simple growth model, they claim a relationship between
family management and the health of financial markets; that is, the worse a financial market
is functioning, the greater number of family-managed firms there will be. This and the claim
that family managers are less talented at running firms imply that the share of family firms
18Regarding the number of firms, the share of family firms is even larger, see for example La Porta et al.
(1999) and Mandl (2008).
19Calculation is based on Eurostat data between 2000 and 2012, and Mandl (2008), IEF (2009), IFB
(2011), Bjuggren et al. (2011) and Lindow (2013).
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is important in explaining cross-country income differences. However, they do not talk about
the labor market. Recently, Epstein-Shapiro (2014) studied labor market policies in a model
with small and large firms. However, they did not consider fiscal consolidation policies, and
they focused only on firm size, rather than including other firm characteristics as well.
At the same time, many of the family firms’ characteristics are documented in the corporate
finance literature, based on firm-level data. First, family firms behave differently in the labor
market, compared to non-family firms. On the one hand, job security is stronger among
family firms.20 Bassanini et al. (2011) use matched employer-employee data of French
companies, and find that the dismissal rate of family firms is significantly lower, and so is
the subjective risk of dismissal perceived by the workers.
Sraer-Thesmar (2007), using a French sample of stock exchange-listed companies, point out
that family firms pay lower wages, even after controlling for the skill and age structure of the
workers. Similarly, Bassanini et al. (2011) show that family firms pay a lower wage on average
than do non-family firms, and this is due to differences in unoberserved characteristics.
Furthermore, when a firm becomes non-family owned, its wages drop. Also, worker influence
on wage setting is lower in family firms. Still, employees of family firms, compared to their
counterparts in the non-family sector, are more loyal to their employers; Siebert et al. (2011)
claim that this greater loyalty stems from long-term employment.
Second, as Caselli-Gennaioli (2013) point out, “inter-generational transmission of man-
agerial responsibilities”, i.e. dynastic management, is crucial for family firms. The current
owner or manager (“the son”) of the firm inherits managerial know-how - related to cus-
tomers, suppliers and other market operators - from the previous owner or manager (“the
father”).
There is no consensus in the literature, however, as to whether family firms are more
or less productive than non-family firms. Bennedsen et al. (2007) claim that family man-
agement has a negative impact on firm performance. However, Maury (2006) and others,
Anderson-Reeb (2003), Villalonga-Amit (2006) or King-Santor (2007), find that the relation-
ship between family management and firm performance is not monotonic.
Furthermore, a general misunderstanding about family firms is that all of them are small
(Figure 1.1).21 As Mandl (2008) highlights, the family business sector is mainly dominated
by small- and medium-sized companies. However, some of the largest firms are also family
20Furthermore, not only is the job security of family firms greater, but these firms are also less likely to
exit the market (Nunes et al. (2014)).
21A micro or small firm employs fewer than 50 people, a medium-sized firm employs between 50 and 249
people, while a large enterprise has at least 250 employees (Eurostat terminology).
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Figure 1.1: Size structure of European (family) firms (Mandl (2008), page 50)
firms. Examples of these are Volkswagen, Metro or Bosch.22 Also, as IFERA (2003) claims,
not only is Wal-Mart, one of the largest companies of the world, a family company, but
further 35 percent of the 500 biggest US companies are family firms.
When considering employment or turnover instead of number of firms, the dominance of
small firms among family firms is even lower. According to Mandl (2008), the share of family
firms with an annual turnover higher than EUR 50 million is 34 percent in Germany. Also,
in Ireland 27.1 percent and in Finland 22 percent of large firms are family firms. In the UK,
the share of large firms in the family sector is also notable, although it is lower (15.6 percent
is reported by IFB (2011)). In Italy, the average number of employed people is 68 in the
family sector and 305 in the non-family sector, based on Navaretti et al. (2008).
Another common misperception is that family firms are not export-oriented. According
to IFB (2011), in the UK 19 percent of family firms sold exports last year, while the relevant
non-family value was 15 percent. In Spain, both the export propensities and the export
intensities of family and non-family firms are very similar (71.1 and 68.8, and 20.9 and 25.3
percent, respectively), shown by Merino et al. (2012). Similar conclusions can be drawn for
Italy (Navaretti et al. (2008) and Minetti et al. (2013)).
Thus, the New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions of this paper, as an
innovation, contains sectoral heterogeneity, i.e. family and non-family firms. I concentrate
22http://www.campdenfb.com/article/top-100-family-businesses-europe-1
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on the different labor market behavior of family firms, as well as introduce an intangible
capital23 in the family sector, which enables me to model the dynastic management of family
firms. Also, the presence of the two sectors creates the possibility of sectoral movements due
to changes in relative sectoral prices and wages. For the purpose of illustration, the model
is calibrated to match data of those European countries where family firms have an above-
average presence in the labor market.
The model predicts that all fiscal austerity policies raise unemployment. At peak, the
highest increase is implied by a cut in government consumption. Nevertheless, an increase in
employees’ labor income tax, cumulatively, implies the same size increase in unemployment
as does the government consumption cut. A higher employer social security contribution is,
however, less costly in terms employment than an increase on the same scale in the tax on
employees’ labor income. Both at peak and cumulatively, unemployment reacts least when
the budget is consolidated by increasing the rate of value-added tax. Yet, a policymaker
must manage trade-offs, as the increase in value-added tax results in the steepest decline in
consumption.
Sectoral heterogeneity seems to play a crucial role: unemployment fiscal multipliers are
very different with and without it. With homogeneous firms multipliers of labor income tax
policies and government consumption multipliers are usually smaller, while consumption tax
multipliers are often biased upwards. Thus, ignoring sectoral heterogeneity might lead to
incorrect policy conclusions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the model, while
calibration is presented in Section 1.3. Results appear in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes,
while the Appendix provides more detail on the model’s steady state, the loglinearized
equations and impulse response functions.
1.2 Modeling framework
My model builds on a standard, closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) framework with price stickiness (Rotemberg (1982)) and search and matching fric-
tions (Gertler et al. (2008) and Staehler-Thomas (2012)).
As an innovation, there is sectoral heterogeneity on the firm side, ie. family and non-family
firms are distinguished. Family firms behave differently in the labor market than non-family
23In this paper the terms ’organisational’, ’family’, ’family organisational’ and ’intangible capital’ are
used interchangeably. The author is aware of the fact that, for instance, research and development is also
intangible, but in this paper only the so called ’family’ capital, capital related to special firm management,
is taken into account.
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firms by providing greater job security, but lower wages and less bargaining power to their
employees. As well, dynastic management of family firms is modeled by the inclusion of an
intangible capital in the family sector, following Danthine-Jin (2007).24 The presence of the
two sectors creates the possibility of sectoral movements due to changes in relative sectoral
prices and wages.
1.2.1 Representative household
A representative household maximizes expected discounted lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct) (1.1)
Here, β is the usual deterministic discount factor. For simplicity’s sake, I assume that the
household only derives utility from aggregate consumption Ct.
25
The household’s contemporaneous utility is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) func-
tion of aggregate consumption:
u (Ct) =
(Ct − hCt−1)1−σC − 1
1− σC (1.2)
where h is the external habit parameter and σC is the relative risk aversion parameter.
There is unemployment due to search and matching frictions, which I will describe in
more detail later on. A member of the household might work in the intermediate family
sector (LF,t) or in the intermediate non-family sector (LNF,t). If the household member is
not employed in any of these sectors, he/she is unemployed. I define the beginning of period
unemployment by Ut:
Ut = 1− LF,t−1 − LNF,t−1 (1.3)
Here, I normalise the total number of labor force to one, meaning I do not take into account
labor force participation decision. 26
When working in the family or in the non-family sector, the household receives labor
income, WF,t and WNF,t, respectively. These are sectoral real wages, expressed in the
economy-wide price level Pt. Labor income is taxed in both sectors by τLEE,t, which is
the sum of personal labor income tax and the employees’ social security contribution. While
the social security contribution is deducted, modeling retirement is beyond the scope of this
paper. When unemployed, the household member receives WU unemployment benefit, also
expressed in the economy-wide price level.
24Other examples of intangible capital include McGrattan-Prescott (2010), Ai et al. (2013), Gourio-
Rudanko (2014) or McGrattan et al. (2014).
25See, for example, Gertler et al. (2008).
26A recent example of a model with labor force participation is Bermperoglou et al. (2013).
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Because the household owns the firms, the household receives the dividends. The house-
hold owns and rents physical capital to intermediate family and non-family firms, KF,t and
KNF,t, so he/she receives rental rate of capital, RKF,t and RKNF,t, respectively. The rental
rates differ in the two sectors, and are also expressed in terms of the economy-wide price
level. The household can save either in a risk-free government bond Bt, after which he/she
gets it−1 nominal interest rate, deflated by pit quarterly inflation rate, or she can invest into
physical capital. To avoid jumps, investment is subject to an adjustment cost following
Christiano et al. (2005):
KF,t = (1− δF )KF,t−1 + IF,t − φ
IF
2
(
IF,t
IF,t−1
− 1
)2
IF,t (1.4)
Here, IF,t denotes investment into family physical capital, δF is the family depreciation rate,
and φIF is the investment adjustment cost related to family physical capital. Investment
adjustment cost is zero in steady state.27
The household consumes an aggregate consumption bundle Ct, which will be described in
more detail shortly, and after her consumption she pays value-added tax τC,t, and a lump
sum tax Tt to close the model. For simplicity, I assume that income related to bonds or
physical capital renting are not taxed. 28
Thus, the period-by-period household budget constraint is
(1− τLEE,t) (WF,tLF,t +WNF,tLNFt) +WU(1− LF,t − LNF,t) +
+
1 + it−1
pit
Bt−1 +RKF,tKF,t−1 +RKNF,tKNF,t−1 + Prof IF,t + Prof
I
NF,t +
+
PF,t
Pt
ProfFF,t +
PNF,t
Pt
ProfFNF,t =
= (1 + τC,t)Ct +
PF,t
Pt
IF,t +
PNF,t
Pt
INF,t +Bt + Tt (1.5)
Here, PF,t (PNF,t) is the price level of the goods produced in the family (non-family) sector.
As the budget constraint is expressed in terms of the aggregate price level Pt, the relative
sectoral prices are considered regarding sectoral investments (the same is true of final firms’
profits).
The household maximises its expected discounted lifetime utility subject to its budget
constraint and the two physical capital laws of motion with respect to Bt, Ct, IF,t, INF,t,
KF,t and KNF,t. The household takes wages and labor as given, as these are determined in
the labor market when bargaining with intermediate firms.
27Similarly in the non-family sector with INF,t as investment into non-family physical capital, δNF as the
non-family depreciation rate and φINF as the non-family investment adjustment cost.
28A counterexample is e.g. Staehler-Thomas (2012).
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Optimization yields the usual Euler equation:
Et
[
β
1 + it
pit+1
1
1 + τC,t+1
1
Ct+1
]
=
1
1 + τC,t
1
Ct
(1.6)
Because there is a value-added tax, the current and next period tax levels affect the in-
tertemporal consumption choice of the household.
The family physical capital and investment decisions of the household can be expressed
by two equations, a Tobin-Q and an arbitrage condition:29
PF,t
Pt
= QF,t −QF,tφ
IF
2
(
3
I2F,t
I2F,t−1
− 4 IF,t
IF,t−1
+ 1
)
+
+Et
[
QF,t+1φ
IF pit
it+1
(
I3F,t+1
I3F,t
− I
2
F,t+1
I2F,t
)]
(1.7)
Et
[
1 + it
pit+1
]
= Et
[
RKF,t + (1− δF )QF,t+1
QF,t
]
(1.8)
QF,t is the price level of family physical capital, which is related to the Lagrangian multiplier
of the relevant law of motion. A Tobin-Q of a standard, one-sector model does not contain
any relative prices. However, because there are two sectors here, the relative sectoral prices
appear in the Tobin-Q. Thus, in steady state, the price level of family physical capital is
equal to the relative price of family goods, instead of 1 of the usual one-sector framework.
Furthermore, the arbitrage condition is also affected by the sectoral price level; in steady
state the rental rate of capital is thus not equal to the real interest rate net depreciation
rate, but it is also affected by the sectoral Tobin-Q.
Finally, It aggregate investment is defined as follows:
It =
PF,t
Pt
IF,t +
PF,t
Pt
INF,t (1.9)
Aggregate household consumption is a composite of goods produced by family and non-
family firms:
Ct =
[
γ
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t + (1− γ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
NF,t
] η
η−1
(1.10)
γ is the share of family-firm produced goods in the consumption basket, while η is the
elasticity of substitution between family and non-family firm produced goods.
29Here, I describe the family sector, the non-family sector is similar.
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The household minimizes its expenditure spent on consumption goods, taking into ac-
count the composite consumption function above. As a result, the demand functions for
consumption of family and non-family produced goods are
CF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (1.11)
CNF,t = (1− γ)
(
PNF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (1.12)
The economy-wide price level Pt, which is the Lagrangian multiplier of the above maxi-
mization problem, can be expressed as a composite of the sectoral price levels:
Pt =
[
γP 1−ηF,t + (1− γ)P 1−ηNF,t
] 1
1−η (1.13)
Finally, the stochastic discount factor is, as usual, βt,t+1 = Et
[
β
∂u(Ct+1)
∂Ct+1
∂u(Ct)
∂Ct
]
.
1.2.2 Intermediate good producing firms and wage bargaining
In each sector, there is a continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms, which are
perfectly competitive, ie. they take prices as given. They produce goods hiring labor (as
well as the employer social security contribution τLER,t) and renting physical capital from
the household. Hiring labor requires posting vacancies, which is costly, and so induces
unemployment.
Also, intermediate firms bargain over wages with workers. Modeling the labor market is
similar to Gertler et al. (2008) and Staehler-Thomas (2012). Based on empirical, firm-level
evidence, family firms behave differently in the labor market than non-family firms: i) their
dismissal rate is lower, ii) their workers obtain a lower wage (in steady state) and iii) their
workers have less bargaining power in wage setting. Moreover, family firms invest in family
capital, which non-family firms do not do. This capital, an intangible one in accordance with
Danthine-Jin (2007), represents the dynastic management of family firms. At this point, I
will describe the intermediate firms in detail.30
Sectoral goods Y IF,t and Y
I
NF,t are produced based these production functions:
Y IF,t = AF,tL
αF
F,tK
1−αF−µ
F,t−1 K
µ
OF,t−1 (1.14)
Y INF,t = ANF,tL
αNF
NF,tK
1−αNF
NF,t−1 (1.15)
30I focus on the family sector; the non-family sector, except for the organisational capital, is parallel.
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which are, for simplicity’s sake, Cobb-Douglas functions with constant returns to scale.31
αF and αNF denote labor income shares in the two sectors, respectively. AF,t and ANF,t are
exogenous productivity levels, which are assumed to be equal in the steady state:
AˆF,t = ρAF ˆAF,t−1 + AF,t (1.16)
ˆANF,t = ρANF ˆANF,t−1 + ANF,t (1.17)
In the family sector the family capital, which represents dynastic management, is denoted
by KOF,t−1. Investment in family organisational capital follows a law of motion:
KOF,t = (1− δOF )KOF,t−1 + θIOF,t − φ
IOF
2
(
IOF,t
IOF,t−1
− 1
)2
IOF,t (1.18)
This is similar to the physical capital law of motion described above (here, δOF is the family
intangle depreciation rate, while φIOF is the relevant adjustment cost). Nevertheless, pa-
rameter θ appears, which represents the effectiveness of family organisational investment.
In the baseline scenario, this parameter is set to 1. Family organisational investment IOF,t
is intangible, so it is not part of the final output. This creates a trade-off, namely, invest-
ment in family capital reduces goods sold today as well as profit today, but it increases the
next period’s family organisational capital stock, thus bringing about future production and
profit.
Family firms post vacancies, vFt . The number of new hires (matches), m
F
t , depends on the
number of vacancies posted and the number of people searching for a job, U st . Searching can
be described by a matching function:
mFt = σF,m(U
s
t )
σF (vFt )
1−σF (1.19)
Here, σF,m is the matching efficiency, while σF denotes the matching elasticity.
Similarly to Staehler-Thomas (2012), but in contrast to Gertler et al. (2008) I assume
that the number of people searching for a job in period t equals the number of people who
are unemployed at the end of period t− 1 (Ut) plus the number of people losing their job at
the beginning of period t:
U st = Ut + (1− ρF )LF,t−1 + (1− ρNF )LNF,t−1 (1.20)
Those who are fired can immediately start to search for a new job. Firing is exogenous: the
sectoral dismissal rates are ρF and ρNF . Furthermore, everyone can search for a job in any
of the sectors, not only in the sector in which one was working previously.
31Following the intangible capital literature, such as McGrattan-Prescott (2010) and McGrattan et al.
(2014), constant returns to scale mean constant returns to scale in all production inputs, including the
intangible capital.
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Those who find a job in period t start to work immediately. The same assumption is
made by Gertler et al. (2008) and Staehler-Thomas (2012), but Bermperoglou et al. (2013)
assume that those who find a job in period t start to work in period t + 1 only. Given the
above functional forms and assumptions, the family labor law of motion is
LF,t = ρ
FLF,t−1 +mFt (1.21)
Finally, family vacancy filling and job finding probabilities are defined as
qFt =
mFt
vFt
(1.22)
pFt =
mFt
U st
(1.23)
Regarding vacancy posting, κF and κNF denote per-vacancy costs. Total vacancy cost is
linear in the number of vacancies posted. Also, this is the only cost in my framework. In
contrast, Staehler-Thomas (2012) consider a training cost as well. Regarding the functional
form, Gertler et al. (2008) do not use a linear function. This is because they assume nominal
wage rigidity, which requires a quadratic function. I follow most of the literature when
considering a linear function. Hence, my framework is the closest to that of Bermperoglou
et al. (2013).
Intermediate profits are
Prof IF,t = MCF,tY
I
F,t − (1 + τLER,t)WF,tLF,t −RKF,tKF,t−1 −
−κF PF,t
Pt
vFt −MCFtIOF,t (1.24)
Prof INF,t = MCNF,tY
I
NF,t − (1 + τLER,t)WNF,tLNF,t −RKNF,tKNF,t−1 −
−κNF PNF,t
Pt
vNFt (1.25)
Because intermediate firms are perfectly competitive, the price of goods is equal to the real
marginal cost, MCF,t and MCNF,t in the two sectors, respectively. Profit equals revenue net
wages and rental rate of capital. Vacancy posting costs are deducted, as well. Because there
are two sectors and the profits are expressed in the economy-wide price level Pt, relative
sectoral prices are taken into account when calculating total vacancy posting costs. The last
term in the family profit is related to family organisational investment. Specifically, some
part of family production, IOF,t, is not sold in the market, but it is used by the firm itself
as investment in organisational capital to enhance future production. Because the family
firm invests in organisational capital itself, the price of investment equals the price of goods
produced.
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Intermediate firms maximize their expected discounted lifetime profit by choosing labor,
number of vacancies and physical capital, taking into account the production functions and
labor laws of motion above:
E0
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+jProf
I
F,t+j (1.26)
E0
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+jProf
I
NF,t+j (1.27)
βt,t+j denotes the stochastic discount factor of the household between periods t and t+ j.
Optimization implies a usual physical capital demand:
RKF,t = MCF,t(1− αF − µ)
Y IF,t
KF,t−1
(1.28)
Demand for labor, however, differs from the standard one without labor market frictions,
namely, current and next period firm values affect the real wage:
(1 + τLER,t)WF,t = MCF,tαF
Y IF,t
LF,t
− FF,t + Et
[
βt,t+1ρ
FFF,t+1
]
(1.29)
where the current firm value FF,t is related to the vacancy posting cost:
FF,t = κ
F PF,t
Pt
1
qFt
(1.30)
Combining these two yields the wage setting equation:
(1 + τLER,t)WF,t = MCF,tαF
Y IF,t
LF,t
− κF PF,t
Pt
1
qFt
+ Et
[
βt,t+1ρ
FκF
PF,t+1
Pt+1
1
qFt+1
]
(1.31)
Additionally, only in the family sector, there is a demand for organisational capital:
QOF,t − Et [βt,t+1(1− δOF )QOF,t+1] = Et
[
βt,t+1MCF,t+1µ
Y IF,t+1
KOF,t
]
(1.32)
In contrast to the family physical capital demand, rather than the current period’s pro-
duction, the next period’s production is relevant. This is because the firm decides about
the next period’s organisational capital today, taking this period’s organisational capital as
given. Also, this is the reason that both the current period’s and also the next period’s
capital prices appear.
Similarly to physical capital, there is also a Tobin-Q for family organisational capital:
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MCF,t = θQOF,t −QOF,tφ
IOF
2
(
3
I2OF,t
I2OF,t−1
− 4 IOF,t
IOF,t−1
+ 1
)
+
+Et
[
βt,t+1QOF,t+1φ
IOF
(
I3OF,t+1
I3OF,t
− I
2
OF,t+1
I2OF,t
)]
(1.33)
θ, the effectiveness of family organisational investment has an impact on the price of family
organisational capital. In steady state, the price of family capital is equal to MCF
θ
, so the
higher the effectiveness of organisational investment, the lower the price of family organisa-
tional capital. Again, the price of family capital is related to the price of production, as the
family firm sacrifices its own goods to invest in this inheritable special knowlegde.
Intermediate firms and workers bargain over gross wages; in period t they bargain over
wages paid in period t. Bargaining happens after matching is over. My framework closely
follows that of Staehler-Thomas (2012). Rearranging labor demand gives the firm value
(FF,t):
FF,t = MCF,tαF
Y IF,t
LF,t
− (1 + τLER,t)WF,t + Et
[
βt,t+1ρ
FFF,t+1
]
(1.34)
The current firm value depends on the difference between the marginal revenue of the firm
net wage (affected by employer social security contribution), while it is also related to next
period’s firm value, taking into account the dismissal rate of workers.
Worker value of working in the family sector (VF,t) at the end of period t is equal to the
wage received by the worker in period t (affected by employee labor income tax rate) and
the discounted worker value in period t + 1. This latter is a sum of remaining employed in
the family sector with probability ρF , plus the value of being unemployed at the beginning
of period t+ 1 with probability of losing the job:
VF,t = (1− τLEE,t)WF,t + Et
[
βt,t+1
(
ρFVF,t+1 + (1− ρF )UVb,t+1
)]
(1.35)
The value of searching for a job at the begining of period t:
UVb,t = p
F
t VF,t + p
NF
t VNF,t + (1− pFt − pFt )UVe,t (1.36)
With probability pFt the unemployed person finds a job in the family sector, with probability
pNFt he/she finds a job in the non-family sector, while with probability 1 − pFt − pFt at the
end of period t he/she is still unemployed. Those who are unemployed at the end of period
t receive unemployment benefits from the government, and can search again in the next
period:
UVe,t = WU + Et [βt,t+1UVb,t+1] (1.37)
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Workers and intermediate firms bargain over the net surplus in the two sectors separately,
family bargaining means maximizing the following expression with respect to the gross wage:
max (VF,t(WF,t)− UVe,t)λF (FF,t(WF,t))1−λF (1.38)
where λF is the bargaining powers of workers in the family sector. Optimization implies
λF (1− τLEE,t)FF,t = (1− λF )(1 + τLER,t)(VF,t − UVe,t) (1.39)
1.2.3 Final good producing firms
Similarly to Gertler et al. (2008), in each sector there is a continuum of (0, 1) final
goods-producing firms which set final goods prices. I present the family sector only, as the
non-family sector is parallel.
Final firm s in the family sector sells Y FF,t(s) amount of final goods at price PF,t(s). Total
final output is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)) of s ∈ (0, 1) final goods with
family markup equal to F
F−1 :
Y FF,t =
(∫ 1
0
Y FF,t(s)
F−1
F ds
) F
F−1
(1.40)
Then, optimization yields a demand function for each final good s:
Y FF,t(s) =
(
PF,t
PF,t(s)
)F
Y FF,t (1.41)
while the total final good price is a function of s ∈ (0, 1) final good prices:
PF,t =
(∫ 1
0
PF,t(s)
1−F ds
) 1
1−F
(1.42)
As prices are sticky, firms must pay a quadratic cost when changing prices, following
Rotemberg (1982). This cost is zero in the steady state, but around the steady state it
varies depending on the ratio of the current price level to the previous period’s price level of
final firm s. Thus, the profit of final firm s expressed in PF,t price level is
ProfFF,t(s) =
PF,t(s)−MCF,tPt
PF,t
Y FF,t(s)−
φF
2
 PF,t(s)PF,t−1(s)
pi
− 1
2 Y FF,t (1.43)
φF is the price rigidity parameter, and pi is the economy wide steady state quarterly inflation
rate.
Final firms maximize expected discounted lifetime profit with respect to PF,t(s) given the
demand function above:
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E0
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+jProf
F
F,t+j(s) (1.44)
Then, the optimal pricing decision is
φF
(
piFt
pi
− 1
)
piFt
pi
= 1− F + FMCF,tPF,t
Pt
+
+Et
[
βt,t+1φ
F
(
piFt+1
pi
− 1
)
piFt+1
pi
Y FF,t+1
Y FF,t
]
(1.45)
where piFt =
PF,t
PF,t−1
is the sectoral inflation rate.
After loglinearising and rearranging the pricing decisions, the sectoral New-Keynesian
Philips curves are
piFt =
FMCF
φF PF
P
(
ˆMCF,t − ˆPFPt
)
+ Et
[
β ˆpiFt+1
]
(1.46)
ˆpiNNFt =
FMCNF
φNF PNF
P
(
ˆMCNF,t − ˆPNFPt
)
+ Et
[
β ˆpiNFt+1
]
(1.47)
with PFPt =
PF,t
Pt
and PNFPt =
PNF,t
Pt
. These Philips curves are similar to the standard
Philips curve, apart from the fact that they contain relative sectoral prices. Substituting
PF,t = Pt and PNF,t = Pt (ie. ˆPFPt = 0 and ˆPFPt = 0) into the sectoral Philips-curves, one
can immediately see that we get back the standard Philips curve.
1.2.4 Monetary authority
The central bank sets the next period’s interest rate based on the current period inflation,
following a simple Taylor rule:
iˆt = ρpipit + 
i
t (1.48)
where ρpi is the weight on inflation in the Taylor rule and 
i
t is an exogenous monetary policy
shock.
1.2.5 Government
The government collects taxes: labor income taxes (personal labor income tax and social
security contribution of employees, and social security contribution of employers), a value-
added tax and a lump-sum tax. For purposes of simplicity, I assume that interest income of
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bond holdings and income on physical capital renting are not taxed. Taxes finance govern-
ment consumption expenditure Gt and unemployment benefit expenditure. Revenues Revt
and expenditures Expt are
Revt = (τLEE,t + τLER,t) (WF,tLF,t +WNF,tLNF,t) + τC,tCt + Tt (1.49)
Expt = Gt +WU(1− LF,t − LNF,t) (1.50)
Then, government deficit DEFt is defined as the difference between expenditures and
revenues. The government issues bonds (Bt) to finance its deficit, which are bought by the
household.
DEFt = Expt −Revt (1.51)
DEFt = Bt − 1 + it−1
pit
Bt−1 (1.52)
In order to avoid an explosive solution, there is a lump-sum tax rule which depends on
the government debt-output ratio, following Bermperoglou et al. (2013):
Tt = T (Tt−1)ρT
(
Bt−1
Yt
B
Y
)(1−ρT )ξB
exp(T,t) (1.53)
Here, ρT is the autocorrelation parameter, ξB is the debt rule parameter representing the
sensitivity of lump-sum taxes to the government debt-output ratio and T,t is the shock. If
the government debt to output ratio goes up compared to its steady state value, lump-sum
tax increases.
Similarly to aggregate household consumption, aggregate government consumption is also
a composite of goods produced by family and non-family firms:
Gt =
[
γ
1
ηG
η−1
η
F,t + (1− γ)
1
ηG
η−1
η
NF,t
] η
η−1
(1.54)
Demand functions follow
GF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Gt (1.55)
GNF,t = (1− γ)
(
PNF,t
Pt
)−η
Gt (1.56)
For purposes of simplification, the share of family goods and the elasticity of substitution
between family and non-family goods is the same as for household consumption, so the price
levels are the same, too.
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Finally, there is an exogenous shock process for each tax and expenditure item:
ˆτLEE,t = ρτLEE ˆτLEE,t−1 + τLEE,t (1.57)
ˆτLER,t = ρτLER ˆτLER,t−1 + τLER,t (1.58)
ˆτC,t = ρτC ˆτC,t−1 + τC,t (1.59)
Gˆt = ρG ˆGt−1 + G,t (1.60)
with ρτLEE, ρτLER, ρτC , ρG autocorrelation parameters and τLEE,t, τLER,t, τC,t, G,t shock
error terms.
1.2.6 Market clearing
In equilibrium all markets clear. Physical capital markets clear, ie. physical capital sup-
plied by the household is equal to physical capital demanded by intermediate firms. Similarly,
labor markets clear.
Also, goods markets clear. Total final output is equal to total intermediate output:
Y FF,t = Y
I
F,t − IOF,t (1.61)
Y FNF,t = Y
I
NF,t (1.62)
Concerning family goods, family organisational investment must be subtracted from inter-
mediate output, as it is not distributed, but used by the firm itself. This is in line with
Danthine-Jin (2007), who point out that, from an accounting point of view, GDP does not
contain intangible investment due to the fact that it is treated as an expense. (This is true
despite the fact that from an economical point of view it is not an expense.)
Also, output in each sector equals demand in each sector. Final output of family firms
is equal to the sum of household and government consumption demand, and for physical
investment demand for family firm-produced goods, too, there is a deadweight loss related
to vacancy posting and price stickiness (non-family market clearing is similar).
Y FF,t = CF,t +GF,t + IF,t + κFv
F
t +
φF
2
(
piFt
pi
− 1
)2
Y FF,t
Pt
PF,t
(1.63)
Finally, total output (GDP) is defined as:
PtYt = PF,tY
F
F,t + PNF,tY
F
NF,t (1.64)
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1.3 Calibration
For the purpose of illustration, the model is calibrated to match data of European countries
with an above-average share of family firms in employment (Table 1.3).32
First, the long-run unemployment rate is 8.1 percent (Eurostat), and, based on Mandl
(2008) and others, the share of family firms in employment is 56.4 percent. Then, Bassanini
et al. (2011) is the sole paper that estimates sectoral dismissal rates. They find that the
dismissal rate of family firms is 0.16 pp lower than that of the non-family sector. Separation
rates in the literature vary between 1.8 percent of Bermperoglou et al. (2013), which is also
close to the estimated rates of Hobijn-Sahin (2007), and the 10.5 percent of Gertler et al.
(2008), which is similar to the 8-10 percent reported by Hall (1995). Following Staehler-
Thomas (2012), I set the non-family dismissal rate to 6 percent, which is the middle point,
so, taking into account Bassanini et al. (2011), the family rate is 5.84 percent.
Next, Bassanini et al. (2011) also show evidence that the bargaining power of workers, i.e.
the importance of unions, is higher in the non-family sector (0.807), compared to the family
sector (0.495). Hosios (1990) claims that an efficient solution requires that the bargaining
power of workers is equal to the matching elasticity in the matching function; therefore, I
set the sectoral matching elasticities accordingly. The non-family bargaining power is higher
than the usual values of 0.3-0.5 of the literature (Mortensen-Nagypal (2007)), apart from
Gertler et al. (2008) who use a value of slightly more than 0.9. Also, most papers, following
Hosios (1990), set the matching elasticity equal to the bargaining power of workers, except
Gertler et al. (2008) who fix the matching elasticity to 0.5. Moreover, Christoffel et al.
(2009) consider a somewhat higher matching elasticity than bargaining power of workers
(0.6 and 0.5, respectively).
Similarly to dismissal rates, there is a wide range of values found in the literature regarding
the ratio of vacancy costs to wages. Bruckner-Pappa (2012) and Bermperoglou et al. (2013)
use 4.5 percent following Hagedorn-Manovski (2008). But others, such as Christoffel et al.
(2009) and Staehler-Thomas (2012), consider higher values, around 6-7 percents, while the
highest value is used by Gertler et al. (2008) (almost 9 percent). I calibrate these ratios to
7 percent in both sectors, which is in the middle of the range.
As a next step, the share of family firm produced goods in the household and government
consumption basket is 60 percent following Mandl (2008) and others. Also, price elasticity
32In this section we detail parameters related to the labor and goods markets and family capital, also the
great ratios and parameters affecting the public budget, but the table contains all other parameter values as
well.
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of demand between family and non-family goods is assumed to be 1.5 and I check the
robustness of the results with respect to this assumption.33
Again, I am unaware of any information concerning the ratio of sectoral price levels.
Nevertheless, Bassanini et al. (2011) find that wages in the family sector are 5 percent lower
than wages in the non-family sector. Sraer-Thesmar (2007) also find a similar wage penalty
(about 4.5 percent), even though they did not consider non-listed companies as did Bassanini
et al. (2011). Hence, I consider a 5 percent gap between the sectoral price levels.
The effectiveness of family organisational investment is normalized to 1, which, following
McGrattan-Prescott (2010), assumes that the accumulation process of intangible capital is
the same as the usual accumulation process of physical capital.
Dynastic management connotes firm knowledge about customers, but also about suppliers.
It is a latent variable that is difficult to measure, and I am unaware of any empirical estimates.
Gourio-Rudanko (2014) claim that in general about 11 percent of employment is related to
sales. This is the way they calibrate the weight of customer capital, an intangible capital
that represents the relationship between firms and customers. By assumption, I calibrate
the level of organisational to physical capital in the family sector to 11 percent. By doing
so, the relationship between firms and suppliers is not fully captured, and the importance of
family capital might therefore be even higher.
Now, turning to great ratios, the household consumption to GDP ratio is 59.1 percent
(Eurostat).34 As regards the public budget, the steady-state deficit to GDP ratio is 3 percent
pursuant to the Maastrict Treaty. Following the OECD and taking into account the great
ratio of household consumption, the steady-state value of the effective value-added tax rate
is 12.4 percent. Then, the steady state effective labor income tax rate of employees is 28.8
percent (including both personal labor income tax and social security contribution), while
the employer social security contribution rate is 24.2 percent. These tax rates are similar to
those of Staehler-Thomas (2012).35
Then, the gross steady-state replacement rate of unemployment benefit is 28 percent
(OECD). For this parameter, there is a very wide range of values in the literature. The
implied value of Monacelli et al. (2010) is only slightly above 10 percent, but Christoffel et
33This and all other robustness checks are available in the Appendix.
34When calculating this ratio, GDP was modified by net exports and government investment, as the
model is a closed economy and does not contain public investment.
35Other papers usually consider only a lump sum tax, apart from Bermperoglou et al. (2013).
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al. (2009) set this rate to 65 percent, while Esser et al. (2013) suggest 50 percent. The most
common value is around 30-40 percent; usually lower for the US than for the euro area.36
Calibration implies that the job-finding rates are 22.4 and 17.8 percent in the family and
non-family sectors, respectively. This is in line with unemployment duration in the euro area
where between 2000 and 2012 about 22.7 percent of unemployed people found a job within
one to two months, while about 37.5 percent found a job in less than five months (Eurostat).
My values are also similar to those of Christoffel et al. (2009) or Staehler-Thomas (2012).
Nevertheless, for the US Shimer (2005) reports 45 percent and while there is 83 percent in
Bermperoglou et al. (2013) and in Bruckner-Pappa (2012).
As regards the job-filling probabilities, they are lower than those in the literature: 15.4
and 9.9 percent in the family and non-family sectors, respectively. For the US, Bermperoglou
et al. (2013) and Bruckner-Pappa (2012) consider 2
3
, while for the euro area Christoffel et al.
(2009) and Staehler-Thomas (2012) use 0.7. The reason for this is that in this paper, unlike
in others, the job-filling probability is linearly and positively related to the vacancy cost.37
Thus, there is a trade-off in setting both the vacancy cost and the job-filling probability
close to values in the literature. I calibrated the model such that the vacancy-posting cost is
as similar as possible to the literature, at the cost of accepting lower job-filling probability
rates. Too, the implied share of total vacancy costs in GDP is 1.7 percent, while family and
non-family matching efficiencies are 0.19 and 0.16.
Dynamic parameters are based on others studies and summarized in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Dynamic parameters
36It is not straightforward how to compare the replacement rates, as some models only contain a lump-
sum tax. This means that there is no clear distinction between gross and net wages and, thus, between gross
and net unemployment benefit replacement rates.
37See the first-order conditions with respect to the number of posted vacancies in Section 1.2.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Baseline results
The model is loglinearized and stochastic simulations are done by Dynare 4.4.2. Four
fiscal austerity shocks are studied, all of them are 1 percent of GDP size, so they are directly
comparable: i) a decrease in government consumption, ii) an increase in the rate of value-
added tax, iii) an increase in employees’ labor income tax rate (personal labor income tax
and social security contribution) and iv) an increase in employer social security contribution.
Table 1.5 shows the unemployment multipliers: i) at peak and ii) cumulatively. A peak
multiplier is the largest response after the shock, while the cumulative multipliers are the
sum of the multipliers in the first one, two and four years, respectively. This is similar to
Spilimbergo et al. (2009), Uhlig (2010) or Campolmi et al. (2011). All multipliers are
presented in percentage point deviations from the steady state.38
To begin with, all fiscal consolidation policies raise unemployment. At peak, the highest
increase, 0.52 percentage points, is implied by a cut in government consumption. At peak,
all other policies imply a considerably lower unemployment hike.
Nevertheless, the cumulative multipliers show a somewhat different picture. On the whole,
during the four years, cutting government consumption or increasing employees’ labor income
taxes cause the highest, around 0.5 pp increase in the unemployment rate. At the same time,
over a shorter time horizon, the government consumption multiplier still exceeds any other
multiplier. Furthermore, an increase in the employer social security contribution rate is less
harmful for employment than an increase in the employees’ labor income tax. Cumulatively,
also, consolidating the budget by increasing the value added tax revenue is the least costly
in terms of employment.
Table 1.5: Unemployment fiscal multipliers (in percentage points)
Regarding the economic driving forces, a higher consumption tax implies a decline in
consumption, however, investment goes up, so total demand does not significantly change,
38Stochastic impulse response functions are shown in Figures 1.A1-1.A4 of the Appendix.
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similarly to total employment. As for the cut in government consumption, even though
household consumption and investment both increase, total demand considerably declines.
In spite of the lower wages, firms therefore decrease employment owing to a lower demand
for labor. At the same time, concerning the labor income tax shocks, the main driving force
is related to wage bargaining. Increasing employees’ labor income tax results in a decline in
worker values, which means that being employed becomes less favourable than the outside
option (unemployment benefit). The increase in the employer social security contribution
rate has a negative effect on the firm values, however. The fact that increasing the employees’
labor income tax is more harmful for employment than increasing the employer social secu-
rity contribution highlights the relatively more important role of worker values over other
channels of the model. Moreover, the greater the bargaining power of workers, the more
truth there is to this claim.
Thus, the results suggest that, if the aim of the government is to consolidate the budget
at the lowest price in terms of employment, an increase in the value-added tax rate is
preferred. Moreover, a cut in government consumption usually implies a higher increase
in unemployment than do labor income tax hikes, while an increase in employees’ labor
income tax is more harmful for employment than increasing the employers’ social security
contribution rate.
With regard to the existing literature, these results are in line with studies that suggest
that tightening fiscal policy on the expenditure side increases unemployment. As regards
the size of the unemployment multiplier of government consumption, it is close to that of
Monacelli et al. (2010). Further, results are, at peak, consistent with Ball et al. (2013), who
claim that spending-based adjustments have a more pronounced effect on unemployment
than tax-based adjustments. Nonetheless, as they employ a narrative approach, they were
unable to compare different tax policies, thus, another contribution of this paper is the ability
of doing that. In contrary to Staehler-Thomas (2012), though, I find that cumulatively a
labor income tax hike implies a similar rise in unemployment than a government consumption
tax does.
Nevertheless, unemployment is clearly not the sole concern of the government. Regarding
output, all policies, apart from the value-added tax policy, induce a decline in it. The
largest decline occurs after a cut in government consumption; output goes down on impact
by more than 0.4 percent. Also, not only the reaction of GDP, but also that of household
consumption is important. The only policy that raises household consumption is a cut
in government consumption (household consumption goes up by more than 0.9 percent at
peak). At the same time, it goes down considerably when the rate of value-added tax is
increased (at peak by 0.25 percent). Hence, there are trade-offs to consider.
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Combining policies might be a way to manage these trade-offs. Given the debate on shifting
the focus of taxation from labor income toward value-added taxes, two policy packages are
investigated: an increase of 1 percent of GDP in revenue from value-added tax and the
same size of decrease in the employees’ or employers’ labor income tax revenue, keeping the
budget deficit unchanged.39 These policies, at peak, induce a 0.1 and a 0.05 percentage
points decline in unemployment, respectively. At the same time, household consumption
goes down somewhat less than after an increase in value-added tax and output goes up
compared to a decline following the hikes in labor income taxes.
1.4.2 The role of sectoral heterogeneity
Sectoral heterogeneity on the firm side - besides labor force participation and short- and
long-term unemployment suggested by Bermperoglou et al. (2013) - might also explain the
gap between theoretical and empirical multipliers reported but not clarified by Monacelli et
al. (2010). In this section, three alternative scenarios are compared to the baseline scenario:
i) only family firms, ii) only non-family firms, iii) and a two-sectoral framework without
family capital; the model closest to the literature is version ii).
Table 1.6: Unemployment fiscal multipliers and sectoral heterogeneity (in percentage points)
Sectoral heterogeneity seems to play a crucial role (Table 1.6)40; unemployment multipliers
39Impulse responses are presented in Figures 1.A5-1.A6 of the Appendix.
40See also Figure 1.A7 of the Appendix.
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are very different with and without it. When firms are homogeneous, multipliers of labor
income tax policies and government consumption multipliers are usually biased downwards,
while the consumption tax multipliers are often larger than with sectoral heterogeneity. One
can also conclude that about half of the difference is due to the number of sectors, while the
other half is related to the inclusion of intangible capital in the family sector.
1.5 Discussion
The aim of this paper was to calculate unemployment multipliers of expenditure and
revenue-side fiscal austerity policies. This research contributes to the body of knowledge as
there is a debate on both the sign and the size of unemployment multipliers of government
expenditure items. Moreover, the literature is very narrow regarding unemployment multi-
pliers of tax policies. Lastly, to the best of my knowledge, sectoral heterogeneity was not
studied in this context before, although firms are obviously not homogeneous.
The framework was based on a standard DSGE model with sticky prices and search and
matching frictions, and, as a novelty, on the firm side there was a distinction between family
and non-family firms. Family firms employ a notable share of people in Europe, and the
differently managed family and non-family firms behave differently in the labor market.
The model was calibrated to match data of European countries with a large percentage of
family firms in employment, while the characteristics of family firms were based on empirical,
micro-level evidence documented in the corporate finance literature.
The model predicts that all fiscal austerity policies raise unemployment. At peak, the
highest increase in unemployment is implied by a cut in government consumption. Never-
theless, a hike in employees’ labor income tax, cumulatively, implies the same size of increase
in unemployment as does the government consumption cut. A higher employer social se-
curity contribution is always less costly in terms employment than an increase of the same
size in employees’ labor income tax, however. Both at peak and cumulatively, unemploy-
ment reacts least when the budget is consolidated by increasing the rate of value-added tax.
Nonetheless, a policymaker will need to deal with trade-offs, as the increase in value-added
tax results in the highest decline in consumption.
Regarding the existing literature, the results are in line with those who suggest that tight-
ening fiscal policy on the expenditure side increases unemployment. As regards the size of the
unemployment multiplier of government consumption, it is close to that of Monacelli et al.
(2010). Further, results are consistent with Ball et al. (2013), who show that spending-based
adjustments have a more pronounced effect on unemployment than tax-based adjustments
(only at peak, however). Additionally, in contrary to Staehler-Thomas (2012) I do not find
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that four years after the shock the rise in unemployment, if the budget is consolidated by a
cut in government consumption, is lower than after a labor income tax hike.
Sectoral heterogeneity seems to play a crucial role: unemployment fiscal multipliers are
very different with and without it. When homogeneous firms are considered, multipliers
of labor income tax policies and government consumption multipliers are usually lower,
while the consumption tax multipliers are often higher than with sectoral heterogeneity. So
ignoring it might lead to incorrect policy conclusions. Also, sectoral heterogeneity on the firm
side - besides labor force participation and short- and long-term unemployment suggested by
Bermperoglou et al. (2013) - might be another explanation of the gap between theoretical
and empirical multipliers reported but unexplained by Monacelli et al. (2010).
Does this mean that the government should consolidate the budget by increasing the role
of consumption taxation? This depends on the goals of the government; in particular, how
each goal is weighted. Clearly, increasing the rate of value-added tax is least costly in terms
of employment, at any time-horizon considered. However, there are trade-offs. Specifically,
household consumption declines considerably after this policy, and this policy is the most
harmful for household consumption. Should the government care more about the number
of unemployed or about the amount of consumption of the society as a whole? This raises
further questions. Does inequality increase more when more people are unemployed, or does
inequality increase more when household consumption declines more? Inequality is related
to the progressivity of the tax system; while labor income taxation is often progressive,
consumption taxation is always regressive. A drawback of this paper’s model is that - due
to the representative agent assumption - no inequality measure can be defined, leaving me
unable to answer these important questions. Also, do we think that, as time goes by, it is
more difficult to leave unemployment? If so, then the less time that passes since losing a
job, the higher the probability of finding another one. In this case, a decline in consumption
might be less harmful than an increase in unemployment from a longer-term point of view.
As I pointed out earlier, sectoral heterogeneity has not been considered before in the unem-
ployment fiscal multiplier literature. Did we find evidence of its importance in this paper? I
think yes, and we can conclude that sectoral heterogeneity, and a distinction between family
and non-family firms, in particular, has a crucial role. Multipliers are very different with and
without it. Here we are not concerned with determining the “best” fiscal austerity policy for
employment, which, according to my results, is always an increase in consumption tax, but
rather, with regard to the relative employment cost of the “second-best” policies.41 Still,
further research is urged in this field as regards the remaining questions.
41“Best” policy here does not mean an optimal policy, but means the policy that causes the lowest rise
in unemployment.
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Appendix
A Steady-state calculation of the model
In this section I describe the steps of calibrating the model’s steady state. First, based
on data, pi, AF , ANF , LF , LNF , τC , τLEE and τLER are fixed. Then, following the steps
presented below, the steady-state values of all the other variables are calculated given the
parameter values and the values of the already fixed variables. XX, Y Y , ZZ, and AA,
BB, CC, DD, EE, FF , GG, HH, II, JJ are not model variables, but a combination of
variables, only used for the purpose of illustration. Vacancy costs and matching efficiencies
are fixed to their calibrated values when checking the robustness of the model.
i =
pi
β
− 1 (1.65)
PFP =
(
γ + (1− γ)PFPPNFP η−1) 1η−1 (1.66)
PNFP =
(
1− γPFP 1−η
1− γ
) 1
1−η
(1.67)
QF = PFP (1.68)
QNF = PNFP (1.69)
MCF = PFP
F − 1
F
(1.70)
MCNF = PNFP
NF − 1
NF
(1.71)
QOF =
MCF
θ
(1.72)
U = 1− LF − LNF (1.73)
Us = U + (1− ρF )LF + (1− ρNF )LNF (1.74)
RKF = QF
(
1 + i
pi
− 1 + δF
)
(1.75)
RKNF = QNF
(
1 + i
pi
− 1 + δNF
)
(1.76)
XX =
QOF − (1− δOF )βQOF
βMCF
(1.77)
Y Y =
RKF
MCF
(1.78)
ZZ =
XX
Y Y
KOFKF (1.79)
αOF = (1− αF ) ZZ
ZZ + 1
(1.80)
KF =
(
(1− αF − αOF )AFLαFF KOFKFαOF
1
Y Y
) 1
αF
(1.81)
KOF = KOFKF KF (1.82)
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IOF = δOFKOF (1.83)
Y IF = AFL
αF
F K
1−αF−αOF
F K
αOF
OF (1.84)
Y FF = Y
I
F − IOF (1.85)
Y NFIKNF =
RKNF
MCNF (1− αNF ) (1.86)
Y NFILNF = Y NFIKNF
1− 1
αNF A
1
αNF
NF (1.87)
KNF = A
1
αNF
NF LNFY NFIKNF
− 1
αNF (1.88)
Y INF = ANFL
αNF
NF K
1−αNF
NF (1.89)
Y FNF = Y
I
NF (1.90)
IF = δFKF (1.91)
INF = δNFKNF (1.92)
Y = PFP Y FF + PNFP Y
F
NF (1.93)
C = CY Y (1.94)
CF = γC PFP
−η (1.95)
CNF = (1− γ)C PNFP−η (1.96)
mF = LF (1− ρF ) (1.97)
mNF = LNF (1− ρNF ) (1.98)
pF =
mF
Us
(1.99)
pNF =
mNF
Us
(1.100)
AA =
pF 1−τLEE
1−βρF + (1− pF − pNF ) bLFLF+LNF
1− pFβ 1−ρF
1−βρF − pNFβ 1−ρ
NF
1−βρNF − (1− pF − pNF )β
(1.101)
BB =
pNF 1−τLEE
1−βρNF + (1− pF − pNF ) bLNFLF+LNF
1− pFβ 1−ρF
1−βρF − pNFβ 1−ρ
NF
1−βρNF − (1− pF − pNF )β
(1.102)
CC = βAA+
bLF
LF + LNF
(1.103)
DD = βBB +
bLNF
LF + LNF
(1.104)
EE = λF (1− τLEE)MCFαF Y
I
F
LF
(1.105)
FF = (1 + τLER)
(
(1− τLEE) + (1− λF )β(1− ρF )AA
)−
−(1 + τLER)(1− λF )(1− βρF )CC (1.106)
GG = (1 + τLER)
(
(1− λF )β(1− ρF )BB − (1− λF )(1− βρF )DD) (1.107)
HH = λNF (1− τLEE)MCNFαNF Y
I
NF
LNF
(1.108)
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II = (1 + τLER)
(
(1− λNF )β(1− ρNF )AA− (1− λNF )(1− βρNF )CC) (1.109)
JJ = (1 + τLER)
(
(1− τLEE) + (1− λNF )β(1− ρNF )BB
)−
−(1 + τLER)(1− λNF )(1− βρNF )DD (1.110)
WNF =
HH − II EE
FF
JJ − II GG
FF
(1.111)
WF =
EE −GG WNF
FF
(1.112)
WU =
b(LFWF + LNFWNF )
LF + LNF
(1.113)
UVb = AA WF +BB WNF (1.114)
UVe = WU + βUVb (1.115)
FF =
MCFαF
Y IF
LF
− (1 + τLER)WF
1− βρF (1.116)
FNF =
MCNFαNF
Y INF
LNF
− (1 + τLER)WNF
1− βρNF (1.117)
VF =
(1− τLEE)WF + β(1− ρF )UVb
1− βρF (1.118)
VNF =
(1− τLEE)WNF + β(1− ρNF )UVb
1− βρNF (1.119)
κF = cFWF (1.120)
κNF = cNFWNF (1.121)
qF = PFP
κF
FF
(1.122)
qNF = PNFP
κNF
FNF
(1.123)
vF =
mF
qF
(1.124)
vNF =
mNF
qNF
(1.125)
σF,m =
mF
(Us)σF (vF )1−σF
(1.126)
σNF,m =
mNF
(Us)σNF (vNF )1−σNF
(1.127)
G = Y − C − PFP IF − PNFP INF − κFPFPvF − κNFPNFPvNF (1.128)
GF = γG PFP
−η (1.129)
GNF = (1− γ)G PNFP−η (1.130)
DEF = DEFY Y (1.131)
B =
DEF
1− 1+i
pi
(1.132)
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T = G+WUU −DEF − (τLEE + τLER)(WFLF +WNFLNF )− τCC (1.133)
Prof IF = MCFY
I
F − (1 + τLER)WFLF −RKFKF −
−κFPFPvF −MCF IOF (1.134)
Prof INF = MCNFY
I
NF − (1 + τLER)WNFLNF −RKNFKNF −
−κNFPNFPvNF (1.135)
ProfFF = (PFP −MCF )Y FF (1.136)
ProfFNF = (PNFP −MCNF )Y FNF (1.137)
I = PFP IF + PNFP INF (1.138)
Notation:
• ratio of family to non-family prices
PFPPNFP =
PFP
PNFP
(1.139)
• ratio of organisational capital to physical capital in the family sector
KOFKF =
KOF
KF
(1.140)
• non-family output-physical capital ratio
Y NFIKNF =
Y INF
KNF
(1.141)
• non-family output-labor ratio
Y NFILNF =
Y INF
KNF
(1.142)
• great ratios (consumption to GDP and government deficit to GDP)
CY =
C
Y
(1.143)
DEFY =
DEF
Y
(1.144)
• ratios of vacancy costs to wages
cF =
κF
WF
(1.145)
cNF =
κNF
WNF
(1.146)
B Loglinearized model
Now, I summarize the loglinearized equations. Symbolˆmeans a percentage deviation from
the steady state, while any variable without a time index is the steady-state value.
34
Aggregation:
• Household consumption demand for family firm produced goods
CˆF,t = Cˆt − η ˆPFPt (1.147)
• Household consumption demand for non-family firm produced goods
ˆCNF,t = Cˆt − η ˆPNFPt (1.148)
• Government consumption demand for family firm produced goods
GˆF,t = Gˆt − η ˆPFPt (1.149)
• Government consumption demand for non-family firm produced goods
ˆGNF,t = Gˆt − η ˆPNFPt (1.150)
• Price level
0 = γPFPIF ( ˆPFPt + ˆIF,t) + (1− γ)PNFPINF ( ˆPNFPt + ˆINF,t) (1.151)
• Definition of private physical investment
IIˆt = PFPIF ( ˆIFt + ˆPFPt) + PNFPINF ( ˆINFt + ˆPNFPt) (1.152)
Household:
• Euler equation
τC
1 + τC
( ˆτC,t − Et [ ˆτC,t+1]) + σC 1 + h
1− hCˆt −
h
1− h
ˆCt−1 − 1
1− hEt
[
ˆCt+1 + iˆt − ˆpit+1
]
= 0 (1.153)
• Family physical capital accumulation
KF KˆF,t = (1− δF )KF ˆKF,t−1 + IF ˆIF,t (1.154)
• Family physical capital Tobin-Q
QF QˆF,t − φIFQF ( ˆIF,t − ˆIF,t−1) + φIFQFβ( ˆIF,t − ˆIF,t−1) = PFP ˆPFPt (1.155)
• Family physical capital arbitrage condition
1 + i
pi
Et
[
iˆt − ˆpit+1
]
= Et
[
RKF
QF
ˆRKF,t+1 + (1− δF )QF,t+1
]
− RKF + (1− δF )QF
QF
ˆQF,t (1.156)
• Non-family physical capital accumulation
KNF ˆKNF,t = (1− δNF )KNF ˆKNF,t−1 + INF ˆINF,t (1.157)
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• Non-family physical capital Tobin-Q
QNF ˆQNF,t − φINFQNF ( ˆINF,t − ˆINF,t−1) +
+ φINFQNFβ( ˆINF,t − ˆINF,t−1) = PNFP ˆPNFPt (1.158)
• Non-family physical capital arbitrage condition
1 + i
pi
Et
[
iˆt − ˆpit+1
]
= Et
[
RKNF
QNF
ˆRKNF,t+1 + (1− δNF )QNF,t+1
]
−
− RKNF + (1− δNF )QNF
QNF
ˆQNF,t (1.159)
Intermediate firms and wage bargaining:
• Family production function
ˆY IF,t = AˆF,t + αF LˆFt + (1− αF − αOF ) ˆKFt−1 + αOF ˆKOF,t−1 (1.160)
• Non-family production function
ˆY INF,t =
ˆANF,t + αNF ˆLNFt + (1− αNF ) ˆKNFt−1 (1.161)
• Demand for family physical capital
ˆMCF,t +
ˆY IF,t − ˆKF,t−1 = ˆRKF,t (1.162)
• Demand for non-family physical capital
ˆMCNF,t +
ˆY INF,t − ˆKNF,t−1 = ˆRKNF,t (1.163)
• Family organisational capital accumulation
KOF ˆKOF,t = (1− δOF )KOF ˆKOF,t−1 + θIOF ˆIOF,t (1.164)
• Family organisational capital Tobin-Q
MCF ˆMCF,t = θQOF ˆQOF,t − φIOFQOF ( ˆIOF,t − ˆIOF,t−1) + φIOFQOF β(Et
[
ˆIOF,t+1
]
− ˆIOF,t) (1.165)
• Demand for family organisational capital(
MCFαOF
Y IF
KOF
+ (1− δOF )QOF
)
βσC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+
+ βMCFαOF
Y IF
KOF
Et
[
ˆMCF,t+1 +
ˆY IF,t+1 − ˆKOF,t
]
+ (1− δOF )QOFβEt
[
ˆQOF,t+1
]
=
= QOF ˆQOF,t (1.166)
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• Definition of unemployment
(1− LF − LNF )Uˆt + LF ˆLFt−1 + LNF ˆLNFt−1 = 0 (1.167)
• Definition of search pool
UsUˆs,t = UUˆt + (1− ρF )LF ˆLF,t−1 + (1− ρNF )LNF ˆLNF,t−1 (1.168)
• Family matching function
mˆFt = σF Uˆs,t + (1− σF )vˆFt (1.169)
• Non-family matching function
ˆmNFt = σNF Uˆs,t + (1− σNF ) ˆvNFt (1.170)
• Job filling probability in the family sector
qˆFt = mˆ
F
t − vˆFt (1.171)
• Job filling probability in the non-family sector
ˆqNFt =
ˆmNFt − ˆvNFt (1.172)
• Job finding probability in the family sector
pˆFt = mˆ
F
t − Uˆs,t (1.173)
• Job finding probability in the non-family sector
ˆpNFt =
ˆmNFt − Uˆs,t (1.174)
• Labor law of motion in the family sector
ˆLF,t = ρ
F ˆLF,t−1 +mF mˆFt (1.175)
• Labor law of motion in the non-family sector
ˆLNF,t = ρ
NF ˆLNF,t−1 +mNF ˆmNFt (1.176)
• Intermediate family firm profit
Prof IF
ˆProf IF,t = MCFY
I
F ( ˆMCF,t +
ˆY IF,t)− τLERWFLF ˆτLER,t −
−(1 + τLER)WFLF (WˆF,t + ˆLF,t)−RKFKF ( ˆRKF,t + ˆKF,t−1)−
−κFPFPvF ( ˆPFPt + vˆFt )−MCF IOF ( ˆMCF,t + ˆIOF,t) (1.177)
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• Intermediate non-family firm profit
Prof INF
ˆProf INF,t = MCNFY
I
NF (
ˆMCNF,t +
ˆY INF,t)−
−τLERWNFLNF ˆτLER,t − (1 + τLER)WNFLNF ( ˆWNF,t + ˆLNF,t)−
−RKNFKNF ( ˆRKNF,t + ˆKNF,t−1)− κNFPNFPvNF ( ˆPNFPt + ˆvNFt ) (1.178)
• Vacancy decision in the family sector
ˆFF,t = ˆPFPt − qˆFt (1.179)
• Vacancy decision in the non-family sector
ˆFNF,t = ˆPNFPt − ˆqNFt (1.180)
• Firm value in the family sector
FF ˆFF,t = MCFαF
Y IF
LF
(
ˆMCF,t +
ˆY IF,t − ˆLF,t
)
− (1 + τLER)WF WˆF,t +
+βFF ρ
F σC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+ Et [FF,t+1]− τLERWF ˆτLER,t (1.181)
• Firm value in the non-family sector
FNF ˆFNF,t = MCNFαNF
Y INF
LNF
(
ˆMCNF,t +
ˆY INF,t − ˆLNF,t
)
− (1 + τLER)WNF ˆWNF,t +
+βFNF ρ
NF σC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+ Et
[
FNF,t+1
]− τLERWNF ˆτLER,t (1.182)
• Worker value in the family sector
VF ˆVF,t = (1− τLEE)WF WˆF,t − τLEEWF ˆτLEE,t +
+β
(
ρFVF + (1− ρF )UVb
) σC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+
+βρFVFEt
[
ˆVF,t+1
]
+ β(1− ρF )UVbEt
[
ˆUVb,t+1
]
(1.183)
• Worker value in the non-family sector
VNF ˆVNF,t = (1− τLEE)WNF ˆWNF,t − τLEEWNF ˆτLEE,t +
+β
(
ρNFVNF + (1− ρNF )UVb
) σC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+
+βρNFVNFEt
[
ˆVNF,t+1
]
+ β(1− ρNF )UVbEt
[
ˆUVb,t+1
]
(1.184)
• Beginning of period unemployment value
UVb ˆUVb,t = p
FVF (pˆFt + ˆVF,t) + p
NFVNF (
ˆpNFt + ˆVNF,t) +
+(1− pF − pNF )UVe ˆUVe,t − pFUVepˆFt − pNFUVe ˆpNFt (1.185)
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• End of period unemployment value
UVe ˆUVe,t = βUVb(
σC
1− h
(
(1 + h)Cˆt − h ˆCt−1 − Et
[
ˆCt+1
])
+ Et
[
ˆUVb,t+1
]
(1.186)
• Family bargaining condition
− τLEE
1− τLEE ˆτLEE,t +
ˆFF,t =
VF
VF − UVe
ˆVF,t − UVe
VF − UVe
ˆUVe,t +
τLER
1 + τLER
ˆτLER,t (1.187)
• Non-family bargaining condition
− τLEE
1− τLEE ˆτLEE,t +
ˆFNF,t =
VNF
VNF − UVe
ˆVNF,t − UVe
VNF − UVe
ˆUVe,t +
τLER
1 + τLER
ˆτLER,t (1.188)
Final firms:
• Final family firm profit
ProfFF
ˆProfFF,t = PFPY
F
F
ˆPFPt −MCFY FF ˆMCF,t + (PFP −MCF )Y FF ˆY FF,t (1.189)
• Final non-family firm profit
ProfFNF
ˆProfFNF,t = PNFPY
F
NF
ˆPNFPt −MCNFY FNF ˆMCNF,t +
+(PNFP −MCNF )Y FNF ˆY FNF,t (1.190)
• Family pricing decision
F
MCF
PFP
(
ˆMCF,t − ˆPFPt
)
+ βφFEt [ ˆpiF,t+1] = φ
F ˆpiF,t (1.191)
• Non-family pricing decision
NF
MCNF
PNFP
(
ˆMCNF,t − ˆPNFPt
)
+ βφNFEt [ ˆpiNF,t+1] = φ
NF ˆpiNF,t (1.192)
Central bank:
• Taylor rule
Et
[
iˆt
]
= γpipit + ˆi,t (1.193)
Government:
• Budget constraint
GGˆt +WUU ˆUt+1 = DEF ˆDEFt + (τLEE ˆτLEE,t + τLER ˆτLER,t)(WFLF +WNFLNF ) +
+(τLEE + τLER)WFLF (WˆF,t + ˆLF,t) + (τLEE + τLER)WNFLNF ( ˆWNF,t + ˆLNF,t) +
+τCC( ˆτC,t + Cˆt) + T Tˆt (1.194)
• Definition of government debt
DEF ˆDEFt +
1 + i
pi
B
(
ˆit−1 + ˆBt−1 − pit
)
= BBˆt (1.195)
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Market clearing and other equations:
• Family goods’ market clearing
Y FF
ˆY FF,t = CF CˆF,t +GF GˆF,t + IF
ˆIF,t + κ
FvF vˆFt (1.196)
• Non-family goods’ market clearing
Y FNF
ˆY FNF,t = CNF
ˆCNF,t +GNF ˆGNF,t + INF ˆINF,t + κ
NFvNF ˆvNFt (1.197)
• Family final and intermediate output
Y FF
ˆY FF,t = Y
I
F
ˆY IF,t − IOF ˆIOF,t (1.198)
• Non-family final and intermediate output
ˆY FNF,t =
ˆY INF,t (1.199)
• GDP equation
Y Yˆt = PFPY
F
F ( ˆPFPt +
ˆY FF,t) + PNFPY
F
NF ( ˆPNFPt +
ˆY FNF,t) (1.200)
• Definition of family inflation
piFt = ˆPFPt + pit − ˆPFPt−1 (1.201)
• Definition of non-family inflation
ˆpiNFt = ˆPNFPt + pit − ˆPNFPt−1 (1.202)
Shocks:
• Technology shock in the family sector
AˆF,t = ρAF ˆAF,t−1 + AF,t (1.203)
• Technology shock in the non-family sector
ˆANF,t = ρANF ˆANF,t−1 + ANF,t (1.204)
• Value-added tax shock
ˆτC,t = ρτC ˆτC,t−1 + τC,t (1.205)
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• Employees’ labor income tax shock
ˆτLEE,t = ρτLEE ˆτLEE,t−1 + τLEE,t (1.206)
• Employers’ labor income tax shock
ˆτLER,t = ρτLER ˆτLER,t−1 + τLER,t (1.207)
• Government consumption expenditure shock
Gˆt = ρG ˆGt−1 + G,t (1.208)
• Lump-sum tax rule
Tˆt = ρT ˆTt−1 + (1− ρT )ξB( ˆBt−1 − Yˆt) + T,t (1.209)
Notation:
• Relative price of family firm produced goods
PFPt =
PF,t
Pt
(1.210)
• Relative price of non-family firm produced goods
PNFPt =
PNF,t
Pt
(1.211)
C Robustness of multipliers
Tables 1.A1 and 1.A2 show the robustness of unemployment fiscal multipliers with re-
spect to i) the unemployment benefit replacement rate, ii) the bargaining power of workers
in the non-family sector, iii) the dismissal rate of workers in the family sector, iv) the elas-
ticity of substitution between family and non-family goods, v) the effectiveness of family
organisational investment and vi) the level of price rigidity in the family sector.
I can conclude that, in general, the signs of the multipliers are always robust, and the
magnitudes of the multipliers are also highly robust.
Except those of price rigidity, which significantly affects the magnitude of the government
consumption multiplier, and also that of the value-added tax. There is no evidence in the
literature as to whether family or non-family firms set prices more often, so in the baseline
calibration sectoral price rigidities are equal. At the same time, Goldberg-Hellerstein (2011)
show that small firms set prices more often than large firms, so in an alternative scenario a
larger price rigidity is considered in the family sector. When 70 percent of family firms do
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not set prices compared to the baseline 66 percent, the government consumption multiplier,
at peak, goes up to 0.67 pp instead of the baseline 0.52 (other multipliers do not significantly
change). Concerning cumulative multipliers, both the government consumption multiplier
and the consumption tax multiplier considerably increase. Still, the main policy conclusions
remain the same. The importance of the degree of price rigidity for unemployment fiscal
multipliers was also highlighted by Bruckner-Pappa (2012), stressing the role of the demand
effect.42
Sometimes, multipliers are sensitive to the unemployment benefit replacement rate and
the dismissal rate. Regarding the unemployment benefit replacement rate, there is a wide
range of values in the literature (see Section 1.3 of the paper). As already pointed out by
Gertler et al. (2008), this ratio is crucial for the impulse responses of a model with search
and matching frictions. When decreasing it, at peak, unemployment increases less after a
cut in government consumption. This might be because a lower replacement rate means a
lower outside option, so being unemployed becomes relatively less attractive. Cumulatively,
not only the government consumption multiplier, but also the employees’ labor income tax
multipliers are affected, albeit to a lesser extent. Similar findings hold for the dismissal rate.
D Impulse response functions
Figures 1.A1-1.A4 show baseline stochastic impulse response functions of the following
fiscal consolidation policies (all 1 percent of GDP in size): i) increase in value added taxes,
ii) cut in government consumption, iii) increase in the employees’ labor income tax (personal
labor income tax and social security contribution) and iv) increase in the employer social
security contribution rate.
Then, Figures 1.A5-1.A6 present stochastic impulse response functions of tax shifts from
consumption to labor income taxation (1 percent of GDP size), while keeping the government
deficit at its steadystate level.
Lastly, Figure 1.A7 shows the effects of sectoral heterogeneity on stochastic impulse re-
sponse functions. The solid line is the baseline model. The dotted line is a one-sector
model assuming that all firms are family firms, while the line with round markers is another
one-sector model where all firms are non-family firms. The line with squared markers is a
two-sector model without organisational capital in the family sector.43
42Generally, Woodford (2011) points out that sticky prices imply a larger output government expenditure
multiplier.
43Impulse responses of other variables are available upon request.
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Figure 1.A1: An increase in value added tax revenue equal to 1 percent of GDP
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Figure 1.A2: A cut in government consumption equal to 1 percent of GDP
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Figure 1.A3: An increase in employees’ labor income tax (personal labor income tax and
social security contribution) revenue equal to 1 percent of GDP
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Figure 1.A4: An increase in employer social security contribution revenue equal to 1 percent
of GDP
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Figure 1.A5: Tax shift (a 1-1 percent of GDP decrease in employees’ labor income tax
revenue and increase in value added tax revenue)
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Figure 1.A6: Tax shift (a 1-1 percent of GDP decrease in employer social security contribu-
tion revenue and increase in value added tax revenue)
50
Figure 1.A7: First column: a cut in government consumption. Second column: an increase in
value added tax revenue. Third column: an increase in employees’ labor income tax. Fourth
column: an increase in the employer social security contribution. All shocks correspond to
1 percent of GDP.
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Chapter 2
Structural Reforms, Openness and
the Shadow Economy
with Rahul Anand, Purva Khera and Magnus Saxegaard
2.1 Motivation and literature
Since the recent economic crisis, the interest of policymakers has reverted (back) to struc-
tural reforms, tools for enhancing growth and employment. A recent example is Mario
Draghi’s speech delivered in December 20151; the President of the ECB stressed that, along-
side monetary policy,“structural reforms are key” to achieve prosperity. Also, IMF (2015)
points out that reforms related to market deregulation (promotion of competition, hiring
and firing regulations) particularly boost the economy (Table 3 on page 31).
An early example of academic research on structural reforms is Blanchard-Giavazzi (2003),
who were followed by Kugler-Pica (2003), Berger-Danninger (2005), Boken-Hallett (2008),
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014) or Cacciatore-Fiori (2016), among others.2,3 They all
1Monetary policy and structural reforms in the euro area, speech by Mario Draghi in Bologna on 14
December 2015. Link: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp151214.en.html
2Some papers which solely consider product or labor market deregulation are Nicoletti-Scarpetta (2003),
Besley-Burgess (2004), Conwey et al. (2005), Ebell-Haefke (2009) and Gomes et al. (2013). Furthermore,
we mainly investigate impacts on output and unemployment, but other macroeconomic impacts are also
interesting; see e.g. Alesina et al. (2005) or Estevao (2005). Additionally, Gerali et al. (2014) study effects
on productivity, not of mixed deregulation reforms, but of simultaneous implementation of fiscal consolidation
and an increase in competition; the latter constitutes a decrease in mark-up. Furthermore, Cacciatore et al.
(2016) examine optimal monetary policy in a monetary union in the presence of product and labor market
regulation. Finally, Gnocchi et al. (2015) find that labor market flexibility (e.g. wage bargaining reforms),
while controling for openness, matters for business cycle fluctuations.
3In general, shadow economy is not rarely ignored. Recent exceptions are Batini et al. (2011) who
explore optimal monetary policy taking a shadow sector into account and Pappa et al. (2015) who revisit
fiscal multipliers in the presence of tax evasion and corruption.
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developed closed-economy models; however, there are several examples of open-economy
frameworks as well, for instance Lusinyan-Muir (2013), Andres et al. (2014), Vogel (2014),
Eggertson et al. (2014) or Cacciatore et al. (2015). Concerning the importance of openness,
policies of the home country obviously affect the foreign country, and vice versa, as goods
can move across borders; and it is more true as the country becomes more open. Notably,
products can be sold not only in the home country, but also abroad, similarly, an increase
in demand can be fulfilled by imports as well; while exchange rate movements and price
differentials between home and foreign goods also matter.
Additionally, there is a lot of attention on tax evasion. The last “T” in the “three Ts”
that were discussed by the Group of Eight at their summit in 2013 was tax4; in particular,
they emphasized the importance of fighting tax avoidance. Also, G20 leaders in November
2015 endorsed some steps in order to crack down on avoiding taxes.5
Tax evasion is the major part of shadow economy6, in company with avoiding regulations.
Notably, as Schneider (2012) points out, shadow economy is mostly related to avoiding tax-
ation or legal requirements in general.7 Still, we are only aware of one paper on deregulation
policies, Charlot et al. (2011), where a shadow economy is taken into account. And, we are
not aware of any work combining informality with openness.
Multiple points support the conviction that the underground sector and its interactions
with openness must be considered when studying the impacts of structural reforms.
As, by definition, the shadow side of the economy is “in the shadow”, the government can
only affect directly the official side of the economy. For instance, lowering the tax rate cannot
directly influence the informal economy, as taxes are not paid there. Thus, the larger the
unofficial sector, the smaller will be the fraction of the economy impacted by the government.
If there were no interactions between the formal and informal economies (but there are), the
macroeconomic effects of deregulation policies would always increase in magnitude, as the
size of the shadow economy decreased (“composition effect”).
Additionally, the formal and informal markets interact. First, the higher the absolute
level of informality, potentially the more workers and goods can move out of the shadow
(“substitution effect”). Second, working in the shadow has been theorized to function as
4E.g. The Economist published an article on 22 June 2013 with the title of The G8 summit T time.
5See this note on OECD’s contribution for instance: http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/antalya/
g20-leaders-endorse-oecd-measures-to-crackdown-on-tax-evasion-reaffirm-its-role-in-
ensuring-strong-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth.htm
6In our paper the terms shadow, informal, underground and unofficial are interchangeable.
7See the Appendix for precise definitions.
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a kind of “insurance policy”; the “shadow employment is tolerated because its repression
increases unemployment” (Boeri-Garibaldi (2007), page 125). Accounts of any such synergy
fall by the wayside when the underground economy is neglected.
Figure 2.1: The fraction of shadow output in total output around the world. Source is
Schneider et al. (2010) page 458).
How large is the shadow economy? This is a central question. In fact, in most countries
it is rather sizable (Figure 2.1). Even though it is larger in developing countries, there is
a great deal of informality in the developed world as well. Notably, 16.3 percent of OECD
countries’ GDP and 43.2 percent of African countries’ GDP is in the shadow (Schneider
(2005)). Obviously, informality is also present in employment (Schneider (2012)). Thus, the
very size of the shadow economy renders vital the incorporation of it into our framework.
Regarding the relation of openness and the underground sector, legal duties are only met
in the formal sector, enabling access to foreign markets, whereas unofficial firms have no such
access. Consequently, a critical trade-off takes place: functioning in the formal sector creates
new markets abroad, as well as higher costs in the form of legal obligations. Empirically,
based on a simple OLS regression, if the size of the underground sector in GDP increases by
1 pp, openness measured as the sum of nominal exports and imports in nominal GDP, goes
down by 0.8 pp (p-value is 0.01) (Figure 2.2).8
As already mentioned, we are aware of only one study that investigates the macroeconomic
impacts of deregulation policies in the presence of an informal sector. We contend that
8We do not claim at all that this regression is enough to describe the empirical relationship between the
shadow economy and openness, it is only provided with the purpose of illustration.
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Figure 2.2: The relation between the shadow economy and openness. Openness is calculated
by the authors as the ratio of the sum of nominal exports and imports in nominal GDP;
data source is World Bank. Data sources of the size of the shadow economy are Schneider
et al. (2010) and Schneider (2012). Both openness and the size of the shadow economy are
calculated between 1999 and 2007.
Charlot et al. (2011) is incontrovertably an important step in the literature, but we can
also identify some further important steps. First, the model is not dynamic; the authors
study short- and long-run reforms independently of each other, rather than of examining the
short-run transition towards the new long-run equilibrium. As well, reform interactions or
sequencing are not evaluated. Furthermore, the model is a closed-economy, and firms in the
formal and informal sectors mainly differ because there is tax evasion in the latter.
Thus, in our paper we revisit the macroeconomic impacts of structural reforms, i.e. dereg-
ulating the labor and product markets, in an open-economy framework with an underground
sector.9 Alongside the long-run effects, we examine the path to the new long-run equilib-
rium, as short-term costs might emerge even if the long-run implications were positive. Both
single and parallel policies are studied, and the implementation order as well, because it
might prove pivotal in policy blends.
As regards defining deregulation policies more precisely, they are permanent and unex-
pected reductions in the level of regulation in the formal economy. So, another property
that distinguishes this paper from those without a shadow economy is that here reforms are
9We mainly focus on impacts on GDP and unemployment; it is beyond the scope of this paper to study
in detail the reasons behind a shadow economy. Among others, the tax burden and the level of regulation
are important factors, see e.g. Schneider (2005).
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solely implemented in the formal sector. Specifically, we consider a decrease in the cost of
hiring, bargaining power of workers and entry cost of firms. The hiring cost represents both
training and administrative costs, while the bargaining power of workers is mainly related to
the level of unionization. The entry cost consists of cost of registration and the time spent
on bureaucracy when setting up a new business.
South Africa, an example of the emerging countries, is considered when Bayesian estimat-
ing the model.10 Economic growth in emerging economies, in general, was considerable in
the 1990s, and after the recent crisis many of them recovered sooner than the developed
countries did (Dabla-Norris et al. (2013), IMF (2015)). Still, they usually have a larger
shadow economy, hence, we focus on them.
Regarding the mechanisms, we find that the unofficial economy is a major determinant
of the sign, and, particularly, the magnitude of the macroeconomic effects of structural
reforms, in contrary to openness. We show that, in the long run, both labor and product
market reforms considerably increase output in South Africa, although labor market reforms
are somewhat more successful in decreasing unemployment. At the same time, the level
of shadow employment does not decrease in the long run, although it does so relatively.
Nevertheless, there are short-term costs, for example, a decrease in household consumption,
net exports or output, or a decrease in competition. Reform packages often mitigate short-
term costs, though, which accompany all policies we consider. Also, we find that it is usually
better to start with a labor market reform than with a product market reform.
The rest of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the model and its economic channels
in detail. Then, we present the process of calibration and Bayesian estimating the dynamic
parameters. Later, we turn to showing and interpreting our results: long- and short-term
effects of single policies, mixed policies to mitigate short-run costs and reform sequencing.
The Appendix provides more information on the steps of calculating the model’s steady-
state and its robustness, also on the role of shadow economy, Bayesian estimation, reform
packages and policy sequence.
2.2 Model
The model is a small open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices
a la Rotemberg (1982), unemployment due to hiring costs and wage bargaining following
Blanchard-Gali (2010) and endogenous firm entry like Bilbie et al. (2012). Figure 2.3 shows
an overview of its structure.11
10A similar model is used to look at the impacts of deregulation reforms in India in Anand-Khera (2016).
11Notation is as follows: F for formal, I for informal, H for home, f for import/foreign, W for wholesaler
(intermediate) and R for retailer (final).
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Figure 2.3: The structure of the model
The main novelty is the distinction between formal and informal sectors in the labor and
goods markets. The major difference is that taxes are avoided in the underground economy.
Furthermore, in line with (Williamson (1975)), the level of regulation is lower in the informal
sector; hiring and producer entry manifest differently in the shadow and non-shadow sectors.
Also, openness is only a consideration in the formal sector, while the government and capital
producers can only buy formal goods.
At this point, we start to describe the model in detail12; it is called STRESS that stands
for Studying Structural Reforms in a Small Open-Economy Dynamic General Equilibrium
Model with Unemployment, Regulation and a Shadow Sector. It also reflects the need for
(stress of) structural reforms that each country faces today, especially in the presence of a
(large) shadow sector.
2.2.1 Households
There is a representative infinitely living household with perfect foresight that maximizes
expected discounted lifetime utility of consumption Ct:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtζC,tU [Ct] (2.1)
The contemporaneous utility is given by U [Ct] = (1 − hc)ln(Ct − Ct−1), where β is the
discount factor, ζC,t is the preference shock and hc ∈ (0, 1) is the external consumption habit
12Whenever the formal maximization is parallel to the informal one, we only detail the first one.
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parameter. This functional form ensures that habit persistence does not affect the long-run
equilibrium.
The household faces a budget constraint in every period:
Ct +RERtBt +Dt +N
E
F,tentryF,t +N
E
I,tentryI,t + Taxt =
= DEPt
1 + i?t−1
pit
RERt−1Bt−1 +
1 + it−1
pit
Dt−1 +NF,tProfRF,t +NI,tProf
R
I,t +
+ProfWF,t + Prof
W
I,t + (1− τF,t)WFtLF,t +WItLI,t +WUtUt + YHP,t (2.2)
As usual, the household consumes an aggregate consumption bundle Ct and saves. Savings
can be in the form of foreign bonds Bt or in home bonds Dt; all markets are complete. RERt
is the real exchange rate and DEPt is the depreciation rate of the nominal exchange rate.
Nominal interest rate on home bonds it is determined by the central banks’ Taylor rule,
while nominal interest rate on foreign bonds i?t depends on the exogenous foreign interest
rate, on the one hand, and on an interest rate premium related to the relative amount of
foreign debt holdings, on the other hand, following Schmitt-Grohe-Uribe (2003).
The household owns wholesaler and retailer firms, denoted by W and R, respectively, so
the firms’ respective profits return to the household. Because the retailer profit means one
firm’s profit, it is multiplied by the number of retailer firms. At the same time, there is no
endogenous entry at the wholesaler level, or, to put it another way, the number of wholesaler
firms is normalized to one. Endogenous firm entry at the retailer level also explains why the
household finances entry costs (entryF,t and entryI,t) of new firms N
E
F,t and N
E
I,t. Firm exit
is exogenous with sectoral bankruptcy rates δF and δI . Thus, the laws of motion for the
number of retailer firms are:
NF,t = (1− δF,t)(NF,t−1 +NEF,t) (2.3)
NI,t = (1− δI,t)(NI,t−1 +NEI,t) (2.4)
Here, we assume that a firm, which enters in period t, starts to operate in period t.
Besides profit, the household earns labor income from working in the formal sector (LF,t)
or in the informal sector (LI,t), or it receives social benefits WUt, which is an exogenous
shock, if it is unemployed. WFt and WIt are the sectoral real wages; although only the
formal sector’s wage is subject to income τF,t which is an exogenous variable. The household
also pays a lump-sum tax Taxt to close the model. Finally, YHP,t denotes home production.
Given the utility function and the budget constraint, two Euler equations follow, one for
each bond holdings:
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β(Ct − hcCt−1)Et
[
(1 + it)ζC,t+1
Ct+1 − hcCt
]
= Et [pit+1ζC,t] (2.5)
β(Ct − hcCt−1)Et
[
(1 + i?t )ζC,t+1
Ct+1 − hcCt DEPt+1
]
= Et [pit+1ζC,t] (2.6)
In the second Euler equation, which refers to foreign savings, the depreciation rate of the
nominal exchange rate is also taken into account.
The aggregate consumption bundle Ct consists of home-produced goods CH,t and foreign-
produced (imported) goods Cf,t, and is given by:
Ct =
[
α
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1− α)
1
ηC
η−1
η
f,t
] η
η−1
(2.7)
where α ∈ (0, 1) can be interpreted as a measure of home bias, or one could think of 1−α as
the import ratio which captures the degree of openness. η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign produced goods.
Total cost spent on home- and foreign-produced goods is minimised. As a result, the
demand functions and the aggregate price level Pt – a composite of home price PH,t and
foreign (import) price Pf,t – are:
CH,t = αCt
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
(2.8)
Cf,t = (1− α)Ct
(
Pf,t
Pt
)−η
(2.9)
Pt =
[
αP 1−ηH,t + (1− α)P 1−ηf,t
] 1
1−η (2.10)
The relevant inflation rates are defined as follow:
pit =
Pt
Pt−1
(2.11)
piH,t =
PH,t
PH,t−1
(2.12)
pif,t =
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
(2.13)
Similarly to aggregate consumption, home consumption CH,t is also a composite, namely,
it is a composite of goods produced in the formal sector CF,t and goods produced in the
informal sector CI,t:
CH,t =
[
ω
1
µC
µ−1
µ
F,t + (1− ω)
1
µC
µ−1
µ
I,t
] µ
µ−1
(2.14)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) represents the weight of formal sector goods in the basket, and µ > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods.
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Total cost spent on formal and informal goods is minimised, which implies the demand
functions:
CF,t = ωCH,t
(
PF,t
PH,t
)−µ
(2.15)
CI,t = (1− ω)CH,t
(
PI,t
PH,t
)−µ
(2.16)
Also, as a result of optimization, we can specify the price of home goods PH,t as a function
of PF,t formal and PI,t informal price levels:
PH,t =
[
ωP 1−µF,t + (1− ω)P 1−µI,t
] 1
1−µ (2.17)
Relevant inflation rates are:
piF,t =
PF,t
PF,t−1
(2.18)
piI,t =
PI,t
PI,t−1
(2.19)
2.2.2 Capital producer
The capital producer owns physical capital, and, by investing, produces new physical
capital. Investment is subject to a capital adjustment cost. This set-up follows that of
Bernanke et al. (1999).
The capital law of motion is standard, except that the price of investment is not equal to
the general economy-wide price level:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + PINV,t
Pt
It − φINV
2
(
PINV,t
Pt
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 (2.20)
This is because only goods produced in the formal sector can be used for investment, by
assumption. The φINV
2
( PINV,t
Pt
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 capital adjustment cost is zero in the long run,
but varies around the steady state, with φINV being the capital adjustment cost parameter
and δ the depreciation rate of physical capital.
The capital producer invests such that its profit is maximized:
maxQt
PINV,tPt It − φINV2
(
PINV,t
Pt
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 − PINV,t
Pt
It
 (2.21)
where Qt is the price of physical capital.
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As a result, the Tobin-Q equation follows:
Qt
(
1− φINV
(
PINV,t
Pt
It
Kt−1
− δ
))
= 1 (2.22)
Also, because no arbitrage is possible, the following condition holds:
Et
1 + it
pit+1
= Et
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
(2.23)
This condition means that the real return on saving in home bonds must equal the net return
on saving in physical capital, which is the ratio of the sum of the current period’s physical
capital price level and real rental rate of capital RKt and previous period’s physical capital
price level.
Finally, aggregate investment, like aggregate consumption, is a composite good. Notably,
it is a composite of home produced and imported goods:
It =
[
α
1
η I
η−1
η
H,t + (1− α)
1
η I
η−1
η
f,t
] η
η−1
(2.24)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0 represent the same parameters as before. Nevertheless, we would
like to stress that home investment is a function of formal goods only, which explains the
fact that the home demand function depends on the formal goods’ price level and the price
of investment does not depend on the informal goods’ price level either:
IH,t = αIt
(
PF,t
PINV,t
)−η
(2.25)
If,t = (1− α)It
(
Pf,t
PINV,t
)−η
(2.26)
PINV,t =
[
αP 1−ηF,t + (1− α)P 1−ηf,t
] 1
1−η (2.27)
A similar assumption is made regarding government consumption; thus, the price of in-
vestment is equal to the price of government consumption, and home demand for government
consumption depends on the formal goods’ price level only.
2.2.3 Wholesale good producers
A continuum of entrepreneurs of (0, 1)13 in each sector use labor (LF,t and LI,t) and physical
capital (KF,t and KI,t) to produce intermediate goods (YF,t and YI,t), following a constant
13Because in equilibrium all i ∈ (0, 1) intermediate firms follow the same optimization process, for the
sake of simplicity we disregard the symbol i when describing the intermediate firms’ optimization in most of
this section.
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returns to scale technology:
YF,t = θF,t(KF,t−1)ψF (LF,t)1−ψF (2.28)
YI,t = θI,t(KI,t−1)ψI (LI,t)1−ψI (2.29)
θF,t and θI,t are exogenous sectoral productivities, and ψF and ψI are the sectoral capital
income shares.
From now on, we only describe the formal sector, as the informal sector’s optimization is a
mirror image of it. The one-period profit of the formal intermediate firm is equal to revenue
net costs spent on labor and physical capital; the cost of hiring new workers is deducted,
too:
ProfWF,t = MCF,tYF,t −WFtLF,t −RKtKF,t−1 −HCF,tHF,t (2.30)
MCF,t is the real marginal cost of production, which is equal to the price of intermediate
goods as we assume that intermediate firms are price takers. The hiring cost is denoted by
HCF,t, while HF,t is the number of hired people.
The number of employed people follows a law of motion:
LF,t = (1− probfF,t)LF,t−1 +HF,t (2.31)
At the beginning of period t LF,t−1 people are employed. Then, at the beginning of period t
probfF,tLF,t−1 people are fired, where the exogenous firing probability is probfF,t. During pe-
riod t, firms hire new workers. After firing and hiring is over, the end of period t employment
will be LF,t, which is also the level of employment at the beginning of period t+ 1.
Regarding labor market frictions, unemployment is induced by the above-noted hiring
costs. The set-up of these labor market frictions closely follows that of Blanchard-Gali
(2010). The hiring cost and the search and matching frictions differ mainly in that the
hiring itself is costly. Thus, unemployment costs mostly reflect not the search itself or the
possible inefficiency of the match, but rather the cost – above the wage – of hiring a new
worker. This is the training cost: if the educational level or expertise of the worker does
not meet the needs of the firm, it must train the worker. Alternatively, one could think of
this hiring cost as a cost the firm pays to the government or another company (head-hunter,
recruiter), or it can proxy the administration “costs” incurred by the firm when hiring (i.e.
social security paperwork, etc.)
In our model, hiring cost is a function of hiring probability:
HCF,t = βHCF,t (probhF,t)
αHCF (2.32)
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where the hiring probability is:
probhF,t =
HF,t
Ut−1 + probfF,tLF,t−1 + probfI,tLI,t−1
(2.33)
Thus, the probability of hiring depends on the number of hired people HF,t (the higher the
number of hired people, the higher the probability of hiring) and on the number of people
– potentially – available to hire. We assume that not only those who were unemployed at
the beginning of period t can be hired, but also those who have just lost their jobs in any of
the sectors. The exogenous term βHCF,t represents the per capita hiring cost, and this is the
labor market deregulation variable, too. Finally, αHCF is the elasticity of hiring cost with
respect to the hiring probability.14
Formal sector firms maximize the expected present value of future profits:
maxEt
∞∑
j=0
Qt,t+jProf
W
F,t+j (2.34)
subject to the employment law of motion discussed above. The discount rate is consistent
with the Euler equation of the household Qt,t+j = β
Uc,t+j
Uc,t
.
Capital and labor demand functions follow:
MCF,tψF
YF,t
KF,t−1
= RKt (2.35)
MCF,t(1− ψF )YF,t
LF,t
−WFt =
= HCF,t − βCt − hcCt−1
ζC,t
Et
[
ζC,t+1
Ct+1 − hcCt (1− probfF,t+1)HCF,t+1
]
(2.36)
The capital demand function is standard. Nevertheless, the labor demand function be-
comes dynamic due to the presence of labor market frictions, that is, not only the wage is
taken into account, but also the current and next period’s hiring cost.
Wage setting is sectoral and follows a Nash bargaining process between workers and whole-
saler firms, with exogenous sectoral bargaining power of the workers λF,t and λI,t.
In period t a worker is either employed in the formal sector, or she is employed in the
informal sector, or she is unemployed. If a worker is employed in the formal sector, her
current wage is (1 − τF,t)WFt. In the next period, she might keep her job with probability
1 − probfF,t+1, or she might be fired with probability probfF,t+1. If she is fired, she might
find another job either in the formal sector, with probability probfF,t+1probhF,t+1, or in
14Hiring cost today might be interpreted as firing cost tomorrow. The reason is that when hiring today
takes place the probability of firing tomorrow is taken into account.
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the informal sector, with probability probfF,t+1probhI,t+1, or she might stay unemployed,
with probability probfF,t+1(1− probhI,t+1 − probhF,t+1). Hence, the value function of being
employed in the formal sector in period t is:
V Ft = (1− τF,t)WFt + Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
(1− probfF,t+1 + probfF,t+1probhF,t+1)V Ft+1
]}
+
+Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
probfF,t+1probhI,t+1V
I
t+1 + probfF,t+1(1− probhI,t+1 − probhF,t+1)V Ut+1
]}
(2.37)
The value function of being employed in the informal sector is similar, except that the
worker does not pay labor income tax today:
V It = WIt + Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
(1− probfI,t+1 + probfI,t+1probhI,t+1)V It+1
]}
+
+Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
probfI,t+1probhF,t+1V
F
t+1 + probfI,t+1(1− probhI,t+1 − probhF,t+1)V Ut+1
]}
(2.38)
If a worker is currently unemployed, she receives social security benefits today, and in
the next period she might be unemployed still, with probability 1− probhI,t+1 − probhF,t+1,
or she might find a job in any of the two sectors:
V Ut = WUt +
+Et
{
Qt,t+1
[
(1− probhI,t+1 − probhF,t+1)V Ut+1 + probhF,t+1V Ft+1 + probhI,t+1V It+1
]}
(2.39)
Workers’ surplus of being employed in the formal or in the informal sector are V Ft − V Ut
and V It − V Ut , respectively.
Sectoral firm value functions are given by the hiring costs (see Blanchard-Gali (2010) for
more detail):
JFt = HCF,t (2.40)
J It = HCI,t (2.41)
The underlying intuition is that a firm can always replace a worker by paying the hiring
cost, as there is no search time required.
Workers and firms bargain over real wages, given the above value functions:
max
(
V Ft − V Ut
)λF,t (JFt )1−λF,t (2.42)
max
(
V It − V Ut
)λI,t (J It )1−λI,t (2.43)
Two first-order bargaining conditions follow:
λF,t
1− λF,t (1− τF,t)J
F
t = V
F
t − V Ut (2.44)
λI,t
1− λI,tJ
I
t = V
I
t − V Ut (2.45)
Only the formal sector’ bargaining is affected by labor income taxes, as taxes are avoided in
the informal sector.
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2.2.4 Retailers
At the retailer level, there are NF,t monopolistic competitive firms which distribute at no
cost wholesale goods purchased from the intermediate firms. Total demand for formal goods
is denoted by QDF,t. We assume that the total final demand for formal goods is a Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) aggregator of the formal goods distributed by all final firms in the formal
sector, where s denotes one of those firms:
QDF,t =
(∫ NF,t
0
QDF,t(s)
F,t−1
F,t ds
) F,t
F,t−1
(2.46)
Here, the number of formal firms NF,t enters the aggregation because there is endogenous
entry and the number of firms is not normalised to one. F,t is the elasticity of substitution
between goods in the formal sector. As usual, this elasticity is related to the price mark-up,
which is
F,t
F,t−1 . We assume that this mark-up is endogenous and depends on the number of
firms, i.e. F,t = αFNF,t.
As a result of the retailer maximization problem, the aggregate price level is a function of
the firms’ price levels:
PF,t =
(∫ NF,t
0
PF,t(s)
1−F,tds
) 1
1−F,t
(2.47)
and the relevant demand function is:
QDF,t(s) =
(
PF,t(s)
PF,t
)−F,t
QDF,t (2.48)
There is price stickiness at the retailer level; retailer firms set prices a la Rotemberg (1982).
This means that there is a quadratic cost of price adjustment:
R(PF,t(s) =
φF
2
(
PF,t(s)
PF,t−1(s)
1
pi
− 1
)2
QDF,t(s) (2.49)
where the degree of price stickiness is φF , and pi is the steady-state economy-wide inflation
rate. Price adjustment positively depends on final demand as well.
Retailer s maximises its expected discounted stream of future profits:
maxEt
∞∑
k=t
Qt,kProf
R
F,k(s) (2.50)
where Qt,k is the stochastic discount factor as before.
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The one-period profit is given by:
ProfRF,t(s) =
(
PF,t(s)
Pt
−MCF,t(s)
)(
PF,t(s)
PF,t
)−F,t
QDF,t −R(PF,t)(s) (2.51)
Here, MCF,t(s) is the price final firm s pays when purchasing the wholesale goods. This is
not equal to MCF,t, but it is related to it through the number of final firms. Specifically:
MCF,t =
(∫ NF,t
0
MCF,t(s)
1−F,tds
) 1
1−F,t
(2.52)
This is a similar, Dixit-Stiglitz-type, expression that holds for PF,t as well.
As a result, the formal sector’s pricing rule is:
1− F,t
(
PF,t
Pt
−MCF,t
)(
PF,t
Pt
)−1
− φF
(
PF,t(s)
PF,t−1(s)
1
pi
− 1
)
1
pi
Pt
PF,t−1(s)
+
+β
Ct − hcCt−1
ζC,t
Et
[
ζC,t+1
Ct+1 − hcCtφF
(
PF,t+1(s)
PF,t(s)
1
pi
− 1
)
PF,t+1
PF,t
NF,t
NF,t+1
QDF,t+1
QDF,t
]
= 0 (2.53)
Then, product market regulation is modeled at the retailer level, and it follows Bilbie et
al. (2012). A mass of firms potentially and endogenously enter the retailer market in every
period. Entry is subject to an exogenous entry cost entryF,t. This entry cost consists of the
costs to set up a new business, e.g. company registration, but also the administrative burden
a firm assumes when starting a new company. This cost is the reason that the number of
firms is not normalized to one, in contrast to a standard set-up without entry decision. Also,
this is why the number of firms follows a law of motion described in the household sector.
New firms enter the market until the entry cost is equal to the firm value, which is the
expected discounted value of future profits, taking into account the probability of going
bankrupt:
entryF,t = Et
∞∑
k=t
Qt,k(1− δF )k−t+1ProfRF,k(s) =
= (1− δF )ProfRF,t(s) + EtQt,t+1(1− δF )entryF,t+1 (2.54)
Here, 1−δF enters the present value of future profits because the timing of retailers’ decisions
is as follow: first they decide whether to enter or not, then 1− δF share of the new entrants
does not go bankrupt and operates, finally all firms operating in period t decide on prices.
Deregulating the product market means that the fixed formal entry cost is decreased by
the government.
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2.2.5 Rest of the world, government, monetary authority and
market clearing
The home economy is a small open-economy. Consequently, it cannot affect foreign price
level or foreign interest rate, which are exogenously given.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the aggregate export demand is:
QXt =
(
PF,t
etP ?t αX
)−ςX
(2.55)
where ςX > 0 is the price elasticity and αX is a parameter that captures factors other than the
export price, which affect the export demand, e.g. the international economic environment.
Because only formal goods are exported, the price of exports in foreign currency is P ?F,t =
PF,t
et
;
here et is the nominal exchange rate, and we assume that the law of one price holds.
The exogenous foreign inflation is defined as pi?t =
P ?t
P ?t−1
.
Also, we assume that the import price of each company s (by assumption the number of
companies which import is equal to the number of formal goods producers) is related to the
real exchange rate where ςM captures the exchange rate pass-through to import prices:
Pf,t(s)
Pt
Pf (s)
P
=
(
RERt
RER
)ςM
(2.56)
Then, the final import price is a Dixit-Stiglitz-type aggregator of the individual import
prices, namely:
Pf,t =
(∫ NF,t
0
Pf,t(s)
1−F,tds
) 1
1−F,t
(2.57)
Finally, the interest rate on foreign bond holdings i?t depends not only on the exogenous
foreign interest rate ifft, but also on a premium (χ), following Schmitt-Grohe-Uribe (2003),
whereby holders of foreign debt are assumed to face an interest rate that is increasing in the
country’s relative net foreign debt:
ifft = i
?
t − χ
Bt −B
PF
eP ?
QX
(2.58)
The government sector is relatively simple, as the focus is on product and labor market
regulations and not on the public sector. There is an exogenous stream of government
consumption Gt which is purchased both from the home formal sector and abroad:
Gt =
[
α
1
ηG
η−1
η
H,t + (1− α)
1
ηG
η−1
η
f,t
] η
η−1
(2.59)
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Cost spent on government consumption goods is minimized, and this implies the usual
demand functions:
GH,t = αGt
(
PF,t
PINV,t
)−η
(2.60)
Gf,t = (1− α)Gt
(
Pf,t
PINV,t
)−η
(2.61)
The price level of government consumption goods is the same as that of investment goods,
and differs from that of household consumption goods, as the government does not buy
informal goods.
Also, the government is responsible for financing social benefit expenditure to those who
are not employed.
These government expenses are financed by a labor income tax – in the formal sector only
– and a lump-sum tax. For simplicity’s sake, we neglect consumption, capital and bond
taxes. Also, we do not assume that the government has access to domestic or international
bond markets.
So, the period-by-period government budget constraint is:
PF,t
Pt
Gt +WUtUt = Taxt + τF,tWFtLF,t (2.62)
Then, we consider a Taylor-type monetary policy rule following Smets-Wouters (2007):
1 + it
1 + i
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)ρi [(pit
pi
)ρpi (GDPt
GDP
)ρGDP ]1−ρi
ei,t (2.63)
where ρi captures interest rate smoothing, and the central bank responds to current inflation
and GDP. i,t is the monetary policy shock intended to capture unanticipated increases in
the nominal interest rate. ρpi and ρGDP are the weights on inflation and GDP, respectively.
Concerning market clearing, employment in the formal and in the informal sector adds up
to total employment, which is one minus unemployment:
LF,t + LI,t = Lt (2.64)
Ut = 1− Lt (2.65)
Formal and informal capital demand add up to total capital supplied by capital producers.
Then, there is equilibrium in the home bond market.
KF,t +KI,t = Kt (2.66)
Dt = QtKt (2.67)
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The resource constraint for the formal sector is given by:
YF,t = QDF,t +HCF,tHF,t
Pt
PF,t
+NEF,tentryF,t
Pt
PF,t
+
+
φF
2
(
PF,t(s)
PF,t−1(s)
1
pi
− 1
)2
QDF,t(s)NF,t
Pt
PF,t
(2.68)
where QDF,t = CF,t+ IH,t+GH,t+Q
X
t , which means that the total demand for formal goods
is equal to the sum of home demand (demand by consumers, firms and the government) and
export demand. This constraint means that the amount of goods produced in the formal
sector is equal to the amount of formal goods demanded by the home and foreign economy.
There are three deadweight losses, too: first, labor market frictions; second, entry cost; and
third, the Rotemberg price adjustment cost.
A similar constraint holds for the informal sector as well:
YI,t + YHP,t = QDI,t +HCI,tHI,t
Pt
PI,t
+NEI,tentryI,t
Pt
PI,t
+ (2.69)
+
φI
2
(
PI,t(s)
PI,t−1(s)
1
pi
− 1
)2
QDI,t(s)NI,t
Pt
PI,t
(2.70)
where QDI,t = CI,t is the total demand for informal goods.
The main difference between formal and informal constraints is that home production
YHP,t enters the informal resource constraint. This is necessary to close the model, while
the intuitive reason behind it is the fact that people also work at home. Here, we follow
Cacciatore-Fiori (2016). Also, in line with the aforementioned paper, we assume that the
value of home production is equal to a fraction αHP of the product of average wage and the
number of unemployed people in each period:
YHP,t = αHP
WFtLF,t +WItLI,t
Lt
Ut (2.71)
This means that we assume that those who work at home (and for the sake of simplicity we
equalize the number of unemployed to the number of working at home) “earn” the average
economy-wide wage level.
Total import is a sum of imported consumption, investment and government goods:
QMt = Cf,t + If,t +Gf,t (2.72)
Finally, total home output and GDP are given by:
PH,tYt = PF,tYF,t + PI,tYI,t (2.73)
GDPt +
Pf,t
Pt
QMt = Ct +
PINV,t
Pt
(It +Gt) +
PF,t
Pt
QXt (2.74)
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2.2.6 The role of informality and openness
As noted before, there are several differences between the formal and informal sectors
(Table 2.1). First, the level of regulation, i.e. rigidities related to hiring, firing and entry,
are lower in the shadow economy, in line with Williamson (1975). On the one hand, formal
sector firms incur greater hiring costs than do firms in the informal sector. These costs can
be associated with training to make up for educational or experiential deficits on the worker’s
part, but they might reflect as well administrative costs such as the time spent on hiring.
Then too, the bargaining power of workers in wage setting is higher in the formal than in
the informal sector. The strength of unions in the formal sector might be at play here, but
this relative bargaining clout can also be related to the sector’s legal environment, which
provides more rights for workers than firms in setting wages. The strength of unions might
also be reflected in the fact that the probability of firing is relatively higher in the informal
sector. Furthermore, registering a new company is costly, in terms of both money and time.
Hence, formal entry costs are larger than informal ones. Finally, price mark-up is higher and
firm exit rate, similarly to the dismissal rate of workers, is lower in the formal sector than
in the underground economy.
Table 2.1: Differences between the formal and informal sectors
Alongside differences in regulation levels, other features serve to distinguish the two sec-
tors. Notably, only formal sector’s labor income falls under the taxation umbrella. Also, the
government can only purchase formal goods, and, by virtue of administrative regulations,
physical capital investment is made solely on the basis of formal goods. Finally, formal
goods are traded abroad, but informal goods are not. This is likely explained by the fact
that entering the foreign markets requires the meeting of certain legal obligations. The fact
that only formal goods are traded abroad constitutes the main example in our model of
interactions between the shadow economy and openness.
Due to the model’s complexity, we are unable to examine analytically the mechanisms
induced by the presence of informality and openness. Nevertheless, we provide simulation
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results in three parametrized economies: a baseline open-economy model, an alternative
closed-economy model and an another alternative model where the size of the shadow output
is 1/3 of that of the baseline value.15 Table 2.2 shows the long-run (25-year) effects of
structural reforms; deterministic simulations were carried out by Dynare 4.4.3. The following
reforms are studied: a 10 percent permanent and unexpected reduction in the formal i) hiring
cost, ii) bargaining power of workers and iii) entry cost.16
First, in the long-run, macroeconomic impacts in an open-economy and in a closed-
economy model are quite similar. The only exceptions are the labor market reactions of
the bargaining power of workers policy.17
On the other hand, the size of the shadow economy crucially influences the reactions of the
macroeconomy. This is especially true for labor market policies, but also responses of product
market deregulation are affected. Notably, GDP goes up by 1 or 1.8 per cent in the long-run,
if hiring costs or bargaining power of workers in the formal sector are lowered, respectively;
while the same effects are 1.7 and 2.8 per cent if the size of the shadow economy is 1/3 of the
original level. As regards unemployment, the presence of informality is not less important. A
10 per cent reduction in hiring costs implies a 1.7 pp drop in the rate of unemployment with
low informality, while in the baseline scenario unemployment only goes down by 1.2 pp. Also,
a bargaining power policy induces 3.3 and 2.4 pp decreases in unemployment, respectively.
Similarly, formal employment is also essentially affected, for instance a bargaining power
policy induces a 3.2 pp drop in formal employment with low informality, but only a 2 pp
drop with high informality.
The main reason is that the lower the size of the shadow economy, the larger the share of
the economy directly affected by structural reforms; and, this outweighs other channels in
the model. Thus, in a model that does not (or does not fully) incorporate the underground
sector, macroeconomic impacts seem to be larger larger than they really are. Because the
model behaves as if some part of the macroeconomy was formal, even though it is informal.
15Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2 in the Appendix show the steady-state and dynamic parameters of the three
parametrized economies.
16Fiscal consolidation policies are easy to compare in the sense that all of them can be expressed in GDP
size. The size of deregulation policies, however, is less straightforward to compare. A 10 percent decrease
in hiring cost means that the hiring cost is 10 percent lower compared to wages. A 10 percent decrease in
workers’ bargaining power means that workers have 10 percent less power in wage setting. While entry cost
is typically calculated as a share in production. Hence, in terms of GDP, the sizes of these shocks might
differ. The same note holds for Section 2.4.
17The model is a small open-economy model with a simple trade sector that largely depends on exogenous
processes. In other open-economy models openness might be more relevant, but it is beyond the scope of
this paper to further investigate this issue.
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Table 2.2: The role of shadow economy and openness in long-run (25-year) effects of labor
and product market deregulation policies. All deregulation policies are implemented in the
formal sector, and mean a permanent and unexpected 10 percent reform size. Low informality
means that the size of shadow economy in output is 1/3 of the baseline value.
Short-run dynamics are also influenced by the presence of informality; impulse responses
with low informality are about 0.5-1 pp higher (Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2 in the Appendix).
Additionally, labor market reforms do not raise informal employment; while informal wages
go up instead of down if the bargaining power of workers is lowered. Also, inflation goes
up more with low informality. Then, as regards deregulating the product market, in the
baseline scenario GDP increases immediately after the shock, with low informality, however,
during the first couple of quarters it decreases. It means that there is a severe cost during
the transition. It happens because, on the one hand, investment declines, on the other hand,
unemployment drops more than before. So, in the short-run, the size of the shadow economy
also crucially affects the signs of the reactions of the macroeconomy.
On the whole, we can conclude that informality is a crucial determinant of the sign, and,
in particular, the magnitude of macroeconomic responses to structural reforms.
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2.3 Calibration and Bayesian estimation
In this section, we describe the calibration of the steady-state parameters and the Bayesian
estimation of the dynamic parameters. We consider quarterly data on South Africa, which
is a small open-economy and serves as an example of the emerging world where the under-
ground economy plays, in general, a stronger role than it does in developed countries. When
calibrating the steady state, our main goal is to match, as accurately as possible, data on
unemployment, shadow employment, informality in GDP and openness.
First, according to the Labor Force Survey (LFS) data of the South African Reserve Bank,
unemployment is pretty stable; during the last two decades it hovered around 28.7 percent,
with a low dispersion around this mean (Table 2.3).18 As regards formal and informal
employment, the available empirical information is mixed. According to the University of
Stellenbosch, the share of informal employment in the South African labor force is fairly low
(15.8 percent). At the same time, ILO (2002) reports that informality in the labor market
was 34 percent in 2000. Finally, DTI (2008) claims that the fraction of informal employment
was on average 18.3 percent between 1996 and 2007. In terms of GDP, the size of the shadow
economy is close to the value reported by ILO, namely, it is 27.3 percent (Schneider et al.
(2010)).
Table 2.3: Evaluating the steady state of the model
First of all, we aim to match the size of the shadow economy in GDP, and the model
does a very good job at it. Regarding shadow employment, its share in total employment is
closest to that of ILO (2002). At the same time, unemployment is slightly underestimated
and openness is slightly overestimated.19 As a cross-check, we also have a look at investment
to GDP ratio (the only big ratio which is not fixed during calibration); which is slightly
higher in the model than in the data.
18In LFS, by design, those who are unemployed do not work in parallel (not even in the shadow economy).
Hence, there is no significant overlap between the number of unemployed and the number of informally
employed people in the survey.
19The Appendix shows evidence on the robustness of the long-run macroeconomic impacts of structural
reforms with respect to the assumptions we made during calibrating the steady state of the model.
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Now, we turn to describing the process of calibration; Table 2.4 provides an overview of
it.20
First, we estimate sectoral firing probabilities using LFS data on the number of job losers
and the number of new entrants among the unemployed, as well as data on formal and
informal employment published by the Statistics of South Africa (SSA). Based on our own
estimates, the probability of firing is 14.5 percent in the formal sector and 84.8 percent in
the informal sector.
Regrettably, we are not aware of any empirical information on hiring costs. Nevertheless,
the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum provides data on firing
costs; since 2006 redundancy costs were 21.9 weeks of salary on average. This means that the
ratio of hiring costs to quarterly wages was 1.7. Assuming that hiring costs are at a similar
magnitude, we use this ratio to calibrate them compared to wages in the formal sector. In
light of the dearth of data regarding the informal sector, we assume that the fraction of
hiring costs to wages is half as much in the informal as in the formal sector.
Furthermore, information regarding bargaining power of workers in South Africa is also
unknown to us. In the literature, it is usually between 0.3 and 0.5 (Mortensen-Nagypal
(2007)). We assume that workers in the formal sector have more bargaining power in wage
setting than do workers in the informal sector. Thus, we set the formal bargaining power
of workers to 0.6 and the relevant informal value to 0.4 to match the characteristics of the
labor market as accurately as possible.
Regarding sectoral bankruptcy rates, we use data on the number of new and total firms;
datasources are i) the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission’s dataset and ii) SSA
(2006), SSA (2010) and SSA (2014). Based on these datasets, we estimate the bankruptcy
rates to be 10.9 percent in the formal sector and 17.3 percent in the informal sector.
As regards the level of entry costs, we are not aware of data for South Africa, either. How-
ever, Cacciatore-Fiori (2016) claim that, in the euro area, the entry cost of new companies
is equal to about 2.1 months of yearly output. We use this value as a proxy to calibrate the
steady-state level of formal entry costs, while we assume that the entry cost to output ratio
in the informal sector is half of the relevant formal sector’s value.
20In this section we discuss parameters related to regulation, informality and openness, but Table 2.4
shows all parameter values.
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Table 2.4: Calibration of steady-state parameters
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In the absence of data, the formality bias, i.e. the share of formal goods in household and
government consumption, is normalized to 50 percent. Furthermore, we assume that the
elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods is 1.5, which is in the range of
usual values of the literature. We do not set this elasticity to one, because we believe that
when purchasing informal goods personal relations between sellers and buyers also matter
(but we check the robustness of our results with a unit elasticity).
Finally, concerning openness, home bias is 0.8, which means that the share of imported
goods is 20 percent, and the elasticity of substitution between home- and foreign-produced
goods is 0.6. Both values follow Steinbach et al. (2009). Then, export price elasticity is 4.5,
in line with Behar-Edwards (2004), and the exchange rate pass-through to import prices is
slightly above 0.8 according to Karoro et al. (2008).
Now, we turn to presenting the dynamic structural parameters, which are Bayesian esti-
mated using Dynare 4.4.3. Priors and posteriors are shown in Table 2.5.21
Bayesian estimation was done by using the following quarterly time series; the time span
was between 2000Q3 and 2012Q2 (data sources are in parenthesis):
• gross domestic product (International Monetary Fund, IMF)
• household consumption expenditure (South African Reserve Bank, SARB)
• government consumption expenditure (SARB)
• private investment (SARB)
• exports of goods and services (SARB)
• imports of goods and services (SARB)
• real exchange rate (SARB)
• consumer price index (SSA)
• treasury bill rate (IMF)
• compensation of employees in the formal sector (SARB)
• formal and informal employment (SSA and own estimates)
21Also, see Figure 2.A3 in the Appendix. Because we run deterministic simulations, we do not show
priors and posteriors of autocorrelations and standard deviations of shocks here, however, they are available
in Tables 2.A8-2.A9 in Appendix A. The priors of the Rotemberg price adjustment costs are based on the
priors of Calvo price rigidities (equal to 50 percent) and the levels of price mark-ups, following Lombardo-
Vestin (2007).
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Table 2.5: Prior and posterior distributions of structural dynamic parameters. The priors
of consumption habit and interest rate smoothing are maximized to 0.9, while the prior of
interest rate premium is maximized to 0.005.
Three caveats apply. First, all national accounts’ time series are expressed in real terms,
in 2005 prices and in South African RAND. Next, all time series are seasonally adjusted
and divided by the number of population (if necessary). Finally, all time series are official
data, except formal and informal employment, which are estimated by the authors before
2008Q2.22
2.4 Long- and short-run effects of deregulation policies
in South-Africa
Permanent and unexpected reforms are carried out in the labor and product markets; and,
we do not only study their long-run (25-year) impacts, but also the transition (first 5 years)
between the pre-reform and the post-reform equilibria. All shocks are implemented in the
formal sector, while in the papers without informality policies are defined at the aggregate
level. Regarding the size of the reforms, the level of regulation (hiring cost, bargaining power
of workers and entry cost) is reduced by 10 percent.23 First, single policies are studied, then
reform packages are investigated to see to what extent and in which parts of the economy
they can mitigate short-term costs. Finally, we focus on the role of policy sequence, with a
special interest in the speed of adjustment. Deterministic simulations were carried out by
Dynare 4.4.3.
22Quarterly formal and informal employment data published by SSA is available since 2008Q2. First,
based on yearly data, ordinary least-squares regressions of formal and informal employment (data source is
DTI) on GDP, (formal) compensation of employees and inflation are estimated. Then, using these coefficients
and quarterly data on GDP, (formal) compensation of employees and inflation between 2003Q3 and 2012Q2
and on formal and informal employment between 2008Q2 and 2012Q2, we estimate quarterly formal and
informal employment for 2003Q3 and 2008Q1.
23See footnote 16.
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2.4.1 Long-run effects of single reforms
In the long-run, GDP increases in the wake of all deregulation policies (Table 2.6). In
particular, permanently lowering the hiring cost in the formal sector by 10 percent results
in a 2.9 percent increase in GDP 25 years post-policy implementation. A reduction in the
formal bargaining power of workers increases GDP by 3.3 percent, while decreasing the
formal entry cost implies a 1.1 percent rise. Regarding unemployment, lowering the hiring
cost, the bargaining power of workers and the entry cost in the formal sector brings about a
2.8, 4.6 and 0.5 pp decline in the rate of unemployment, respectively. Hence, product market
deregulation seems to be somewhat less efficient at lowering unemployment.
Furthermore, while all policies increase both formal and informal employment, formal
employment increases much more. That is to say, previously unemployed people begin
working in the formal economy. The level of underground employment is largely unaffected,
though. However, as a consequence, its share still considerably drops. Also, formality in the
labor market increases more with a labor market, as compared to a product market, reform.
In terms of wage reactions, not only the magnitude of the responses but also the signs
differ among the policies. Notably, a labor market reform decreases formal wages - wages
decline more if the bargaining power of workers goes down -, while a product market reform
implies the opposite. Informal wages always go up, but they go up less after a product
market reform. Similarly, the level of competition (number of firms) also reacts differently;
it increases in both sectors, but more in the formal sector, especially if the product market
is liberalized.
Regarding the intuition, the starting point is the reaction of wages. A lower formal bar-
gaining power of workers results in a lower formal wage, because firms have more power to
control wages. Similarly, when formal hiring costs go down, firms want to cut down wages,
too; for example because a lower hiring cost means that it is less important to keep the work-
ers today. As regards reforming the product market, formal wages go up; larger demand and
larger production requires to attract new workers. Informal wages always go up; workers
tend to move out of informality – although to a small extent – and firms try to keep them
this way. The employment reaction is, obviously, strongly related to that of wages. Notably,
unemployment decreases more after a labor market reform, consistently with the decline in
formal wages there. Reducing hiring costs in the formal sector not only reduces the relative
cost of labor to capital, but it also encourages workers to move to the more productive formal
sector. The latter is less true when formal entry costs are lowered.
As both reforms are effective in decreasing unemployment, both reforms are suitable to
increase competition. Still, as a labor market reform is more successful in lowering unem-
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Table 2.6: Long-run (25-year) effects of single structural reforms in South Africa. All deregu-
lation policies are implemented in the formal sector, and mean a permanent and unexpected
10 percent reform size.
ployment because it directly affects the labor market (and only indirectly other markets),
a product market reform is more successful in achieving higher competition because it is
carried out in the product market.
Finally, as formal firms can have access to foreign markets, a decrease in the size of the
shadow economy results in a positive response of net exports, too, and it is true for any
policy we consider.
Our conclusions sometimes converge with and sometimes diverge from those found in the
literature.24 First, we find that a product market reform seems to be less successful in
increasing employment. This is consistent with Charlot et al. (2011), but in contrary to
Cacciatore et al. (2015) and Lusinyan-Muir (2013). The reason behind this might be that
the latter do not take informality into account, hence, the fact that after a labor market
reform workers move to the more productive formal sector is not considered; in particular,
Lusinyan-Muir (2013) find a sizeable increase in wages when competition increases, which
we do not find.
Our findings are in line with Charlot et al. (2011) in the sense that they claim that
both deregulations imply a decrease in the size of the informal sector and unemployment.
However, contrary to them we cannot generally conclude that a labor market deregulation
has a negative effect on wages. This is only true for formal wages, while informal wages
24Importantly, comparisons are not always straightforward, because different policies, or the same policies
but with different dimensions, are implemented.
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always go up. At the same time, we find that product market deregulation has a positive
impact on wages in both sectors.
2.4.2 Short-run effects of single reforms
While there are considerable long-term gains of deregulation in the form of an increase in
output or a decrease in unemployment, also, shadow employment becomes less significant,
short-term costs emerge during the transition (Figure 2.4).
First, GDP declines during the first year when the bargaining power of workers is lowered,
while it stagnates with a hiring cost decrease. Nevertheless, thanks to a greater increase in
formal employment, unemployment goes a bit more down if the bargaining power of workers
is decreased. Also, shadow employment goes down after decreasing the bargaining power of
workers, but it goes up if the hiring cost is cut down. Furthermore, net exports go up if the
bargaining power of workers declines, but they go down if the cost of hiring declines. Also,
less inflationary pressure accompanies a hiring cost policy, while formal wages decrease much
more with a decline in workers’ bargaining power. The competition response is also different,
that is, the number of formal firms goes down first if the bargaining power of workers goes
down, but otherwise it stagnates.
The intuition behind the decline and stagnation of output after the shock – in spite of
the inevitable long-run gain – is that formal wages decline more in the short-term than in
the long-run following the bargaining power reform, while both labor market reforms imply
a smaller increase in informal wages right after the shock compared to a later point in the
transition path. Hence, demand starts to increase with a lag, namely, both investment and
consumption decline or increase less at the beginning. Also, it takes some time until new
firms enter the market.
As regards reforming the product market, GDP declines in the first two quarters after the
shock. Unemployment immediately starts to go down, though less than with a labor market
reform. As with the hiring cost policy, not only formal employment, but also unofficial
employment goes up. However, informal workers are less productive, hence, it negatively
affects output. Although net exports increase in the long run, there is a fall in the short run.
Both sectoral wages increase. The number of firms in the informal sector first declines, then
starts to rise, while the number of formal firms rises considerably immediately upon policy
implementation.
Compared to the labor market reforms, the speed of adjustment is larger. In particular,
the level of output is already close to the post-reform level one year after the shock (it takes
about two or four years to achieve the same with a labor market reform). The reason is
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Figure 2.4: Short-run effects of single labor and product market reforms in South Africa.
The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years after the shock) of a permanent and
unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal hiring cost (HCF), formal bargaining power of
workers (BPF) and formal entry cost (ENTRYF).
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that competition in the formal sector increases quite rapidly when the market entry barriers
are reduced. In connection with this, wages also adjust quickly. Still, because entering the
market takes some time, on the whole, there is a small decline in GDP after the shock.
Again, our results do not always coincide with those in the literature. Cacciatore et al.
(2015) claim that short-run costs last longer with a product market reform than with a labor
market reform. We find that GDP declines in the first two quarters after a product market
reform, but if the bargaining power of workers is lowered, GDP decreases in the first four
quarters. Also, there are other costs, such as the decline in household consumption and
investment following a decrease in the bargaining power of workers, or a fall in net exports
when the entry cost or the hiring cost is lowered. Thus, we can conclude that all reforms
entail short-term costs, and that the diffusion (how many agents, sectors, etc. are affected),
the magnitude and the duration of these negative effects are not always greater with one
reform than with another one.
2.4.3 Reform packages
We showed that some reforms have short-run costs, while others do not; also, some workers
or firms gain, while others lose. Thus, combining reforms is a potentially useful tool to
mitigate overall short-term costs, at least in some cases (Table 2.A5 and Figures 2.A4-2.A7
in the Appendix).25 We study the following combinations: i) a decrease in hiring cost and
bargaining power of workers, ii) a decrease in hiring cost and entry cost, iii) a decrease in
bargaining power of workers and entry cost, and iv) a combination of all three single policies.
When combining the hiring cost policy with the bargaining power of workers policy, output
does not decrease during the first year compared to the single bargaining power of workers
policy. This is also true for household consumption and investment. At the same time, net
exports, formal wages and the number of firms in the formal sector still go down.
Then, if not only the formal hiring cost is lowered, but also the formal entry cost, we can
avoid a decrease in GDP in the short-run. Also, if we both decrease the bargaining power
of workers and the formal entry cost, neither household consumption nor net exports fall.
In line with Cacciatore et al. (2015), we can conclude that parallel reforms might mitigate
short-run costs. Still, mixed policies might be costly too, depending on which policies we
combine or which variables we consider.
25Combining reforms can also reinforce the positive impacts of single policies, but here we focus on
mitigating the negative effects.
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2.4.4 Policy sequence
If several policies are parallel-implemented, the importance of policy sequence becomes a
vital question (Figures 2.A8-2.A11 in the Appendix). Does the choice of reform sequence
determine the transition path? In an effort to answer this crucial query, we will discuss now
how policy sequencing affects adjustment, with a special interest in the speed of adjustment.
The first policy package we study is a decrease both in bargaining power of workers and in
hiring cost. If first the hiring cost is decreased and afterward the bargaining power of workers
is decreased, output goes up faster in the first half of the transition, and then it increases
gradually. If the opposite order is chosen, the speed of output convergence is the opposite,
too. However, if first the level of unionization is lowered, formal employment response
results in unemployment falling more quickly and staying at lower levels for a longer time.
Regarding underground employment, if we start with a workers’ bargaining power reform,
informal employment is lower in the first half of the transition and higher later, compared
to starting with the hiring cost policy. Not only the speed of adjustment is affected by the
sequence of policies, but sometimes the signs are as well. Particularly, net exports decrease
after a decrease in hiring cost, but increase after a decrease in bargaining power of workers.
A drawback of the bargaining power policy is, however, that wages in the formal sector
quickly decline and do not recover, while inflation pressure is also higher. Hence, on the
whole, no particular labor market policy seems better than another.
If a decrease in workers’ bargaining power is combined with a decrease in entry cost,
not only for unemployment, but also for output it is better to start with the bargaining
power policy. Under these circumstances, output goes up faster and stays at high levels,
while unemployment goes down faster and stays at low levels; once again, the latter can be
explained mainly by the reaction of formal employment. As in the hiring cost policy, net
exports decrease with a product market reform, while they increase otherwise. However,
to start with a bargaining power policy is quite controversial; formal wages quickly and
permanently decline, while informal wages soar. Regarding product market competition, to
induce a considerable increase in the number of firms, the entry cost must be cut.
Similarly, as regards a combination of lowering hiring and entry costs, it seems to be
more efficient to start with the hiring cost policy, as GDP immediately and permanently
increases, while unemployment decreases accordingly. Now, the latter effect is due not only
to the reaction of formal employment, but is related as well to the response of unofficial
employment. Net exports fall regardless of policy-implementation sequence, although they
decrease less after a product market reform. As regards wages, formal wages increase after
the product market reform, but they go down if the hiring cost is lowered; informal wages
always increase, but more if we reduce the hiring costs first. Again, product market reform
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is much more successful than labor market reform in increasing market competition.
Finally, we can also conclude that it is better to start with a labor market reform, if we
have a look at a mix all three policies. First, output rises faster and remains at higher levels
during most of the transition path. Also, unemployment falls more quickly and steadily.
Regarding net exports, there is always a decrease in net exports, but the recovery is quicker.
A drawback, however, is that formal wages decline; and competition in the formal economy
increases more with a product market reform.
Generally, we do not concur with Blanchard-Giavazzi (2003), who claim that it is better
to start with a product market reform because they find that it increases wages, while a
labor market reform decreases them. On the one hand, if there is informality in the model,
this claim is only true for formal wages, as informal wages always go up after deregulation.
On the other hand, short-run costs do not only emerge in connection with wages. Output,
consumption, net exports are also significantly affected, and we can not conclude that starting
with a product market reform is less painful for the economy in all aspects.
On the contrary, we believe that it is usually better to start with a labor market reform.
This is true for output, unemployment and several other aspects of the macroeconomy, with
the exception of market competition and formal wages. Beginning with a product market
reform typically results in a later starting point in the transition for increase in output and
decrease in unemployment, and they stay at a lower and higher level for a longer time,
respectively.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we took up the topic of structural reforms, and we investigated their macroe-
conomic impacts, in particular on output and employment; the main innovation was the
incorporation of the shadow economy into an open-economy framework. Both the long-run
effects and the transition path towards the new long-run equilibrium were studied. As well,
we examined both single and mixed reforms, and also the sequence of the mixed reforms. Nei-
ther mixed policies, nor the importance of implementation order, has been much addressed
in the literature. We considered South Africa as an example of emerging countries.
We found that the informal economy is a crucial determinant of the sign and, in particular,
the magnitude of macroeconomic effects of deregulation policies. Also, in the long run, we
showed that both labor and product market reforms considerably increase output, although
labor market reforms are more successful in decreasing unemployment. Then, while the level
of underground employment does not decrease in the long run, its share in total employment
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does. Nevertheless, there are short-term costs, for example, decreasing household consump-
tion, investment, net exports or output, or a decrease in competition. Combining structural
reforms often mitigates the short-run costs, though, which accompany all single reforms we
studied. Finally, we found that it is usually better to start with a labor market reform than
with a product market reform.
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Appendix
A Steady state of the model
Driven by the complexity of our model as well as the lack of information regarding the
relative price levels of goods produced in the formal and informal sectors, we calculate the
steady state numerically.
First, we choose initial values for LF , LI , PIPFs, PfPH, NF and NI (see Notations).
Then, we fix F , I , pi, DEP , ΘF , ΘI , λF , λI , probfF and probfI (see Section 2.3 of the
paper). Finally, the steady state is calculated by Matlab, using function fsolve following
the later-listed steps. Six equations’ error terms are minimized: i) formal sector’s first-order
condition of bargaining, ii) informal sector’s first-order condition of bargaining, iii) formal
sector’s demand equation, iv) foreign market clearing equation, v) free-entry condition in
the formal sector and vi) free-entry condition in the informal sector.
After calibrating the steady state, the values of the exogenous variables are fixed to their
calibrated values, and modified during deterministic simulations: ΘF , ΘI , τF , WU , G, ζ,
βHCF , βHCI , probfF , probfI , λF , λI , entryF , entryI , pi
∗, ı∗ and i. Also, some calibrated
structural parameter values (αF , αI and αX) are also fixed during simulations.
At the end, we provide some evidence on the model’s robustness. First, we study the long-
run impacts of structural reforms if the steady-state informal bargaining power of workers
is reduced to 0.3 or increased to 0.5 from the original 0.4. Then, the baseline steady-state
ratio of informal hiring costs and entry costs to the relevant formal value is 50 per cent;
first, we increase it to 2/3, then we lower it to 40 per cent. Finally, the original elasticity of
substitution between formal and informal goods is 1.5, we show the long-run effects with 1
and 2 as well.
We can conclude that the macroeconomic impacts of reforming the product market are
highly robust with respect to any changes. Nevertheless, the reactions of the labor market
reforms are, for some variables, affected by the level of bargaining power of workers. To a
less extent, the same is true for hiring costs. Lastly, variables in the informal sector are a
bit influenced by the elasticity of substitution, but on the whole the results are robust.
Steps of calculating the model’s steady state:
L = LF + LI (2.75)
U = 1− L (2.76)
NEF =
δF
1− δF NF (2.77)
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NEI =
δI
1− δINI (2.78)
piH = pi (2.79)
pif = pi (2.80)
pi∗ =
pi
DEP
(2.81)
i∗ =
pi∗
β
− 1 (2.82)
piX = pi
∗ (2.83)
piF = piH (2.84)
piI = piH (2.85)
iff = i∗ (2.86)
PHP =
1
(α + (1− α)PfPH1−η) 11−η
(2.87)
PfPP =
1
(αPfPHη−1 + (1− α)) 11−η
(2.88)
PfP =
PfPP
N
1
1−F
F
(2.89)
RER = PfP
1
ςM (2.90)
Q = 1 (2.91)
i =
pi
β
(2.92)
RK = δ +
1 + i
pi
− 1 (2.93)
DEP =
pi
pi∗
(2.94)
PFP =
1(
ω
(
N
1
1−F
F
)1−µ
+ (1− ω)
(
PIPFs N
1
1−I
I
)1−µ) 11−µ (2.95)
PIP = PIPFs PFP (2.96)
PFPP = PFP N
1
1−F
F (2.97)
PIPP = PIP N
1
1−I
I (2.98)
MCF = PFPP PHP
F − 1
F
(2.99)
MCI = PIPP PHP
I − 1
I
(2.100)
MCF (s) =
MCF
N
1
1−F
F
(2.101)
MCI(s) =
MCI
N
1
1−I
I
(2.102)
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KILI =
ψIMCIΘI
RK
(2.103)
YI = ΘIKILI
ψI
1−ψI LI (2.104)
KI = KILI
YI
ΘI
(2.105)
KFLF =
ψFMCFΘF
RK
(2.106)
YF = ΘFKFLF
ψF
1−ψF LF (2.107)
KF = KFLF
YF
ΘF
(2.108)
K = KF +KI (2.109)
ζ = 1 (2.110)
PX∗ = PHP
PFPP
RER
(2.111)
PHPPI =
1(
α + (1− α) (PfPH
PFPP
)1−η) 11−η (2.112)
I =
δK
PFPP PHP
PHPPI (2.113)
IH = αPHPP
−η
I I (2.114)
If = (1− α)PHPP−ηI I (2.115)
D = QK (2.116)
HI = LI − (1− probfI)LI (2.117)
probhI =
HI
U + probfILI + probfFLF
(2.118)
WI =
MCI(1− ψI) YILI
1 +HCIWI − β(1− probfI)HCIWI (2.119)
HCI = HCIWIWI (2.120)
HF = LF − (1− probfF )LF (2.121)
probhF =
HF
U + probfILI + probfFLF
(2.122)
WF =
MCF (1− ψF ) YFLF
1 +HCFWF − β(1− probfF )HCFWF (2.123)
HCF = HCFWFWF (2.124)
βHCF =
HCF
probhαHCFF
(2.125)
βHCI =
HCI
probhαHCII
(2.126)
ProfWF = MCFYF −WF LF −RK KF −HCFHF (2.127)
ProfWI = MCIYI −WI LI −RK KI −HCIHI (2.128)
entryF = entryFY PFPP PHPYF (2.129)
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entryI = entryIY PIPP PHPYI (2.130)
YHP = αHP
WF LF +WI LI
LF + LI
U (2.131)
CI = YI + YHP − HCIHI +N
E
I entryI
PIPP PHP
(2.132)
QDI = CI (2.133)
QDI(s) =
QDI
N
I
I−1
I
(2.134)
CH =
CI
(1− ω)PIPP−µ (2.135)
CF = ωCHPFPP
−µ (2.136)
C =
CH
αPHP−η
(2.137)
Cf = (1− α)C PfPP−η (2.138)
GDP =
C
CY
(2.139)
WU = WUY
GDP
U
(2.140)
QX = QXY
GDP
PFPP PHP
(2.141)
G = GY
GDP
PFPP PHP
PHPPI
(2.142)
GH = αPHPP
−η
I G (2.143)
Gf = (1− α)PHPP−ηI G (2.144)
QM =
C + PFPP PHP
PHPPI
(I +G) + PFPP PHP QX −GDP
PfPP
(2.145)
V RF = entryF (2.146)
V RI = entryI (2.147)
QDF = YF − HCFHF +N
E
F entryF
PFPP PHP
(2.148)
QDF (s) =
QDF
N
F
F−1
F
(2.149)
ProfRF = (PFP PHP −MCF (s)) QDF (s) (2.150)
ProfRI = (PIP PHP −MCI(s)) QDI(s) (2.151)
Y = PFPP YF + PIPP YI (2.152)
τF = taxY
GDP
WFLF
(2.153)
Tax = PFPP
PHP
PHPPI
G+WU U − τFWF LF (2.154)
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B =
Tax+ C +D +NEF entryF +N
E
I entryI −NFProfRF − ProfWF −NIProfRI
RER 1+iff
pi∗−1
+
+
−ProfWI − (1− τF )WF LF −WI LI − YHP −WU U − 1+ipi D
RER 1+iff
pi∗−1
(2.155)
αF =
F
NF
(2.156)
αI =
I
NI
(2.157)
αX = exp
(
log
(
QX
)
ςX
+ log (PXPstar)
)
(2.158)
Notations:
• ratio of home-produced goods’ price level to economy-wide price level
PHP =
PH
P
(2.159)
• ratio of foreign-produced goods’ price level to economy-wide price level
PfPP =
Pf
P
(2.160)
• ratio of formal sector’s price level to home-produced goods’ price level
PFPP =
PF
PH
(2.161)
• ratio of informal sector’s price level to home-produced goods’ price level
PIPP =
PI
PH
(2.162)
• ratio of one foreign firm’s-produced goods’ price level to economy-wide price level
PfP =
Pf (s)
P
(2.163)
• ratio of one firm’s price level in the formal sector to home-produced goods’ price level
PFP =
PF (s)
PH
(2.164)
• ratio of one firm’s price level in the informal sector to home-produced goods’ price level
PIP =
PI(s)
PH
(2.165)
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• ratio of foreign-produced goods’ price level to home-produced goods’ price level
PfPH =
Pf
PH
(2.166)
• ratio of one firm’s price level in the informal sector to one firm’s price level in the
formal sector
PIPFs =
PI(s)
PF (s)
(2.167)
• price of exports in foreign currency
PX =
PF
e
(2.168)
• ratio of price of exports in foreign currency to foreign economy-wide price level
PX∗ =
PX
P ∗
(2.169)
• ratio of formal sector’s price level to price level of investment goods
PHPPI =
PF
PINV
(2.170)
• ratio of foreign-produced goods’ price level to price level of investment goods
PHPPI =
Pf
PINV
(2.171)
• physical capital-labor ratio in the formal sector
KFLF =
KF
LF
(2.172)
• physical capital-labor ratio in the informal sector
KILI =
KI
LI
(2.173)
• ratio of hiring cost to wages in the formal sector
HCFWF =
HCF
WF
(2.174)
• ratio of hiring cost to wages in the informal sector
HCIWI =
HCI
WI
(2.175)
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• formal entry cost as a share of formal production
entryFY =
entryF
PFPP PHP YF
(2.176)
• informal entry cost as a share of informal production
entryIY =
entryI
PIPP PHP YI
(2.177)
• share of home production
αHP =
YHP
WF LF+WI LI
LF+LI
U
(2.178)
• household consumption to GDP ratio
CY =
C
GDP
(2.179)
• share of public social protection expenditure in GDP
WUY =
WU U
GDP
(2.180)
• exports to GDP ratio
QXY =
PFPP PHP QX
GDP
(2.181)
• government consumption expenditure to GDP ratio
GY =
PFPP PHP
PHPPI
G
GDP
(2.182)
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Table 2.A1: The robustness of long-run (25-year) impacts of structural reforms with lower
and higher informal bargaining power of workers
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Table 2.A2: The robustness of long-run (25-year) impacts of structural reforms with lower
and higher informal hiring cost
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Table 2.A3: The robustness of long-run (25-year) impacts of structural reforms with lower
and higher informal entry cost
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Table 2.A4: The robustness of long-run (25-year) impacts of structural reforms with lower
and higher elasticity of substitution between formal and informal goods
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B The role of shadow economy
Because shadow output and employment are, by definition, in the shadow, it is not straight-
forward how to define or measure them.
Concerning output, the broad definitions usually incorporate all monetary and non-monetary
transactions and all legal and illegal activities (Table 2.A5). Hence, not only tax evasion
or tax avoidance, but also, for example, drugs and prostitution are included. In a narrow
approach, however, informality is mostly related to avoiding taxation or legal requirements.
As Schneider (2012) (page 6) claims: “The shadow economy includes all market-based legal
production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for
the following reasons: 1. to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 2. to avoid
payment of social security contributions, 3. to avoid having to meet certain legal labor mar-
ket standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and
4. to avoid complying with certain administrative obligations, such as completing statistical
questionnaires or other administrative forms.” Regarding employment, the “shadow labor
market includes all cases, where the employees or the employers, or both, occupy a shadow
economy position” (Schneider (2012), page 28).
Table 2.A5: A taxonomy of underground economic activities (broad concept). Source: Mirus-
Smith (1977) (page 5).
As regards estimation methodologies, Schneider-Enste (2000) point out that the most
common ones are the currency demand method (the size of the shadow economy is equal to
the unexplained increase in the currency demand) and the MIMIC method (a factor model).
Nevertheless, they also provide a detailed description about other approaches.
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Figure 2.A1: The role of shadow economy in short-run effects of a decrease in formal hiring
cost and barganing power of workers. The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years
after the shock) of a permanent and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal hiring cost
and bargaining power of workers. Low informality (red lines) means that the size of the
shadow economy in output is 1/3 of the original value.
107
Figure 2.A2: The role of shadow economy in short-run effects of a decrease in formal entry
cost. The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years after the shock) of a permanent
and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal entry cost. Low informality (red line) means
that the size of the shadow economy in output is 1/3 of the original value.
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Table 2.A6: Steady state parameters of the three parametrized economies
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Table 2.A7: Dynamic parameters of the three parametrized economies
C Bayesian estimation
Figure 2.A3: Prior and posterior distributions of structural parameters based on Bayesian
estimation using South African data. The parameters are (in order): interest rate smoothing,
inflation weight and output weight in Taylor rule, formal and informal Rotemberg price
rigidity costs, interest rate premium, investment adjustment cost and consumption habit.
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Table 2.A8: Prior and posterior distributions of autocorrelations of shocks based on Bayesian
estimation using South African data. All priors are maximized to 0.9.
Table 2.A9: Prior and posterior distributions of standard deviations of shocks based on
Bayesian estimation using South African data
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D Reform packages
Table 2.A10: Long-run effects of structural reform packages in South Africa. The table
shows the long-run (25 years) effects of permanent and unexpected policies of size 10 percent
implemented in the formal sector.
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Figure 2.A4: Short-run effects of a combined decrease in formal hiring cost and bargaining
power of workers in South Africa. The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years after
the shock) of a permanent and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal hiring cost (line
with marker), formal bargaining power of workers (dotted black line) and their combination
(red line).
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Figure 2.A5: Short-run effects of a combined decrease in formal hiring cost and entry cost
in South Africa.The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years after the shock) of a
permanent and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal hiring cost (line with marker),
formal entry cost (dotted black line) and their combination (red line).
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Figure 2.A6: Short-run effects of a combined decrease in formal bargaining power of workers
and entry cost in South Africa. The chart shows the short-run effects (first 5 years after the
shock) of a permanent and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal bargaining power of
workers (line with marker), formal entry cost (dotted black line) and their combination (red
line).
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Figure 2.A7: Short-run effects of a combined decrease in formal hiring cost and bargaining
power of workers and entry cost in South Africa. The chart shows the short-run effects (first
5 years after the shock) of a permanent and unexpected 10 percent decrease in formal hiring
cost and bargaining power of workers (line with marker), formal entry cost (dotted black
line) and their combination (red line).
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E Policy sequence
Figure 2.A8: Sequencing of a permanent decrease in formal hiring cost and bargaining
power of workers in South Africa. The lines show the long-run (25 years + 25 years) effects
of permanent and unexpected policies of size 10 percent. Line with squared marker: first a
decrease in formal hiring cost, then a decrease in formal bargaining power of workers. Line
with round marker: the opposite. Red line: both policies are implemented during the second
25 years.
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Figure 2.A9: Sequencing of a permanent decrease in formal hiring cost and entry cost in
South Africa. The lines show the long-run (25 years + 25 years) effects of permanent and
unexpected policies of size 10 percent. Line with squared marker: first a decrease in formal
hiring cost, then a decrease in formal entry cost. Line with round marker: the opposite. Red
line: both policies are implemented during the second 25 years.
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Figure 2.A10: Sequencing of a permanent decrease in formal bargaining power of workers
and entry cost in South Africa. The lines show the long-run (25 years + 25 years) effects
of permanent and unexpected policies of size 10 percent. Line with squared marker: first a
decrease in formal bargaining power of workers, then a decrease in formal entry cost. Line
with round marker: the opposite. Red line: both policies are implemented during the second
25 years.
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Figure 2.A11: Sequencing of a decrease in formal hiring cost and bargaining power of workers
and entry cost in South Africa. The lines show the long-run (25 years + 25 years) effects
of permanent and unexpected policies of size 10 percent. Line with squared marker: first a
decrease in formal hiring cost and bargaining power of workers, then a decrease in formal
entry cost. Line with round marker: the opposite. Red line: both policies are implemented
during the second 25 years.
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Chapter 3
Aging, Pension Reforms and the
Shadow Economy
with Daniel Baksa
3.1 Motivation and literature
Today, several countries suffer from a high level of public debt (Figure 3.1). Indeed, by
now, government debt reached more than 60 per cent of GDP in about half of the European
countries. Moreover, in some countries, e.g. in southern Europe, it reached more than 100 per
cent. Old-age pensions play a pivotal part in this story (Figure 3.2).1 Pension expenditure
accounts for about 5-10, but often even more, per cent of GDP, hence, it exceeds spending
on defence, economic affairs, environmental protection, health or education (1.5, 4.5, 0.8, 7
and 5.1 per cent, respectively).2
Looking ahead, the share of old people is projected to increase significantly in the next
decades (Figure 3.3). Southern Europe will be especially strongly affected. By 2065, the
proportion of people above age 65 is predicted to rise to 34.7, 29.9 and 28.4 per cent from the
current 19.8, 21.3 and 18.2 per cent in Portugal, Italy and Spain, respectively. Portugal will
have the second-highest ratio among the European economies. Thus, the burden on working-
age people will increase, specifically, the old-age dependency ratio will more or less double
(Figure 3.4). As such, each working person will be supporting 0.6 old people. An expected
longevity boom is the driving factor (Figure 3.5); in five decades, sixty-five year-olds will live
about 5 years longer than they do today.3 Meanwhile, the fertility rate in southern Europe
will slightly increase during the period (OECD (2011)).
1Data on Figure 3.2 shows the sum of public and private old-age pension spending.
2According to Eurostat data.
3Textboxes on chart show the exact change in additional life expectancy at age 65.
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Figure 3.1: Public debt today (Eurostat)
Figure 3.2: Old-age pension spending today (Eurostat)
As Gora (2014) signals, originally, the public old-age pension system was introduced to
reduce old-age poverty. Technical constraints made it impossible to implement individual-
ized participation; hence, taxation was used to finance pensions. As such, most southern
European countries have a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system4, although some elements
of the Portuguese and the Spanish regimes could be considered as fully funded (FF). Political
convenience also played a role at the time of the introduction, as tax rates were relatively
4There are two types of PAYG systems (World Bank (1994)). A ’defined benefit scheme’ fixes pensions
and allocates taxes accordingly, while a ’defined contribution scheme’ fixes taxes that are then redistributed.
Our model is closer to the first one, in practice, most systems are a combination of these two.
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Figure 3.3: Share of elderly people today and 50 years ahead (Eurostat)
Figure 3.4: Old-age dependency ratio today and 50 years ahead (Eurostat)
low. Moreover, because life expectancy was lower than it is today, most workers died before
retiring. Thanks to an increase in longevity, however, pension spending is increasing now.
With relatively high debt levels, handling the fiscal consequences of aging is becoming more
urgent every day. Because Portugal, Italy and Spain are among those with the highest public
debt level and are projected to experience the most severe aging in the next decades, we focus
on them. By doing so, we aim to contribute to the literature on macroeconomic impacts of
public old-age pension reforms5 and other public policies when population is aging.
5Hence, we focus on the first pillar and disregard the second (contributory forced savings) and the third
(contributory voluntary savings) pillars; the terminologies follow World Bank (1994). Also, we do not study
the impacts of strengthening tax collection, we leave it for further research.
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Figure 3.5: Additional life expectancy at age 65 today and 50 years ahead (OECD)
Nevertheless, other streams of the literature are not less important. Some investigate the
political feasibility of such reforms, which is beyond the scope of our paper. So are optimal
pension plan or optimal retirement age studies. Some examples are, without providing a
detailed review, Galasso (2008), Heijdra-Romp (2009) or Beetsma et al. (2013). Also, for
example, Conesa-Krueger (1999) study the political implications of moving from an unfunded
to an FF system. Then, regarding the impacts of a retirement-age increase on inequality,
one example is Baker-Rosnick (2012). Additionally, our model is a closed economy, while
several studies focus on international spillovers, for instance Borsch-Supan et al. (2006),
Razin-Sadka (1999), Storesletten (2000) or Adema et al. (2009).
By macroeconomic impacts we mainly mean output and unemployment reactions; the
latter are frequently neglected in this context. Some studies without unemployment are
Borsch-Supan et al. (2006), Kilponen et al. (2006), Nickel et al. (2008), Karam et al. (2010),
Braz et al. (2013) or McGrattan-Prescott (2015). Furthermore, Corneo-Marquardt (1999)
conclude that unemployment is independent of social security systems. In our view, however,
it is somewhat misleading to assume full employment, or, to consider unemployment to be
independent of pension systems. The obvious rigidities in the labor market (job hunting
requires money and time on both the employer and the employee side) imply that not
everyone seeking employment can find a job (at least not immediately). It is especially true
for the short-run, for pension and in general for fiscal policies. Brauninger (2005), Ono
(2007), Ono (2010), Marchiori et al. (2011) and de la Croix et al. (2013) claim, however,
that there is a relation between unemployment and social security. Also, Pierrard-Snessens
(2009), Marchiori-Pierrard (2012) and Marchiori-Pierrard (2015) include unemployment into
their framework. And so do we; that is, we incorporate unemployment into a New Keynesian
model with overlapping generations (OLG) and demography, and, we study the importance
of this channel in our model. According to our knowledge, OGRE is the first Blanchard-
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Yaari-type model with unemployment. Regarding the data, unemployment is already at
high levels in southern Europe, first of all in Spain where it is around 16 per cent, but also
in Portugal and Italy (9.2 and 9.4 percent, respectively).6
The main novelty is extending the model with a shadow7 economy, meaning tax evasion
and a lower level of regulation in the underground sector.8 To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to present an OLG and demography model with informality. Also,
we are not aware of any (quantitative) papers that investigate the macroeconomic effects
of public old-age pension reforms in the presence of informality, nor one that examines the
impacts of such reforms on the underground sector.9 There are not too many papers on/with
informality in related literatures, either. We believe that, with informality, Charlot et al.
(2011) is the only quantitative model to study the macroeconomic impacts of deregulation
policies, while Ihrig-Moe (2004) and Pappa et al. (2015) are the only papers as regards the
impacts of fiscal consolidation. As such, our work fills a major lacuna in the literature.
We contend that neglecting the shadow economy leaves a framework markedly incomplete
because of several reasons. First, as the shadow economy is by definition in the shadow,
public policies can only affect directly the non-shadow side of the economy. Consequently,
the larger the underground economy, the smaller will be the fraction of the economy directly
influenced by the government. The reason is that only formal-sector firms and workers pay
taxes which can be modified by the government, or, only they are affected by the level of
regulation (unionization e.g.) which, again, can be influenced by the public sector. Similarly,
only formal sector workers and firms contribute to social security.
Second, the official and unofficial sectors interact. For instance, workers move between
them. And, the higher the size of informality, potentially the more workers can move out of
the shadow. The same is also true for goods. Furthermore, some studies claim that working
in the shadow has been theorized to function as a kind of “insurance policy”; the “shadow
employment is tolerated because its repression increases unemployment” (Boeri-Garibaldi
(2007), page 125). Neglecting these interactions might bias the macroeconomic impacts of
6See Table 3.3.
7We use the terms ’shadow’, ’informal’, ’underground’ and ’unofficial’ interchangeably.
8As Schneider (2012) page 6) claims: “The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production
of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: 1. to
avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 2. to avoid payment of social security contributions, 3.
to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working
hours, safety standards, etc., and 4. to avoid complying with certain administrative obligations, such as
completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.”
9Regarding the latter, two empirical papers (Kumler et al. (2013), Mao et al. (2013)) are closest to ours.
Also, we do not aim to study the macroeconomic and pension effects of reducing the share of the informal
economy; that is an interesting question, but it is beyond the scope of our paper.
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pension reforms or generally those of fiscal policy.
Third, working in the shadow is relevant not only because it affects public revenues in
general, but also because it has an effect on social security, in particular. In a PAYG regime,
revenues collected today are used to finance public old-age pension spending today, while
in a fully funded system the current social security contributions deducted from firms and
workers finance future public old-age pension spending. And, those who work informally
do not contribute to social security. People work in the shadow which, in a pay-as-you-go
system, reduces pension benefits or increases public debt, while in a fully funded regime it
results in no pension savings for the period spent in the shadow. Hence, even though in
the short-run underground employment might function as an “insurance”, in the long-run it
might be costly for both the people and the state.
Lastly, in most countries the shadow economy is rather sizable (Figure 3.6). This is true
for many developed economies as well as emerging countries. Specifically, 23, 27 and 22.5
per cent of output is in the shadow in Portugal, Italy and Spain, respectively (Schneider et
al. (2010), Table 2 on page 454).10
Figure 3.6: The size of shadow output (Schneider et al. (2010), page 458)
Additionally, according to our knowledge, with the exception of Fehr (2000), Kilponen et
al. (2006), Diaz-Gimenez-Diaz-Saavedra (2009) and Goraus et al. (2014)11, the macroeco-
nomic impacts of a retirement age increase are not studied, the focus is usually on social
security contribution rates and pension-wage replacement rates. It is rather surprising, given
10Informality can also be measured in terms of employment, and the share of informal employment might
differ from the share of informal output (Schneider (2012)).
11Only impacts on output are investigated, but not those on unemployment in ? and ?.
132
the fact that according to OECD (2012) 28 out of 34 OECD countries planned or already
started to raise the level of retirement age. Nevertheless, all the papers that investigate the
impacts of pension reforms, do not compare them with those of other fiscal policies. How-
ever, we do study a retirement age policy as well and we compare the impacts of pension
reforms with those of other public policies, which is a further contribution of us towards the
literature.
Finally, regarding the types of pension plans, the majority of research has been done either
on reforming the PAYG plan (e.g. Nickel et al. (2008) and Karam et al. (2010), also the
AINO, PESSOA and LOLA models12, or, on a switch from the PAYG towards an FF system
(e.g. Borsch-Supan et al. (2006) and McGrattan-Prescott (2015)). We, like Marchiori et al.
(2011) or de la Croix et al. (2013), examine both, and, we also study reform policies in a fully
funded regime like Borsch-Supan-Ludwig (2011). We study regime switches, even though
they are rare (examples are Columbia, Poland and Hungary; although in the latter two
instances implementation was not finalized), because the incentives of workers only change if
we move towards an FF plan, reforming the current PAYG system only might not be enough
to handle the challenges of aging. Also, it is crucial to compare the impacts of the same
policies in the two regimes in order to see not only the consequences of introducing a fully
funded regime but also those of fiscal policies in the fully funded regime.
One of our main findings is that with aging population a retirement age increase causes
the smallest decline in long-run GDP in all three countries we study. In general, following
any policy, the majority of the GDP loss happens over the medium-term. The opposite is
true for unemployment; the long-run cost is usually low (except labor income tax policies),
but the short-run cost is more severe. Also, informality somewhat increases, especially after
tax hikes.
Regarding the differences in the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies between the two
pension regimes, we can conclude that they are sizeable. It is especially true for the personal
income tax and social security contributions revenue13 and for the long-run outcomes, but,
following other policies and in the short-run, too, there are distinctions.
Furthermore, as concerns the pension regime switch, in the long-term, informality declines,
both in terms of output and employment. At the same time, there is a crucial cost over the
12AINO: Kilponen et al. (2006), PESSOA: Braz et al. (2013) and Almeida et al. (2013), LOLA: Pierrard-
Snessens (2009), Marchiori-Pierrard (2012) and Marchiori-Pierrard (2015), which are summarized in Dieppe
et al. (2015)
13In the paper we often refer to this as personal income tax revenue only, because the two imply the same
effects.
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transition, namely, a temporary but sharp drop in the implied pension-wage replacement
rate.
Unemployment and the underground sector prove to be vital. In particular, we are not
only able to investigate the impacts of pension and fiscal policies on them, also, their presence
modifies the reactions of the macroeconomy in general. Impulse response functions of labor
income tax hikes highly depend on their presence; reactions to other policies and the pension
regime switch are also affected, but to a less extent.
Finally, we can identify some policy-related concerns. To neutralize the negative fiscal
impacts of the projected aging in Portugal (i.e. 34 pp increase in the old-age dependency
ratio according to Eurostat data by 2065), the retirement age should be raised by 2 years.
The effective retirement age is already quite high compared to other countries (66.6 years),
thus, the fiscal space is quite narrow. Still, it is feasible given the Portugal life expectancy.
However, it might not be feasible from a political point of view. There is a loose connection
between statutory and effective retirement ages which might be explained by the incentives
of employees. Additionally, there is a large cost in the form of a lower replacement rate while
introducing a fully funded regime.
In the next section we describe the modeling framework. Then, we present the process of
calibration, and, evalute the performance of the model’s steady state in matching the data.
After that, we provide the results: i) long- and short-run impacts in a PAYG regime, ii) long-
and short-run impacts with PAYG and FF plans, iii) pension regime switch and iv) the role
of informality and unemployment. Finally, we close our paper with some policy discussion.
3.2 Model
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with overlapping generations
(OLG) and demography by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), unemployment following
Blanchard-Gali (2010), price stickiness a` la Rotemberg (1982) and a shadow economy.
The model is called OGRE which stands for Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with
Overlapping Generations, Demography, Unemployment and a Shadow Economy to Study
Retirement (Public Old-Age Pension) and other Fiscal Policies. The main novelty is the
distinction between formal and informal labor and goods markets in an OLG setup.
Considering in detail the OLG setup, we can distinguish two cohorts. The young (the
workers) either work and pay labor income taxes, or are unemployed and receive unemploy-
ment benefits from the government. The old (the retired) do not work, but receive a public
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old-age pension from the government.14 Concerning the demographic environment, popula-
tion is not constant over time, as young people are born and old people pass away with some
probability. Also, young people retire with a given probability, and the pension of the new
retired people is based on their past average wage, which is then indexed by inflation.
With regard to informality, taxes are avoided in the informal labor and goods markets.
Specifically, i) labor income is only taxed in the formal sector (both on the employer and the
employee side) and ii) value-added taxes are only paid after goods purchased from formal
sector-producers. Another major difference between the formal and informal sectors is that
the formal sector is more regulated than the informal one, meaning that labor and product
market rigidities are higher in the formal sector (Williamson (1975)). Finally, the government
can only buy formal goods, and the same is true for private investment.
3.2.1 Demography
The total number of population is Nt which is the sum of young/worker (N
Y
t ) and
old/retired (NOt ) people. Young people retire with a probability of ω
Y
t−1, while old peo-
ple die with a probability of ωOt−1. Furthermore, nt is the fertility rate which shows the birth
rate of new young (worker) people. This is a net rate, we do not model those who do not
work due to their age (students), neither the mortality of the young, nor migration. So, the
relevant demographic equations are:
Nt = N
Y
t +N
O
t (3.1)
NYt = (1− ωYt−1)NYt−1 + ntNYt−1 (3.2)
NOt = (1− ωOt−1)NOt−1 + ωYt−1NYt−1 (3.3)
3.2.2 Overlapping Generations
The setup, which is also called the Blanchard-Yaari framework, follows Blanchard (1985)
and Yaari (1965). There are two overlapping generations: the young (worker) and the old
(retired). First, we describe the latter cohort.
The retired cohort
’Retired’ agent i of retired cohort a is one individual who retired a years ago. She max-
imises the following Bellman equation:
V O(BOa−1,t−1(i)) =
= max
{
(1 + Ct )
[
1
1− γ
{
CO,Fa,t (i)
}1−γ
+
χ
1− γ
{
CO,Ia,t (i)
}1−γ]
+
+ βEt(1− ωOt )V O(BOa,t(i))
}
(3.4)
14We use the terms ’young’ and ’worker’ interchangably in our paper, as we do the terms ’old’ and ’retired’.
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subject to this budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )C
O,F
a,t (i) + p
I
tC
O,I
a,t (i) + (1− ωOt )BOa,t(i) =
= (1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) + TR
PG,Y O
a,t (i) + TR
FF,Y O
a,t (i) + Profit
O
a,t(i)− TOa,t(i) (3.5)
The retired agent does not work, but receives public pension benefits: TRPG,Y Oa,t (i) in a PAYG
regime and TRFF,Y Oa,t (i) in a fully funded regime (where Y O denotes pension benefits of those
who just retired (were young one period before)). Pension benefits of the newly retired are
determined in the period when they get retired and are indexed by inflation.15 Also, some
share of profits minus lump-sum taxes are received by the retired. The agent consumes
formal and informal goods. Specifically, its utility depends on consuming goods produced
by formal firms (CO,Fa,t (i)) and consuming goods produced by informal firms (C
O,I
a,t (i)). χ
parameter shows that formal and informal goods are differently valued. Namely, formal and
informal goods are not perfect substitutes, because there is no warranty for informal goods.
So, one unit of an informal good implies a lower utility than one unit of a formal good.
The agent pays value-added taxes (VAT) after purchasing formal goods; VAT is denoted
by τCt . Because informal goods are hidden, no VAT is paid upon their purchase. p
I
t is the
relative price of informal goods (expressed in formal goods’ price level), Ct is the preference
(demand) shock and γ is the relative risk aversion parameter. Finally, besides consuming,
the agent saves in BOa,t(i) risk-free bonds and receives rt−1 real interest rate (nominal interest
rate is denoted by it−1) on the previous period’s bond holdings. The retired agent optimizes
with respect to CO,Fa,t (i), C
O,I
a,t (i) and B
O
a,t(i), and, when optimizing, he or she also takes into
account that with probability ωOt by the beginning of the next period he or she will pass
away.
As a result, the Euler-equation for formal goods is:
EtC
O,F
a+1,t+1(i) = EtC
O,F
a,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1 (3.6)
where
EtΛt+1 = Et
{
β
1 + Ct+1
1 + Ct
1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
} 1
γ
(3.7)
The Euler-equation shows the usual intertemporal substitution between periods t and t+ 1;
it is also affected by value-added tax rates.
Then, optimization also implies that informal consumption can be expressed in terms of
formal consumption as follows:
CO,Ia,t (i) = ΥtC
O,F
a,t (i) (3.8)
15More detail is available in Section 3.2.5.
136
where
Υt =
{
χ
1 + τCt
pIt
} 1
γ
(3.9)
The higher the parameter χ and the level of VAT, the larger the relative value of informal
consumption to formal consumption. The opposite is true regarding the relative price of
informal goods.
As noted above, the retired agent knows that he or she will die with a probability ωOt by
the beginning of the next period. As a consequence, the agent changes his or her behavior
because his or her optimization horizon becomes finite. In contrast to a representative
household framework, where, in the long run, the stochastic discount factor is equal to the
inverse of one plus the real interest rate, in an overlapping generation setup this is not the
case. Rather, the stochastic discount factor is a weighted sum of adjacent periods’ real
interest rates, where the weights are related to the demographic environment, namely, to the
probabilities of death (and the retirement probability for the young).
For instance, in period t the probability of death today is ωOt ; thus, the survival probability
is 1−ωOt . Then, the same agent’s t+1-period survival rate today is (1−ωOt )(1−ωOt+1). As a
consequence, the future stream of income must be discounted with the survival probabilities,
and not only with the usual real interest rates, because the agent might die in any period.
The same is true for retirement. Both death and retirement change the current state of the
agent, and so they must be taken into account during the optimization process. As such,
discount rates are affected. Because discount rates are affected, so is aggregation. In a repre-
sentative agent framework there is only and always one state, thus making discounting, and
so aggregation, simple. Nevertheless, in an overlapping generations setup, both discounting
and aggregation are affected by demography.
We can show that the current-period individual formal consumption level of retired agent
(i) can be expressed as follows:
HOt CO,Fa,t (i) = (TRPG,Y Oa,t (i) + TRFF,Y Oa,t (i))ΩOt + IOa,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.10)
where
IOa,t(i) = ProfitOa,t(i)− TOa,t(i) + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
IOa+1,t+1(i) (3.11)
HOt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1− ωOt )(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1Λt+1HOt+1 (3.12)
ΩOt = 1 + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
ΩOt+1 (3.13)
and Υt and Λt+1 are the same as before.
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Then, after aggegation, the retired generation consumes:16
HOt CO,Ft = (TRPGt + TRFFt )ΩOt + IOt + (1 + rt−1)(ωYt−1BYt−1 +BOt−1) (3.14)
CO,It = ΥtC
O,F
t (3.15)
where
IOt = ProfitOt − TOt + Et
1− ωOt
(1 + rt)(1 + g
N,O
t+1 )
IOt+1 (3.16)
ProfitOt − TOt = (1− ξ)(Profitt − Tt) (3.17)
and ξ is the fraction of profits and lump-sum taxes that goes to the young.
Hence, the current level of formal consumption of the old equals the sum of the discounted
stream of current and future pension benefits and other income, and the current level of
savings. Discounting not only depends on the usual real interest rates, though, but also on
mortality rates and the number of people in the retired cohort. A final crucial caveat is that
ωYt−1B
Y
t−1 is included in the consumption function because ω
Y
t−1 share of the young retired in
the previous period. Also, gNOt+1 shows the growth rate of the number of old people.
The young cohort
’Young’ agent i of young cohort b is one individual of its cohort who started to work (was
born) b years ago. The Bellman-equation of a young individual is:
V Yt (B
Y
b−1,t−1(i)) =
= max
{
(1 + Ct )
[
1
1− γ
{
CY,Fb,t (i)
}1−γ
+
χ
1− γ
{
CY,Ib,t (i)
}1−γ]
+
+ βEt
(
(1− ωYt )V Yt+1(BYb,t(i)) + ωYt V Ot+1(BY Ob,t (i))
)}
(3.18)
while the budget constraint is:
(1 + τCt )C
Y,F
b,t (i) + p
I
tC
Y,I
b,t (i) + (1− ωYt )BYb,t(i) + ωYt BY Ob,t (i) =
= (1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) + (1− τLWt )wFt LFb,t(i) + wItLIb,t(i) +
+wUt Ub,t(i) + Profit
Y
b,t(i)− T Yb,t(i) (3.19)
By definiton, a young person does not collect old-age pension benefits. Rather, he or she
either works and receives labor income, or is unemployed (Ub,t(i) denotes unemployment)
and receives wUt unemployment benefits. The agent can either work in the formal sector or
in the informal sector; LFb,t(i) and L
I
b,t(i) denote formal and informal employment, and w
F
t
16The aggregate informal consumption of the retired can be calculated by the informal-formal substitution
equation.
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and wIt are formal and informal wages. A crucial difference between the formal and informal
sectors is that only income earned in the formal sector is subject to taxation; those who
work in the formal sector pay a sum of personal income tax and employees’ social security
contributions of τLWt . Also, a given share of Profit
Y
b,t(i) profits minus T
Y
b,t(i) lump-sum taxes
are earned by the young, where the share is equal to the fraction of young people in the whole
population. The probability of retiring by the next period is ωYt . A young agent saves for
two possible future states: first, for staying young (BYb,t(i)), second, for retiring (B
Y O
b,t (i)).
17
The young optimize with respect to both savings, i.e. BYb,t(i) and B
Y O
b,t (i), and, as usual,
CY,Fb,t (i) and C
Y,I
b,t (i).
As a result, the Euler-equations are:
EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1(i) = EtC
Y,F
b,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1 (3.20)
EtC
O,F
0,t+1(i) = EtC
Y,F
b,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1 (3.21)
where Λt+1 is the same as before. The young agent saves for two potential future states;
hence, there are two Euler-equations. These show the intertemporal substitution, as usual.
However, one of them relates current-period young consumption to next-period young con-
sumption, if the agent is still young in the next period, while the other one does the same
but in relation to future old consumption.
Also, the relation between informal and formal consumptions is:
CY,Ib,t (i) = ΥtC
Y,F
b,t (i) (3.22)
where Υt is the same as before. As with regard to the old, informal consumption is positively
affected by the weight on informal consumption in the utility function and the rate of value-
added tax, but it is negatively affected by the relative price of informal to formal goods.
Then, individual formal consumption of the young are:
HYt CY,Fb,t (i) = IYb,t(i) +
IY Ob,t (i)
1 + rt
+ (1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) (3.23)
where
IYb,t(i) = Incb,t(i) + Et
1− ωYt
1 + rt
IYb,t+1(i) (3.24)
Incb,t(i) = (1− τLWt )wFt LFb,t(i) + wItLIb,t(i) + wUt Ub,t(i) + ProfitYb,t(i)− T Yb,t(i) (3.25)
IY Ob,t (i) = EtωYt
(
(TRPG,Y O0,t+1 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ω
O
t+1 + IO0,t+1(i)
)
+
+Et
1− ωYt
1 + rt+1
IY Ob,t+1(i) (3.26)
HYt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1
Λt+1
(
(1− ωYt )HYt+1 + ωYt HOt+1
)
(3.27)
and Υt and Λt+1 are the same as before.
17This is just a technical distinction; at the end of the day, all young persons’ savings are denoted by BYb .
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Aggregate consumption is as follows:
HYt CY,Ft = IYt +
IY Ot
1 + rt
+ (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BYt−1 (3.28)
CY,It = ΥtC
Y,F
t (3.29)
where
IYt = Inct + Et
1− ωYt
(1 + rt)
(
1 + gN,Yt+1
)IYt+1 (3.30)
Inct = (1− τLWt )wFt LFt + wItLIt + wUt Ut + ProfitYt − T Yt (3.31)
ProfitYt − T Yt = ξ(Profitt − Tt) (3.32)
IY Ot = Et
(TRPG,Y Ot+1 + TRFF,Y Ot+1 )ΩOt+1 + ωYt(
1 + gN,Yt+1
)
st+1
IOt+1
+
+Et
1− ωYt
(1 + rt+1)
(
1 + gN,Yt+1
)IY Ot+1 (3.33)
and Υt, Λt+1 and ξ are the same as before.
Similarly to retired consumption, the current level of young formal consumption is equal
to the sum of the discounted stream of current and future income, and current savings.
Nevertheless, there are two future incomes, one for being young in the future and one for
being old in the future. Moreover, income denotes labor income and other income (but not
pensions). Finally, discounting takes into account not only mortality rates and the number
of retired people, but also the probability of retirement and the number of young people.
Finally, the aggeragate young budget constraint is:
(1 + τCt )C
Y,F
t + p
I
tC
Y,I
t +B
Y
t = Inct + (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BYt−1 (3.34)
3.2.3 Firms
There are two types of firms: physical-capital producing firms and goods-producing firms;
both types are owned by the household sector, and, among both types there are formal and
informal firms. Informal firms avoid paying taxes and the level of regulation is lower in the
shadow sector (Williamson (1975)).
Physical-capital producing firms use beginning-of-period physical capital and invest to
produce end-of-period physical capital. Investment is subject to an investment-adjustment
cost following Christiano et al. (2005).
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Goods-producing firms rent physical capital from capital producers and hire labor from
young households. They produce a good which is either consumed by the households or
purchased by the government (only formal sector goods), or one that is used for capital pro-
duction (only formal sector goods). Also, only formal firms pay social security contributions.
All goods-producing firms pay an extra cost of hiring following Blanchard-Gali (2010); this
hiring cost depends on the number of newly hired people. The hiring cost is higher in the for-
mal sector, reflecting both administration and advertising costs. While hiring is endogenous,
firing is exogenous. Furthermore, goods producers are monopolistically competitive and set
the price level taking into account a price adjustment cost a` la Rotemberg (1982). Finally,
goods-producing firms bargain with workers over wages, similarly to Blanchard-Gali (2010).
Formal workers have a stronger bargaining power over wages than do informal workers, and,
thanks to unions, the firing probability is lower in the formal sector.
Physical capital producers
The Bellman equation of the formal physical capital producer is:18
V (InvFt−1;K
F
t−1) = max
{
rK,Ft K
F
t−1 − InvFt + Et
1
1 + rt
V (InvFt ;K
F
t )
}
(3.35)
while it also takes into account the physical capital accumulation equation:
InvFt = K
F
t − (1− δ)KFt−1 − InvFt S
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)
(3.36)
Here, rK,Ft denotes the real rental rate of capital (R
K,F
t is the nominal rental rate of capital
and rK,Ft =
RK,Ft
PFt
), KFt−1 is the physical capital stock, Inv
F
t denotes investment, Q
F
t is the
shadow price of capital and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Also, gt is the sum of
technology and population growth.
Function S is the investment adjustment cost function, following Christiano et al. (2005),
it looks like:
S
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)
=
φFInv
2
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)2
(3.37)
where φFInv is the investment adjustment cost parameter.
As a result, optimization can be summarized by two equations:
Et
(
rK,Ft+1 +Q
F
t+1(1− δ)
)
= QFt (1 + rt) (3.38)
18The optimization problem of the informal physical capital producer is parallel, so we only describe the
formal one.
141
1 = Et
1
1 + rt
[
QFt+1S
′
(
InvFt+1
InvFt (1 + gt+1)
)(
InvFt+1
InvFt (1 + gt+1)
)2]
+
+QFt
[
1− S
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)
− S ′
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
]
(3.39)
The first equation is the usual no-arbitrage condition. It claims that, taking into account the
shadow price of capital QFt , investing in capital and saving in risk-free bonds yields the same
return. Without this condition a sub-optimal arbitrage could be achieved in the economy.
The second equation is the usual Tobin-Q, which describes the optimal investment strategy
of the firm.
Good producers
Now, we describe goods producers in the formal sector.19 One of them is denoted by j.20
The (nominal) Bellman-equation of the formal sector goods producer is:
V (P Ft−1(j), L
F
t−1(j)) = max
{
profitFt (j) + Et
V (P Ft (j), L
F
t (j))
1 + it
}
(3.40)
which is maximized subject to the profit function, production function, demand function
and the labor law of motion:
profitFt (j) = P
F
t (j)Y
F
t (j)−RK,Ft KFt−1(j)− (1 + τSSCFt )W Ft LFt (j)−
−HCFt HFt (j)− P Ft (j)Y Ft R
(
P Ft (j)
P Ft−1(j)
)
(3.41)
Y Ft (j) = K
F
t−1(j)
αF (AFt L
F
t (j))
1−αF (3.42)
Y Ft (j) =
(
P Ft (j)
P Ft
)−ϕ
Y Ft (3.43)
LFt (j) = (1− prF,Ft )LFt−1(j) +HFt (j) (3.44)
R
 PFt (j)PFt−1(j)(
PFt−1
PFt−2
)γ
 = φP
2
 PFt (j)PFt−1(j)(
PFt−1
PFt−2
)γ − 1
2 = φP
2
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
− 1
)2
(3.45)
HCFt = κ
F
(
prH,Ft
)αHC
(3.46)
prH,Ft =
HFt
Ut−1 + pr
F,F
t L
F
t−1 + pr
F,I
t L
I
t−1
(3.47)
19The optimization problem of informal goods producers is parallel.
20Because the number of firms is equal to 1, index j is only used for the sake of mathematical convenience,
at the end, a variable with j and without j will be the same.
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First, regarding production, the production function is the usual Cobb-Douglas with a
labor-augmenting technological process based on labor and physical capital. Here, AFt de-
notes technology level and 1 − αF shows the share of labor income in total factor income.
Total amount of production Y Ft is related to firm j-production Y
F
t (j) by a usual demand
function, where P Ft (j) is the price set by firm j (P
F
t is the general price level) and ϕ denotes
price elasticity of demand.
Second, the extra cost of hiring a new worker is denoted by HCFt (the real hiring cost is
hcFt =
HCFt
PFt
). This depends on the probability of hiring prH,Ft , which depends on the number
of newly hired people HFt . κ
F denotes the hiring cost parameter and αHC,F shows the
elasticity of hiring cost with respect to the probability of hiring. While hiring is endogenous,
as the labor law of motion shows, firing is exogenous, and the probability of firing is prF,Ft .
Also, firms pay τSSCFt social security contributions.
Finally, regarding price setting, function R is the Rotemberg price adjustment cost. Also,
the price adjustment cost parameter is φFP and γ is the indexation parameter; if γ = 0, there
is no indexation, if γ = 1, there is full indexation.
Although sectoral optimizations are similar, there are some differences. First and fore-
most is tax evasion; that is, only formal firms pay social security contributions. Moreover,
formal hiring costs and bargaining power of workers are higher, while the dismissal rate is
lower. These differences can be attributed to the higher degree of regulation in the formal
as compared to the informal sector (Williamson (1975)).
Optimization results in two demand (physical capital and labor) and a pricing decision,
while the last equation is real marginal cost (mcFt =
MCFt
PFt
):
KFt−1 = α
Fmc
F
t
rK,Ft
Y Ft (3.48)
mcFt (1− αF )
Y Ft
LFt
− (1 + τSSCFt )wFt = hcFt − Et
hcFt+1(1− prF,Ft+1 )
1 + rt
(3.49)
1 +
1
ϕ− 1
{
R
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
)
+R′
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
)
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
}
−
−Et 1
ϕ− 1
Y Ft+1
Y Ft
R′
(
1+piFt+1
(1+piFt )
γ
)(
1+piFt+1
(1+piFt )
γ
)
1 + rt
=
ϕ
ϕ− 1mc
F
t (3.50)
mcFt =
(
rK,Ft
αF
)αF (
(1 + τSSCFt )w
F
t
AFt (1− αF )
)(1−αF )
(3.51)
Two important caveats follow. First, due to the presence of labor market frictions, labor
demand becomes an intertemporal as well as an intratemporal decision. This is because labor
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market rigidities create a link in employment today and tomorrow, a link that is described
by the labor law of motion. Second, the pricing decision is sectoral; hence, there are two
New Keynesian Philips curves, one for each sector.
Goods producers do not only produce goods and set prices, but they also bargain over
wages with their workers. Because an agent either works in the formal sector, or in the
informal sector or is unemployed, there are three worker value functions:
V Ft = (1− τLWt )wFt + Et
1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,Ft+1 + prF,Ft+1prH,Ft+1 )V Ft+1+
+prF,Ft+1pr
H,I
t+1V
I
t+1 + pr
F,F
t+1 (1− prH,Ft+1 − prH,It+1)V Ut+1
]
(3.52)
V It = w
I
t + Et
1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,It+1 + prF,It+1prH,It+1)V It+1+
+ prF,It+1pr
H,F
t+1 V
F
t+1 + pr
F,I
t+1(1− prH,Ft+1 − prH,It+1)V Ut+1
]
(3.53)
V Ut = w
U
t + Et
1
1 + rt
[
(1− prH,It+1 − prH,Ft+1 )V Ut+1 + prH,Ft+1 V Ft+1 + prH,It+1V It+1
]
(3.54)
Today, a worker in the formal sector earns real wage wFt and pays personal income tax
and social security contributions τLWt . In the next period, she might keep this job or might
be fired. If fired, she could find another job either in the formal or in the informal sector.
Alternatively she might stay unemployed. A similar argument holds for the informal worker
value function. Being unemployed, nevertheless, means that wUt unemployment benefits are
received today, and tomorrow she either starts to work in any of the two sectors or stays
unemployed for one more period.
Firm value functions are equal to the hiring costs themselves because searching does not
take time (see Blanchard-Gali (2010) for more detail).
Bargaining happens separately in each sector with bargaining powers σF and σI ; workers
and firms make a common decision about wages, taking into account the value of the job
over that of the outside option (not working):
max
wFt
(V Ft − V Ut )σ
F
(hcFt )
1−σF (3.55)
max
wIt
(V It − V Ut )σ
I
(hcIt )
1−σI (3.56)
As a result, the formal bargaining condition is:
σF
1− σF hc
F
t
1− τLWt
1 + τSSCFt
= (1− τLWt )wFt − wUt +
+Et
1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,Ft+1 )(1− prH,Ft+1 )
(
σF
1− σF hc
F
t+1
1− τLWt+1
1 + τSSCFt+1
)
−
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−(1− prF,Ft+1 )prH,It+1
(
σI
1− σI hc
I
t+1
)]
(3.57)
Note, that both employer and employee taxes affect bargaining. Also, bargaining is an
intertemporal decision, similarly to labor demand, due to the presence of hiring costs.21
3.2.4 Monetary policy
In the short run, price rigidity matters and the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule,
similar to that of Smets-Wouters (2007):
1 + it = (1 + it−1)
ρi Et
(
(1 + r)(1 + piFt+1)
ρpi
)(1−ρi)
e
i
t (3.58)
Here, ρi is the interest rate smoothing parameter, ρpi is the weight on inflation and e
it is the
monetary policy shock. We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the central bank sets the
interest rate based solely on the formal inflation rate.
Also, the Fisher equation is:
1 + it = (1 + rt)Et(1 + pi
F
t+1) (3.59)
3.2.5 Fiscal policy
The fiscal side of our model is very rich, especially regarding pensions. First, we present
the pay-as-you-go-plan, then we move on to the fully funded regime. Also, we highlight how
we model the switch between these two.
Pay-as-you-go pension system
The government collects revenues (Revt) of value-added taxes (τ
C
t ), labor income taxes
(τLt ) and Tt lump-sum taxes:
Revt = τ
C
t C
F
t + τ
L
t w
F
t L
F
t + Tt (3.60)
τLt = τ
PI
t + (1− Ξ)(τSSCWt + τSSCFt ) (3.61)
τLWt = τ
PI
t + τ
SSCW
t (3.62)
Labor income taxes are paid by young households and firms; the former pay personal income
taxes (τPIt ) and social security contributions (τ
SSCW
t ) (τ
LW
t denotes the sum of these two),
while firms are only subject to social security contributions (τSSCFt ). Ξ is an indicator, which
is 1 in a fully funded regime and 0 in a PAYG regime, while it can be time-variant as well.
Obviously, value added taxes are only collected after goods purchased from formal sector
producers, and, only firms and workers in the formal sector pay labor income taxes.
21There is a similar expression for the informal sector.
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Revenues finance government consumption expenditure (Govt), unemployment benefits
expenditure and old-age pension expenditure (TRPGt ):
Expt = Govt + w
U
t Ut + TR
PG
t (3.63)
As the budget might not be balanced in each period, the government issues bonds denoted
by Bt. These can be purchased by all households. Thus, the government budget constraint
is:
Bt +Revt = (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + Expt (3.64)
Also, primary government balance (PBt) is defined as the difference between public rev-
enues and expenditures, while total government balance (GBt) also incorporates interest
payments/receipts on bond holdings:
PBt = Revt − Expt (3.65)
GBt = PBt − rt−1Bt−1 (3.66)
Then, the government budget constraint becomes:
Bt = Bt−1 −GBt (3.67)
Because of the presence of bonds, in order to avoid an explosive solution, similarly to
Leeper (1991) or Anderson et al. (2013), a rule is introduced for lump-sum taxes:
Tt = ηT + (1− η)
[
ρTt−1 + (1− ρ)(GBTargett −GBt)
]
(3.68)
Here, η shows the speed of adjustment; it is a 0-1 indicator; η = 1 if lump-sum taxes stay at
the steady-state level and 0 otherwise. A similar rule is valid for all other fiscal instruments as
well (value-added tax rate, personal income tax rate, employer and employee social security
contributions and government consumption), and, all rules target total government balance
(GBTargett ).
22
The starting point of the pay-as-you-go plan is that the pension of each newly retired
person depends on a pension-wage replacement rate, and, on the individual’s previous wage
stream:
TRPG,Y O0,t (i) = νtIB
Y
b−1,t(i) (3.69)
TRPG,Y Ot (i) denotes pension received by individual (i) who just got retired in period t.
23 νt
is the gross pension-wage replacement rate (ratio of pension to gross wages), while IBYb−1,t(i)
22Calibration implies that GBTarget −GB = T .
23YO refers to just-retired, and, is an abbrevation for young-old.
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is the individual’s previous years’ wage stream. To be more precise, it is a simple average of
wages received in the previous Y years:
IBYb−1,t(i) =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
b−1,t−1(i) +
Y − 1
Y
IBYb−2,t−1(i) (3.70)
Then, total wage stream of all employees follows:
IBYt =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
t−1 +
Y − 1
Y
(1− ωYt−2)IBYt−1 (3.71)
Hence, total pension of those old people who just got retired is:
TRPG,Y Ot = νtω
Y
t−1IB
Y
t−1 (3.72)
Lastly, total pension expenditure is the sum of pension of the just-retired and of those
who got retired in any of the previous periods and are still alive:
TRPGt = TR
PG,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)TRPGt−1 (3.73)
Fully funded pension system
The crucial difference between the two pension regimes is that in a fully funded regime
TRPGt is not included into public expenditures anymore:
Expt = Govt + w
U
t Ut (3.74)
Period-t social security contributions directly go to a pension fund, and, future individ-
ual pension benefits are related to individual pension savings. The starting point is that
individual (i) saves her social security contributions on a separate account:
BY,∗b,t (i) = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w
F
t L
F
b,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)B
Y,∗
b−1,t−1(i) (3.75)
Here, BY,∗t (i) denotes individual (i)’s pension savings. As before, only employees and em-
ployers in the formal sector pay social security contributions, hence, informal income does
not contribute to retirement savings.
Assuming that initial wealth is zero, total pension savings look like:
BY,∗t = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w
F
t L
F
t + (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BY,∗t−1 (3.76)
When someone gets retired, in that period, based on her pension savings and the life
expectancy, an initial pension level is set by the government. Later, it will be adjusted
by inflation only. It can be shown that TRFF,Y O0,t (i) which is a just-retired individual (i)’s
pension in period t fulfills:
(1 + rt−1)B
Y,∗
b−1,t−1(i) = TR
FF,Y O
0,t (i)Ω
O
t (3.77)
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Then, total pension expenditure of those who retired in period t (TRFF,Y Ot ) and of all
retired people (TRFFt ), in the FF regime, are:
(1 + rt−1)ωYt−1B
Y,∗
t−1 = TR
FF,Y O
t Ω
O
t (3.78)
TRFFt = TR
FF,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)TRFFt−1 (3.79)
Lastly, as people get older, their pension savings shrink. So, the following holds:
(1 + rt−1)ωYt−1B
Y,∗
t−1 + (1 + rt−1)B
O,∗
t−1 = TR
FF
t +B
O,∗
t (3.80)
where BO,∗t is pension savings of previously retired people in the fully funded regime.
Finally, total pension savings are:
B∗t = B
Y,∗
t +B
O,∗
t (3.81)
3.2.6 Market clearing
In equilibrium, all markets clear. First, the labor market clears.24
First, total number of workers in the formal and underground sector, and the number of
unemployed people are:
LFt =
∞∑
b=0
LFb,t =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tL
F
b,t(i) (3.82)
LIt =
∞∑
b=0
LIb,t =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tL
I
b,t(i) (3.83)
Ut =
∞∑
b=0
Ub,t =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tUb,t(i) (3.84)
Then, the total number of young people is equal to the sum of the number of people
employed in either the formal or the informal sector and the number of unemployed people:
Ut = N
Y
t − LFt − LIt (3.85)
Total profits is the sum of sectoral profits:
Profitt = profit
F
t + profit
I
t (3.86)
24Also, the physical capital market clears: capital rented by firms equals capital produced by capital
producers (this is why both are denoted by K).
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Then, there is an equilibrium in the assets market:
Bt +Q
F
t K
F
t +Q
I
tK
I
t = B
Y
t +B
O
t +B
∗
t (3.87)
This means that the young and the retired save in risk-free bonds, and this aggregate savings
is equal to the sum of government bonds and physical capital.
Regarding the goods market, in each sector, supply must equal the relevant demand and
deadweight losses due to labor and product market frictions:
Y Ft = C
F
t + Invt +Govt + hc
F
t H
F
t +R
(
P Ft
P Ft−1
)
+
+InvFt S
(
InvFt
InvFt−1(1 + gt)
)
+ InvIt S
(
InvIt
InvIt−1(1 + gt)
)
(3.88)
Y It = C
I
t + hc
I
tH
I
t +R
(
P It
P It−1
)
(3.89)
where
CFt = C
O,F
t + C
Y,F
t (3.90)
CIt = C
O,I
t + C
Y,I
t (3.91)
Invt = Inv
F
t + Inv
I
t (3.92)
Formal sector goods are either consumed by households or invested to produce physical
capital. Also, the government purchases goods from formal firms. Hiring costs and price
rigidity constitute deadweight losses, and, there are also investment adjustment costs; these
create a gap between production and demand. Concerning the informal side, the difference
is that the government does not buy informally produced goods and private investment only
pertains to formal goods.
Finally, GDP is, as usual, the sum of household consumption, private investment and
government consumption, where total consumption is the sum of formal and informal con-
sumption:
GDPt = Ct + Invt +Govt (3.93)
Ct = C
F
t + p
I
tC
I
t (3.94)
Also, production is the sum of formal and informal production:
Yt = Y
F
t + p
I
tY
I
t (3.95)
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3.3 Calibration
3.3.1 Steady-state and dynamic parameters
In this section we describe the steady-state and dynamic parameters which are calibrated
based on yearly data since 199525 of three southern European countries: Portugal, Italy and
Spain; more detail on calculating the steady-state is available in the Appendix.26 In doing so,
our main goal is to match, as accurately as possible, the model with the data, in particular,
household consumption and private investment great ratios, the level of unemployment, share
of informality in output and employment, and, the share of public old-age pension spending
in GDP. First, we describe the process of calibrating the steady-state parameters, which are
summarized in Table 3.1.
Regarding data on the expenditure side of the budget, the government consumption ex-
penditure27 to GDP ratio is 18.5 per cent, the share of unemployment benefits expenditure
in GDP is 1.1 per cent, while the gross pension-wage replacement rate is set such that the
public (old-age) pension spending to GDP ratio matches the data counterpart as close as
possible.
Second, as regards the revenue side of the budget, all tax rates are endogenously calibrated
by fixing the relevant tax revenue shares in GDP, rather then the tax rates themselves. It is
crucial as even though the fiscal side of our model is quite rich, it is still far away from the
richness of the budget itself, hence, only effective tax rates are appropriate to be considered.
As a share of GDP, the value-added tax revenue is 8.0, the personal income tax and employee
social security contributions revenue is 8.5, while the employer social security contribution
revenue is 4.6 per cent, respectively. Also, the share of government debt in GDP is 75.5 per
cent.
Third, the formal and informal labor markets are characterized by several frictions: firing
probabilities, hiring costs and bargaining powers of workers. The formal dismissal rate is
calculated by the authors based on Eurostat Labour Force Survey (LFS) data on labor flows.
As a result, 13.6 per cent of the workers are dismissed in the formal sector each year; then,
we assume the informal dismissal rate to be twice as high as that. Then, we set hiring costs
such that we match data on unemployment. Furthermore, the formal bargaining power of
workers is the standard 0.5, while the informal value is assumed to be half of that. We check
25Or later, if there is no data back to 1995.
26We present calibration on Portugal in detail; tables show calibrated values for Italy and Spain as well,
and, the process of calibration for them is parallel to that of Portugal.
27Following SNA notation, it includes P3S13 final consumption expenditure of general government, but
it does not include D63 social transfers in kind (mainly education and health expenditure).
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Table 3.1: Steady-state parameters
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the robustness of our results with respect to the assumptions we make, and, we find that
our results are highly robust; details are provided in the Appendix.
Lastly, as regards demographics, first, we calculate the size of each cohort, based on
Eurostat data, then using the demographic equations we estimate the transition probabilities:
the fertility rate, the mortality rate and the probability of retirement. For Portugal, people
between 20 and 66.6 are considered to be ’young’, while those who are 66.6 year old or older
are ’old’. 66.6 is the effective retirement age published by OECD (2015).28
Table 3.2: Dynamic parameters
Dynamic parameters are based on other studies, and, are in the range of usual values of
the literature (Table 3.2).
3.3.2 Model performance
Table 3.3 presents some empirical stylized facts and their model counterparts.
The (household consumption and private investment) great ratios and the level of unem-
ployment are particularly well matched.29 Nevertheless, we are less good at matching the size
of the shadow economy; informal employment is slightly overestimated, while the shadow
output is underestimated. However, it is important to note that data on informality is quite
uncertain, as, in contrary to national accounts data, for example, they are estimates them-
selves. Finally, the model is not fully able to replicate the share of public (old-age) pension
spending in GDP, either. It is true even though data shows total old-age pension spending,
while our model only contains public old-age pension spending (the share of private old-age
pension spending is quite low in southern Europe).
28Because we do not incorporate the non-working young, all individuals below 20 are disregarded. Also,
for Italy and Spain effective retirement ages are 61.3 and 62.7 years, respectively.
29In the Labor Force Survey, those who are unemployed do not work in parallel (not even in the shadow
economy). Hence, we believe that in the survey there is no significant overlap between the number of
unemployed and the number of informally employed people.
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Table 3.3: Evaluating the steady-state calibration for Portugal, Italy and Spain in a PAYG
regime
3.4 Results
Now, we turn to presenting our findings. Population aging is modeled by a decline in the
mortality rate such that the old-age dependency ratio gradually increases by 5 percentage
points in the next 30 years, then, it remains at that level. Because of aging, on the one hand,
relatively less people work, hence, GDP per capita declines because (human) resources go
down. On the one other hand, the government spends more on pension, while tax revenues
decline (because less people work). This, evidently, negatively affects the budget, namely,
public debt increases, so consolidation is needed by the government to keep it at a sustainable
level.
Several policies are investigated (in brackets we show abbreviations used on charts). First,
we study two labor income tax policies, particularly, an increase in personal income tax
and employee social security contributions (PIT) and an increase in employer social security
contributions (Employer SSC). Then, we focus on two pension reforms, notably, a decrease in
the gross pension-wage replacement rate (Repl.) and a decrease in the retirement probability
(Ret. prob.)30 which is a proxy for a retirement age increase. Lastly, some other policies are
also studied: an increase in the value added tax revenue (VAT) and a decrease in government
consumption expenditure (GC). Additionally, we consider an increase in the net fertility rate
as well (Fert.). Because we focus on southern Europe where the pension plan is pay-as-you-
go, this is the regime we consider in our baseline simulations.31
30Meanwhile, the fertility rate changes such that the number of new young people remains stable. In our
paper fertility is exogenous, which simplifies the framework, also, it is a reasonable assumption for developed
countries.
31Also, we do not study the impacts of strengthening tax collection, we leave it for further research.
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We study both the long- and the short-run macroeconomic outcomes. By long-run we
mean 100 years which coincides with the working life span of two generations. The first 10
years are also detailed, because costs and benefits might differ over the long- and short-run.
Then, we compare both the long- and short-term impacts with a PAYG and an FF plan,
and, we also investigate the transition towards a fully funded plan. In particular, a full and
a partial reform are examined; a partial reform is a combination of PAYG and FF elements
(50-50 per cent). After all, we concentrate on the role of informality and unemployment in
our framework.
Simulations are carried out by Dynare 4.4.3 and Iris, and, mean (permanent) deterministic
simulations, moving from the original steady-state to a new long-run equilibrium.
3.4.1 Macroeconomic impacts in a PAYG regime in the long- and
short-run
Table 3.4 shows the long-run (100-year) macroeconomic impacts of a mortality rate decline
corresponding to a gradual 5 percentage point increase in the old-age dependency ratio in
the next 30 years in a PAYG regime, while Figure 3.7 demonstrates the short-run (10-year)
consequences during the transition. We find that output in the long-run goes down by 3.8
per cent in Portugal, 3 per cent in Italy and 3.5 per cent in Spain. Regarding the long-run
unemployment reactions, in all countries unemployment stays stable. However, aging implies
a considerable rise in the government debt to GDP ratio, in particular, over the next 100
years, in Portugal, Italy and Spain, respectively, it rises by 111.1, 83.1 and 71.5 pp. Thus,
the negative fiscal impacts of aging must be handled, otherwise fiscal sustainability might
be questioned.
First of all, the lowest decline in GDP when the population is aging is induced by lowering
the probability of retirement; all other fiscal policies imply more severe GDP losses. In-
creasing the retirement age, ceteris paribus, induces a small increase in output (for example
0.8 per cent for Portugal, because aging implied a 3.8, while aging with a retirement age
increase a 3 per cent reduction in output). If the personal income tax and social security
contributions revenue goes up, the Portuguese per capita GDP goes down by 5.9 per cent in
the long-run; and, this policy causes the largest GDP loss. In Italy and Spain, following a
similar shock, GDP declines by 5.6 and 8.2 per cent, respectively.
Similar conclusions can be made about household consumption. Regarding the labor
market, however, we can conclude that aging does not significantly imply a rise in long-run
unemployment, while the size of shadow economy somewhat reduces (by about 0.3-0.4 pp
both in GDP and employment). Then, consolidating the budget with a labor income tax
hike implies a significant rise in unemployment, especially in Spain (unemployment goes up
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Table 3.4: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal, Italy and Spain
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Figure 3.7: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal
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by 2.4 and 1.4 pp if employees or employers’ tax revenues are raised), while in Portugal
and Italy the response of unemployment is about 1/4 of that of Spain. As regards informal
employment, all tax increases and also an increase in government consumption, have a pos-
itive impact. Italy is the country which is the most negatively affected if personal income
taxes go up, i.e. the share of informal employment rises by 1 pp more compared to the no
consolidation scenario. Nevertheless, regarding the share of formal GDP in total GDP, value
added taxes and government consumption are the tools that cause the largest harm, for in-
stance in Portugal a value added tax hike implies a 0.7 pp increase in the size of the shadow
economy. However, the effective value added tax rate must go up by 5.6 pp to induce that
effect, while Ihrig-Moe (2004) conclude that even small tax reductions considerably lower
informal employment.
So, because Portugal is the country where aging implies the largest loss in GDP (3 per
cent if the old-age dependency ratio goes up by 5 pp), and, because Portugal is also the
country where, according to the Eurostat’s projections, the rise in the old-age dependency
ratio will be the highest (34 pp by 2065), from now on we will focus on Portugal. However,
additional information is shown on Italy and Spain in the Appendix.
In the short-run, with the exception of a fertility rate policy, we find similar effects across
the policies. However, the size of the short-run impacts differs from that of the relevant
long-run impacts. While per capita GDP declines by 5.9 per cent in the long-run, in the first
10 years the decline is less severe, around 0.2-0.3 per cent only. It means that the majority of
the GDP loss happens over the medium- and long-term. Regarding unemployment, on the
other hand, it goes up more in the short- than in the long-run (except after a labor income
tax hike). In contrary to GDP, as concerns informality in employment and output, the vast
majority of the, otherwise smaller, changes materialize immediately after the shock.
On the whole, taking into account both the long- and short-term effects, the least harmful
policy, especially for output, is to increase the retirement age level. However, later we will
discuss some doubts about the feasibility of this policy.
3.4.2 Comparing long- and short-run macroeconomic impacts in
PAYG and fully funded regimes
Now, we direct our attention to differences between the two pension regimes. The southern
European countries’ pension plan is PAYG. Still, along with reforming the current PAYG
regime, another way to cope with the fiscal effects of aging might be a regime switch. Also,
with a different pension plan, the same fiscal consolidation policy, over any time horizon,
might have a different effect on the macroeconomy; this is what we will address in this
section. Then, in the next section, we will move on to study the transition path of the
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regime switch itself, both in the long- and in the short-run. Table 3.5 presents the long-run,
while Figures 3.8-3.9 show the short-run macroeconomic impacts of consolidation policies in
a PAYG and an FF plan.
First, both in the long- and short-run, consolidating the budget with a personal income
tax hike hits the macroeconomy much less negatively with a fully funded regime than with
a pay-as-you-go plan; and, the size of the tax hike required to fill in the gap in the budget
due to aging is also lower.
Specifically, in the long-run, with a PAYG plan, GDP declines by 5.9 per cent; while the
same size of shock implies a reduction in GDP of 4.3 per cent only with an FF plan. Also,
the same is true for consumption. Additionally, unemployment increases by 0.2 percentage
points in an FF regime, but by 0.6 pp in a PAYG regime. Furthermore, regarding informal
employment, the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal consolidation in the two plans are even
more different, namely, the share of informal employment in total employment goes up by
0.3 pp in a PAYG regime and goes down by 0.2 pp in an FF regime. Although neither
effects are too sizeable, it is important to notice that the signs are different. Also, the share
of young household consumption in total consumption increases in an FF regime, while it
decreases in a PAYG regime. Lastly, the personal income tax rate must be raised by only
1.7 pp in an FF regime, while a 5.2 pp raise is required in a PAYG regime.
Then, as regards the short-run, on the one hand, quite similar conclusions can be made.
GDP, household consumption, unemployment and informal employment change less if the
pension regime is fully funded. At the same time, the increase in formal GDP is lower
in an FF regime. Regarding the share of young consumption in total consumption, not
only the size of the impacts, but also the signs differ: after the shock, in an FF regime it
declines, while in a PAYG regime it goes up. Moreover, it is exactly the opposite of the
long-run outcomes. So, intuitively a higher personal income tax rate implies a shift from
old consumption towards young consumption in an FF regime, but the reverse is seen in a
PAYG system.
Regarding other policies32, the long-run macroeconomic responses to a VAT hike or a
government consumption cut differ less among the two pension regimes. The main difference
is the share of young household’s consumption in total consumption, which goes up in an
FF regime, but goes down in a PAYG regime, as before. Again, it means that these policies
hit the old people more in an FF regime than with a PAYG plan, which coincides with the
32Note that in an FF regime, by design, it is not possible to run simulations of modifying the employer
social security contributions, the pension-wage replacement rate of the retirement age. Hence, no chart on
pension reforms is presented.
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Table 3.5: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio in Portugal, comparing PAYG and fully funded regimes
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Figure 3.8: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio by modifiying labor income taxes in Portugal, comparing
PAYG and fully funded regimes
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Figure 3.9: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in Portugal, comparing PAYG and
fully funded regimes
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fact that in a PAYG regime less self-caring is less crucial. Additionally, total household
consumption goes down more in an FF regime if government consumption is reduced.
Finally, also the size of the change in the fiscal instruments are markedly different in the
two pension regimes. For example, the value added tax rate must increase by 2 percentage
points in an FF regime, while in a PAYG regime a much higher VAT hike (5.6 percentage
points) is necessary. Then, in the short-run, both policies’ impulse responses are highly
different (and differences are similar to those of a personal income tax hike already described
above).
To sum up, in the long-run, the macroeconomic reactions of a personal income tax hike
largely depend on the type of pension regime. Also, there are crucial differences in the long-
run reactions of other policies. Meanwhile, in the short-run, all policies imply noticeably
unalike macroeconomic effects.
3.4.3 Pension regime switch
After studying how the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies differ in the two pension
regimes, we turn our attention towards the effects of the pension regime switch itself. Two
scenarios are distinguished. First, a full reform means that instead of the PAYG plan a
fully funded plan is introduced. Second, a partial reform is a mixed reform, PAYG and FF
elements are implemented (50-50 per cent). Beetsma et al. (2013), for instance, show that
a two-tier system (first tier PAYG, second tier fully funded) is the first best, i.e. provides
optimal intergenerational risk-sharing without distorting the labour supply.
Table 3.6: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away from
the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Portugal
162
1 3 5 7 9
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15 GDP (%, per capita)
1 3 5 7 9
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0 Share of formal GDP (p.p. of total)
1 3 5 7 9
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05 Unemployment rate (p.p.)
1 3 5 7 9
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08 Share of informal employment (p.p. of total)
1 3 5 7 9
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3 Total household cons. (%, per capita)
1 3 5 7 9
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 Share of young household cons. (p.p of total)
1 3 5 7 9
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 Government debt (p.p. of GDP)
Full reform Partial reform
1 3 5 7 9
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0 Implied replacement rate (p.p.)
Figure 3.10: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away from
the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Portugal
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As regards the long-run (Table 3.6), if a fully funded regime is introduced, GDP goes up;
by 0.9 per cent with the full reform and 0.5 per cent with the partial reform. Also, the
shadow economy shrinks. Notably, the share of formal GDP goes up by 0.5 pp, while the
share of informal employment in total employment goes down by 0.4 pp in the long-run (if
a full reform is implemented).
In the short-term (Figure 3.10), there are some costs. First of all, the share of formal
output declines, and, the share of informal employment rises during the first couple of years
after the reform. Hence, it takes some time until the above gain, i.e. the reduction in
informality can materialize. A temporary benefit, however, is that household consumption
goes up.
The main issue, though, is related to the replacement rate. In an FF regime there is no true
replacement rate because individual pension does not depend on the previous wage stream,
but on pension savings instead. But, we calculate an implied replacement rate. Although
this rate, in the long-run, is higher in an FF regime, in the short-run there is a huge drop.
In particular, it goes down by about 25 pp which is about one-third of the original level. We
consider this to be a serious drawback which questions the feasibility of this reform, and, we
will address it in more detail in the last section of the paper.
3.4.4 The role of informality and unemployment
A vital novelty of our model framework is the inclusion of a shadow economy into an
overlapping generations framework. According to our knowledge, it was done for the first
time in the literature. Informality, on the one hand, means that taxes are avoided in the
shadow, on the other hand, the level of regulation is lower in the underground sector (Table
3.7). Because of several reasons listed in the introduction, we believe that its presence can
reshape the responses of the macroeconomy. So can that of unemployment. While there is
an additional obvious advantage of incorporating them into the framework, namely, that we
can study the impacts of fiscal policies on informality and unemployment.
Because of the complexity of our model, we are unable to provide comparative statics
analysis, hence, in this secton, we show some simulations. Namely, two alternative scenarios
are compared to the baseline scenario presented so far. First, we simulate a model without
a shadow economy but with unemployment, second, we simulate a model without shadow
economy and with full employment.33 Table 3.8 shows the long-run effects in a PAYG regime,
33Some model parameters are modified in order to disregard informality and/or unemployment. These
are the weight on informal household consumption in the utility function, the firing probability, the hiring
cost parameter and the share of capital income in the production function (all in the informal sector). To
reduce the size of informality to zero, both in output and in employment, the first parameter is reduced,
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while Table 3.9 presents the long-run effects of the pension plan switch.34
Table 3.7: Rigidities in the formal and informal sectors of the model
In a PAYG regime, labor-income tax policies imply different macroeconomic impacts in
the alternative model scenarios than in the baseline model. Regarding GDP, in the baseline,
it goes down by 5.9 per cent, but, without a shadow economy, the decline is only 4.6 per cent.
The loss in GDP is even lower if unemployment is not present; it is only 4.1 per cent. Simi-
larly, raising the employer social security contribution rate also induces a considerably lower
loss, both without a shadow economy and without a shadow economy and unemployment.
Not only the reaction of output, but also that of other variables are unalike if either
informality or unemployment are not included. For instance, household consumption declines
by 2 pp or 2.9 pp less in the alternative scenarios than in the baseline case (where the drop
is 7.9 per cent). However, the relative size of young households’ consumption is much less
affected. Intrestingly, the response of unemployment itself is not affected by the presence of
shadow economy, either. It seems that workers, rather, move between the official and the
unofficial economies, than out of or into unemployment.
The underlying intuition is related to the fact that the necessary raise in the tax rates
is higher in the baseline model.Specifically, in the baseline model, the personal income tax
and employee social security contribution rate is required to go up by 5.2 pp, while the
employer social security contribution rate needs to be increased by 6.1 pp. Then, without an
underground economy or unemployment the tax hikes are lower; 4.7 and 5.7 or 4.7 and 5.9
pp, respectively. In Section 3.1 we described two opposite channels implied by the presence
of a shadow economy, namely, that the larger the size of the shadow economy, the smaller
the share of the conomy directly affected by the government, but the larger the amount of
people and goods that can potentially move out of the shadow. It seems that the first effect
dominates, ignoring the shadow side of the economy biases the tax rates downwards due to
while all the others are increased. Then, additionally, in the model without unemployment, also the formal
hiring cost parameter is lowered.
34Figures 3.A1-3.A7 in the Appendix show the relevant short-run dynamics.
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Table 3.8: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp increase
in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal, comparing the baseline
scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow economy
and unemployment
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the assumption that all economic agents pay taxes.35 Tax evasion is actually the most signif-
icant part of informality.36 For other policies, the presence of informality and unemployment
are less crucial, except the size of the fiscal instrument that very much depends on them.
Additionally, the presence of the unofficial economy also affects the long-run outcomes
of a pension regime switch, although to a less extent (Table 3.9). Unemployment declines
more, if the underground sector is ignored, still, the decrease is unemployment is low. Total
household consumption, however, declines without shadow economy, while it was stable in
the baseline model. At the same time, on the whole, informality and unemployment are less
relevant for the pension plan switch compared to reforming the PAYG regime itself.
Table 3.9: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full pension reform in Portugal, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
3.5 Conclusion and policy discussion
We studied the macroeconomic impacts of pension reforms and other public policies to
handle the negative fiscal consequences of aging. By doing so, we developed an overlapping
generations model with demography, unemployment, and, according to our knowledge for
the first time in the literature, with a shadow economy. Also, in contrary to many papers,
we investigated the impacts of a retirement age increase, and, we focused on both a pay-
as-you-go and fully funded regimes. The model was calibrated on annual data on Portugal,
Italy and Spain, because these countries are among those that have the highest public debt
level, and, are also projected to experience the most severe aging in the next decades in the
35In particular, in a model without informality, not only the long-run level of unemployment higher, but
also that of formal employment, so mistakenly it is assumed that more people pay taxes than actually do,
hence, a lower tax increase is required to reduce budget deficit.
36See Schneider (2012) for example.
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region. We focused on Portugal, in particular, where the Eurostat projects that the old-age
dependency ratio will increase by 34 pp by 2065.
Based on both the long-run outcomes and the short-run dynamics, we concluded that the
best policy to cope with the negative fiscal impacts of aging is to increase the retirement
age. Best here means that this is the policy that causes the lowest macroeconomic, especially
output, losses in the long-run.
Based on our calculations, in Portugal, the negative impacts on the public budget of the
above aging can be neutralized by a 2.1-year increase in the retirement age level (Table
3.10).37 According to OECD (2015) the current level of effective retirement age in Portugal
is 66.6 years. Hence, it means that Portuguese workers should retire at the age of 68.7 in
2065. As regards Italy and Spain, on the one hand, a smaller inrease in the retirement age
would be enough (1.5 and 1.9 years, respectively) to handle the negative fiscal impacts of
aging38, on the other hand, the current retirement age levels are lower than the Portuguese
one. As a consequence, in 2065, the effective retirement age should be 62.8 years in Italy
and 64.6 years in Spain; these are about 6 and 4 years lower than the relevant Portuguese
value.39
Table 3.10: Retirement age increase and its consequences in southern Europe
Having a look at life expectancy in Portugal, it is feasible to raise the retirement age to
68.7 years. Because, for 65-year-old women and men, life expectancy on average will be 89.1
years in 2065 (OECD (2013)).
37Without shadow economy a 2.2, without unemployment a 2.3-year increase is projected.
38As a comparison, Dı´az-Gime´nez-Dı´az-Saavedra (2009) find that, in Spain, 3 years of retirement age
increase is necessary to maintain fiscal sustainability.
39Although, the number of people affected by this policy would be significantly higher in Italy and Spain,
due to the fact that more people live in those countries.
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Nevertheless, raising the statutory retirement age might not result in a higher (or high
enough) effective retirement age. As IMF (2014) points out there is no significant relation
between the statutory and the effective retirement age levels. Hence, even if the government
raises the official retirement age level, it might not modify, or might not modify enough, the
effective retirement age level (Figure 3.11). Similarly, Fehr et al. (2012) claim that a 2-year
increase in the official retirement age implies a 1-year increase in the effective retirement age
in Germany.
Figure 3.11: Official versus effective retirement age levels (IMF, 2014, page 39)
Several reasons might be behind this. As regards employees, a recent survey by Aegon
(2014) points out that “41 per cent of employees are resistant to increasing the official
retirement age taking the view that people are already expected to work long enough”. To
put it otherwise, 4 people out of 10 are not willing to work longer even if they are required to.
And, because of aging, while today about one-third of the people are old, in 2065 two-third
of the population will be elderly. Hence, in an absolute value a large number of people seem
to be reluctant to continue work at this age. In accordance with this, Galasso (2008) show,
based on Eurobarometer data, that 70 per cent of EU citizens do not want a retirement age
increase. The fact that a 2-year increase in the retirement age would imply that Portuguese
people lose 9.2 per cent of their after-retirement time might explain why they protest. At the
same time, if we also take into account the increase in life expectancy, they would still gain
18 per cent of lifetime (comparing after-retirement years in 2065 with the higher retirement
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age level to after-retirement years in 2015 with the lower retirement age level).40
Regarding the firm side, World Bank (2015) claims that old people are not less productive
than young people.41 Also, Munnel et al. (2006) (based on US data) find that employers
are not less willing to employ old people than young people, although they consider the
fact that old people might not work too long which could imply a negative impact on their
productivity. Thus, on the whole, it seems that whether an official retirement age increase
implies an increase in the effective retirement age level as well lies on the employees’ side.42
Alongside increasing the retirement age, there might be other options. First, other public
policies can be also implemented. But, they decrease output or increase unemployment more
than the retirement age policy does. Second, demographic changes might be needed. No-
tably, an increase in the fertility rate could compensate for a decrease in the mortality rate at
a much lower long-run output loss (practically output stays stable in the long-run). However,
in the short-run this is the policy that induces the largest increase in unemployment which
raises some concerns regarding its feasibility. Also, according to OECD (2011) the fertility
rate will even slightly increase in the next decades, hence, aging is mainly a consequence
of a longevity boom, rather then a fertility failure. Nevertheless, the relationship between
pensions and endogenous fertility remains beyond the scope of the present study.43
Now, turning our attention towards the pension regime switch, it reduces the size of the
shadow economy. Particularly, introducing a fully funded pension plan implies a 0.4 pp
reduction in the share of informal employment in total employment and a 0.5 pp reduction
in the share of underground GDP in total GDP. At the same time, there is a sharp, about 25
pp drop in the pension-wage replacement rate, although this drop is only temporary. Still, it
questions the feasibility of this policy from a political point of view. Without some additional
40Of course, we are aware of the fact that the health condition worsens as people get older.
41Although people below the age of 64 were studied, while in Portugal the retirement age would be almost
69 years.
42It is beyond the scope of this paper to further investigate the weak relation between official and effective
retirement age levels. IMF (2014), for instance, also points out that, besides the official retirement age, there
are several other factors that influence the retirement decision, among others taxes on continuing work.
Thus, we do not aim to draw conclusions regarding this issue, rather, we urgue further research.
43There is a great deal of extant research on this. Regarding the relation of pensions and fertility, two
main streams can be distinguished in the (theoretical) literature. Barro-Becker (1989) and others argue
that the fact that children tend to take care of their elderly parents is at the root of a positive relationship
between fertility and pensions. As against this, Boldrin-Jones (2002) and others claim that because children
tend to take care of their elderly parents, pensions and fertility are negatively related. The empirical
evidence is mixed (Hohm (1975), Cigno (1993), Cigno-Rosati (1992), Boldrin et al. (2005), Wang (2015) and
many others). Related to fertility, migration and social security has been studied by Razin-Sadka (1999),
Storesletten (2000) and Kilponen et al. (2006), among many others.
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policy, for example providing transfers for those who suffer from the negative effects of the
lower pension replacement rate, implementation might fail.
We are convinced that the inclusion of a shadow economy into an OLG framework was a
vital step in studying the fiscal consequences of aging. Of course, our framework still lacks
some features that might constitute interesting lines of future research. First, there is no
labor force participation decision. Hence, someone is either employed or unemployed when
young, and, retired when old. Nevertheless, choosing to exit the labor force is also a valid
option. Too, someone previously not in the labor force might enter it. Second, for the sake
of simplicity we assume that retired people do not work. In practice, however, some retired
people work (the extent depends on the country), so retired people have multiple sources of
income as well. Finally, individuals close to retirement might have (more) trouble finding a
job because of skill-mismatch; extra time might be required for skill-update. Future work
might consider these important elements as well.
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Appendix44
A Overlapping generations’ optimization
First, we focus on solving the optimizing problems of the young and old generations. Then,
we describe the pay-as-you-go and fully funded pension systems in detail. At the end, we
list all the normalized equations, i.e. equations detrended by technology and population
growth, provide the steady state calculation of the model and show evidence on the model’s
robustness.45
Demography
Total population (Nt) is equal to the sum of the number of old (retired) (N
O
t ) and young
(worker) people (NYt ):
Nt = N
O
t +N
Y
t (3.96)
NYt = (1− ωYt−1)NYt−1 + ntNYt−1 (3.97)
NOt = (1− ωOt−1)NOt−1 + ωYt−1NYt−1 (3.98)
Similarly to most of the general equilibrium models, we focus on the relative shares and
not on the levels. st denotes the ratio of the number of old and young people, while s
Y
t
denotes the share of young people in the whole population:
st =
NOt
NYt
=
(1− ωOt−1)NOt−1 + ωYt−1NYt−1
NYt
= (1− ωOt−1)
NOt−1
NYt−1
NYt−1
NYt
+
+ωYt−1
NYt−1
NYt
=
(1− ωOt−1)
(1− ωYt−1 + nt)
st−1 +
ωYt−1
(1− ωYt−1 + nt)
(3.99)
sYt =
NYt
Nt
=
NYt
NYt +N
O
t
=
1
1 +
NOt
NYt
=
1
1 + st
(3.100)
Then, we can express the growth rate of each cohort:
1 + gN,Yt =
NYt
NYt−1
= (1− ωYt−1)NYt−1 + ntNYt−1 = 1− ωYt−1 + nt (3.101)
1 + gN,Ot =
NOt
NOt−1
=
(1− ωOt−1)NOt−1 + ωYt−1NYt−1
NOt−1
= (1− ωOt−1) +
ωYt−1
st−1
(3.102)
44On Figures 3.A2 and 3.A5, on the subchart of fiscal instruments retirement probablilities are shown on
the right scale.
45Regarding any other technical detail, further information is available from the authors upon request.
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Finally, population growth follows as:
1 + gNt =
NYt +N
O
t
NYt−1 +N
O
t−1
=
NYt
NYt−1
+
NOt
NYt−1
NYt−1
NYt−1
+
NOt−1
NYt−1
=
1 + gN,Yt +
NOt
NYt−1
1 + st−1
=
=
1 + gN,Yt +
NOt
NYt−1
NYt
NYt
1 + st−1
=
1 + gN,Yt + st(1 + g
N,Y
t )
1 + st−1
= (1 + gN,Yt )
1 + st
1 + st−1
(3.103)
Retired generation
First order conditions of a retired agent
’Retired’ agent i of retired cohort a is one individual who retired a years ago. Each agent
maximises the following Bellman equation:
V O(BOa−1,t−1(i)) =
= max
{
(1 + Ct )
[
1
1− γ
{
CO,Fa,t (i)
}1−γ
+
χ
1− γ
{
CO,Ia,t (i)
}1−γ]
+
+ βEt(1− ωOt )V O(BOa,t(i))
}
(3.104)
subject to this budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )C
O,F
a,t (i) + p
I
tC
O,I
a,t (i) + (1− ωOt )BOa,t(i) = (1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) +
+TRPG,Y Oa,t (i) + TR
FF,Y O
a,t (i) + Profit
O
a,t(i)− TOa,t(i) (3.105)
First order conditions:
CO,Fa,t (i) : (1 + 
C
t )
{
CO,Fa,t (i)
}−γ
+ λOa,t(1 + τ
C
t ) = 0 (3.106)
CO,Ia,t (i) : (1 + 
C
t )χ
{
CO,Ia,t (i)
}−γ
+ λOa,tp
I
t = 0 (3.107)
BOa,t(i) : βEt(1− ωOt )V OBOa,t(i) + Et(1− ω
O
t )λ
O
a,t = 0 (3.108)
One-period-ahead Envelope theorem:
EtVBOa,t(i) = −EtλOa+1,t+1(1 + rt) (3.109)
The first order conditions imply the Euler-equation:
βEt
(1 + Ct+1)
(
CO,Fa,t (i)
)γ
(1 + Ct )
(
CO,Fa+1,t+1(i)
)γ (1 + rt) 1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
= 1 (3.110)
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which can be rearranged:
CO,Fa,t (i)Et
{
β
1 + Ct+1
1 + Ct
(1 + rt)
1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
} 1
γ
= EtC
O,F
a+1,t+1(i) (3.111)
EtC
O,F
a+1,t+1(i) = EtC
O,F
a,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1 (3.112)
where EtΛt+1 = Et
{
β
1+Ct+1
1+Ct
1+τCt
1+τCt+1
} 1
γ
.
Based on the Euler-equation all future retired consumptions follow:
EtC
O,F
a+n,t+n(i) = C
O,F
a,t (i)Et
n∏
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k (3.113)
Then, the substitution between formal and informal goods also follows from the first order
conditions:
(1 + Ct )
{
CO,Fa,t (i)
}−γ
= (1 + Ct )χ
{
CO,Ia,t (i)
}−γ 1 + τCt
pIt
(3.114)
which can be rewritten as:
CO,Ia,t (i) = ΥtC
O,F
a,t (i) (3.115)
where Υt =
{
χ
1+τCt
pIt
} 1
γ
.
Individual consumption of a retired agent
First, we derive the intertemporal budget constraint from the one-period budget con-
straint:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)
(
(1 + τCt+n)C
O,F
a+n,t+n(i) + p
I
t+nC
O,I
a+n,t+n(i)
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
=
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)
(
TRPG,Y Oa+n,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
a+n,t+n(i) + Profit
O
a+n,t+n(i)− TOa+n,t+n(i)
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.116)
if k > n and rt+k = 0.
Then, we plug in the formal-informal substitution equation:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)
(
(1 + τCt+n)C
O,F
a+n,t+n(i) + p
I
t+nC
O,F
a+n,t+n(i)Υt+n
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
=
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)
(
TRPG,Y Oa+n,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
a+n,t+n(i) + Profit
O
a+n,t+n(i)− TOa+n,t+n(i)
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.117)
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After some rearranging:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)CO,Fa+n,t+n(i)
(
(1 + τCt+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n
)∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
=
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)
(
TRPG,Y Oa+n,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
a+n,t+n(i) + Profit
O
a+n,t+n(i)− TOa+n,t+n(i)
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.118)
Now, we can use the Euler equation for future consumptions:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)CO,Fa,t (i)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k
(
(1 + τCt+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n
)∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
=
= Et
∞∑
n=0
(1− ωOt+k−1)n
(
TRPG,Y Oa+n,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
a+n,t+n(i) + Profit
O
a+n,t+n(i)− TOa+n,t+n(i)
)
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.119)
Finally, if we rearrange we get consumption of agent i of cohort a at time t as a function
of present value of pension and other income and initial wealth:
CO,Fa,t (i) =
Et
∑∞
n=0
∏n
k=1(1−ωOt+k−1)(TRPG,Y Oa+n,t+n(i)+TRFF,Y Oa+n,t+n(i)+ProfitOa+n,t+n(i)−TOa+n,t+n(i))∏n
k=1(1+rt+k−1)
Et
∑∞
n=0 ((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ
−1Λt+k
+
+
(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i)
Et
∑∞
n=0 ((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)
∏n
k=1(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ
−1Λt+k
(3.120)
After some simplification and by introducing some additional variables, the final version
of consumption of agent i of cohort a at time t is:
HOt CO,Fa,t (i) = (TRPG,Y Oa,t (i) + TRFF,Y Oa,t (i))ΩOt + IOa,t(i) +
+(1 + rt−1)BOa−1,t−1(i) (3.121)
ΩOt = 1 + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
ΩOt+1 (3.122)
IOa,t(i) = ProfitOa,t(i)− TOa,t(i) + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
IOa+1,t+1(i) (3.123)
HOt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1− ωOt )(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1Λt+1HOt+1 (3.124)
Here, we would like to note that TRPG,Y On,t+n (i) = TR
PG,Y O
0,t (i) ∀n > 0, and, the same is true
for fully funded pensions.
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Aggregate consumption of the retired cohort
Aggregate consumption is equal to the sum of total pension and other income and initial
wealth:
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t(i)C
O,F
a,t (i)HOt =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t(i)
(
TRPG,Y Oa,t (i) + TR
FF,Y O
a,t (i)
)
ΩOt +
+
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t(i)IOa,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t(i)B
O
a−1,t−1(i) (3.125)
First, the number of old people declines over time:
NOa+1,t = (1− ωOt−1)NOa,t−1 (3.126)
NOa+2,t = (1− ωOt−1)(1− ωOt−2)NOa,t−2 (3.127)
... (3.128)
and
NOt =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t (3.129)
Now, we can express aggregate pension income in period t of those who got retired today,
one period before, etc.:
TRPG,Y Ot + TR
FF,Y O
t = N
O
0,t(TR
PG,Y O
0,t (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t (i)) (3.130)
(1− ωOt−1)(TRPG,Y Ot−1 + TRFF,Y Ot−1 ) = (1− ωOt−1)NO0,t−1(TRPG,Y O0,t−1 (i) +
+TRFF,Y O0,t−1 (i)) = N
O
1,t(TR
PG,Y O
1,t (i) + TR
FF,Y O
1,t (i)) (3.131)
... (3.132)
using TRPG,Y On,t+n (i) = TR
PG,Y O
0,t (i) ∀n > 0 again.
Then, adding up all pensions implies:
TRPGt + TR
FF
t = TR
PG,Y O
t + TR
FF,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)(TRPG,Y Ot−1 + TRFF,Y Ot−1 ) +
+(1− ωOt−1)(1− ωOt−2)(TRPG,Y Ot−2 + TRFF,Y Ot−2 ) + ... (3.133)
Similarly, we can express the aggregate value of all other incomes:
IOt =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tIOa,t(i) =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t
(
ProfitOa,t(i)− TOa,t(i)
)
+
+Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
∞∑
a=0
NOa,t(i)IOa+1,t+1(i) =
= ProfitOt − TOt + Et
1
1 + rt
∞∑
a=0
NOa+1,t+1IOa+1,t+1(i) (3.134)
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Where we note, because IOt refers to those who are already retired in period t, that
Et
∞∑
a=0
NOa+1,t+1(i)IOa+1,t+1(i) = EtIOt+1 − EtNOa,t+1IOa,t+1(i) (3.135)
Plugging this back to the recursive formula results in:
IOt = ProfitOt − TOt + Et
1
1 + rt
(IOt+1 −NOa,t+1IOa,t+1(i)) (3.136)
Then, the law of large numbers implies:
IOt = ProfitOt − TOt + Et
1
1 + rt
IOt+1
(
1− N
O
a,t+1
NOt+1
)
(3.137)
We rearrange the last term:
1− Et
NOa,t+1
NOt+1
= 1− Etω
Y
t N
Y
t
NOt+1
= 1− Etω
Y
t N
Y
t
NOt+1
NOt
NOt
=
= 1− Etω
Y
t
st
1
1 + gN,Ot+1
= 1− Etω
Y
t
st
1
1− ωOt + ω
Y
t
st
= 1− Et
ωYt
st
1− ωOt + ω
Y
t
st
=
= Et
1− ωOt + ω
Y
t
st
− ωYt
st
1− ωOt + ω
Y
t
st
= Et
1− ωOt
1− ωOt + ω
Y
t
st
= Et
1− ωOt
1 + gN,Ot+1
(3.138)
Finally, total other income is:
IOt = ProfitOt − TOt + Et
1− ωOt
(1 + rt)(1 + g
N,O
t+1 )
IOt+1 (3.139)
where we can define a rule how to divide the aggregate profits and lump-sum taxes among
the retired and young cohorts:
ProfitOt − TOt = (1− ξ)(Profitt − Tt) (3.140)
and ξ is a parameter between zero and one, that shows the fraction of profit minus lump-sum
taxes that goes to young cohort.
Now, aggregate consumption of the retired cohort cohort is defined as:
CO,Ft =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tC
O,F
a,t (i) (3.141)
while total savings of the retired is:
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O
a,t−1(i) = N
O
0,tB
O
0,t−1(i) +
∞∑
a=1
NOa,tB
O
a,t−1(i) (3.142)
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Here, we need to be careful with the just-retired agents, they were young one period before,
and, had different savings then. We can use the law of large numbers, and the following
expression: NO0,t = ω
Y
t−1N
Y
t−1:
NO0,tB
O
0,t−1(i) = N
O
0,t
∞∑
b=1
BY,lastb,t−1 (i) ' ωYt−1NYt−1
BYt−1
NYt−1
(3.143)
where the last refers to the fact those who get retired today spent their last year in the
young cohort in the previous year.
Then, from t − 1 to t it is easy to see that: ∑∞a=1 NOa,t = ∑∞a=1(1 − ωOt−1)NOa−1,t−1 which
implies that
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O
a,t−1(i) = ω
Y
t−1B
Y
t−1 +
∞∑
a=1
(1− ωOt−1)NOa−1,t−1BOa,t−1(i) (3.144)
Here, the second term means that only those retired agents cumulate savings who expect to
survive the next period. Hence, the amount of aggregate old-age savings from the previous
period is BOt−1 =
∑∞
a=1(1−ωOt−1)NOa−1,t−1BOa,t−1(i). Then, overall savings of the retired cohort
in period t can be expressed easily by adding just-retired savings from the previous period’s
young cohorts:
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O
a,t−1(i) = ω
Y
t−1B
Y
t−1 +B
O
t−1 (3.145)
As a last step, we put together all parts of the equation, so, aggregate consumption of
formal goods of the retired cohort is:
HOt CO,Ft = (TRPGt + TRFFt )ΩOt + IOt + (1 + rt−1)(ωYt−1BYt−1 +BOt−1) (3.146)
Also, informal consumption is:
CO,It = ΥtC
O,F
t (3.147)
Young generation
First order conditions of a young agent
’Young’ agent i of young cohort b is one individual of its cohort who started to work (was
born) b years ago. The Bellman-equation of a young individual is:
V Yt (B
Y
b−1,t−1(i)) =
= max
{
(1 + Ct )
[
1
1− γ
{
CY,Fb,t (i)
}1−γ
+
χ
1− γ
{
CY,Ib,t (i)
}1−γ]
+
+ βEt
(
(1− ωYt )V Yt+1(BYb,t(i)) + ωYt V Ot+1(BY Ob,t (i))
)}
(3.148)
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while the budget constraint is:
(1 + τCt )C
Y,F
b,t (i) + p
I
tC
Y,I
b,t (i) + (1− ωYt )BYb,t(i) + ωYt BY Ob,t (i) =
= (1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) + (1− τLWt )wFt LFb,t(i) + wItLIb,t(i) + (3.149)
+wUt Ub,t(i) + Profit
Y
b,t(i)− T Yb,t(i) (3.150)
First order conditions:
CY,Fb,t (i) : (1 + 
C
t )
{
CY,Fb,t (i)
}−γ
+ λYb,t(1 + τ
C
t ) = 0 (3.151)
CY,Ib,t (i) : (1 + 
C
t )χ
{
CY,Ib,t (i)
}−γ
+ λYb,tp
I
t = 0 (3.152)
BYb,t(i) : βEt(1− ωYt )V YBYb,t + Et(1− ω
Y
t )λ
Y
b,t = 0 (3.153)
BY Ob,t (i) : βEtω
Y
t V
Y
BY Ob,t
+ Etω
Y
t λ
Y
b,t = 0 (3.154)
One-period-ahead Envelope theorem:
EtVBYb,t = −Etλ
Y
b+1,t+1(1 + rt) (3.155)
Also, from the retired agent’s optimization we know that:
EtVBY Ob,t = −Etλ
O
0,t+1(1 + rt) = −EtλOb+1,t+1(1 + rt) (3.156)
where Etλ
O
0,t+1 = Etλ
O
b+1,t+1 because someone who was young in t gets retired in t+ 1.
Thus, the Euler equations of the young individual are:
βEt
(1 + Ct+1)
(
CY,Fb,t (i)
)γ
(1 + Ct )
(
CY,Fb+1,t+1(i)
)γ (1 + rt) 1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
= 1 (3.157)
βEt
(1 + Ct+1)
(
CY,Fb,t (i)
)γ
(1 + Ct )
(
CO,F0,t+1(i)
)γ (1 + rt) 1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
= 1 (3.158)
Rearranging:
EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1(i) = C
Y,F
b,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γEtΛt+1 (3.159)
EtC
O,F
0,t+1(i) = EtC
Y,F
b,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1 (3.160)
Also, we can express each period’s consumption as a function of period-t consumption and
the discount rate:
EtC
Y,F
b+n,t+n(i) = C
Y,F
b,t (i)Et
n∏
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k (3.161)
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Furthermore, the first order conditions also imply a substitution between formal and in-
formal goods:
(1 + Ct )
{
CY,Fb,t (i)
}−γ
= (1 + Ct )χ
{
CY,Ib,t (i)
}−γ 1 + τCt
pIt
(3.162)
or with more simple notations:
CY,Ib,t (i) = ΥtC
Y,F
b,t (i) (3.163)
Individual consumption of a young agent
First of all, we would like to stress that one needs to be careful when deriving the young
agent’s individual consumption because old-age incomes and expenditures must be taken
into account, too. Moreover, the young agents also consider the probability of retirement, for
instance, in period t the probability that a young agent becomes retired in period t+1 is ωYt ,
while the probability that the same agent becomes retired in period t+2 is (1−ωYt )ωYt+1. So,
the first term of the left-hand side of this equation shows the stream of lifetime consumption if
the agent stays young, then, from the second term onwards she retires with some probability
in each period:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)((1 + τCt+n)CY,Fb+n,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
Y,I
b+n,t+n
(i))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)(((1 + τCt+n)CO,Fn−1,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
O,I
n−1,t+n(i)))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)(((1 + τCt+n)CO,Fn−2,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
O,I
n−2,t+n(i)))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 + ...
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)
[
(1− τLt+n)wFb+n,t+nLFb+n,t+n(i) + wIb+n,t+nLIb+n,t+n(i) + wUb+n,t+nUb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) +
+Etω
Y
t
∞∑
n=1
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−1,t+n(i)− TOn−1,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
∞∑
n=2
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−2,t+n(i)− TOn−2,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et(1− ωYt )(1− ωYt+1)ωYt+2
∞∑
n=3
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−3,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−3,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−3,t+n(i)− TOn−3,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=4(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+... (3.164)
It is easier to express all consumptions in terms of formal goods
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)((1 + τCt+n)CY,Fb+n,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
Y,F
b+n,t+n
(i)Υt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)(((1 + τCt+n)CO,Fn−1,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
O,F
n−1,t+n(i)Υt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)(((1 + τCt+n)CO,Fn−2,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
O,F
n−2,t+n(i)Υt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 + ...
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)
[
(1− τLt+n)wFb+n,t+nLFb+n,t+n(i) + wIb+n,t+nLIb+n,t+n(i) + wUb+n,t+nUb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) +
+Etω
Y
t
∞∑
n=1
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−1,t+n(i)− TOn−1,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
∞∑
n=2
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−2,t+n(i)− TOn−2,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+ ... (3.165)
180
Based on the Euler-equations, we can express expected future consumptions. Let’s con-
sider an agent who is young in period t, then her consumption functions in the next periods
after getting retired are:
EtC
O,F
n,t+n+1(i) = EtC
O,F
0,t+1(i)
n∏
k=2
(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k (3.166)
On the other hand, if the agent stays young in period t+ 1 and gets retired after that, then
her future old-age consumptions look like
EtC
O,F
n,t+n+2(i) = EtC
O,F
0,t+2(i)
n∏
k=3
(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k (3.167)
Now, we plug them into the intertemporal budget constraint:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)((1 + τCt+n)CY,Fb+n,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
Y,F
b+n,t+n
(i)Υt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)CO,F0,t+1(i)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k(((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)CO,F0,t+2(i)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k(((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 + ...
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)
[
(1− τLt+n)wFb+n,t+nLFb+n,t+n(i) + wIb+n,t+nLIb+n,t+n(i) + wUb+n,t+nUb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) +
+Etω
Y
t
∞∑
n=1
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−1,t+n(i)− TOn−1,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
∞∑
n=2
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−2,t+n(i)− TOn−2,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+ ... (3.168)
After that, we use the other Euler equation (the one that shows the substitution between
period t young and period t+ 1 old-age consumption):
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)((1 + τCt+n)CY,Fb+n,t+n(i) + pIt+nC
Y,F
b+n,t+n
(i)Υt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)CY,Fb,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k(((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)CY,Fb+1,t+1(i)(1 + rt+1)
1
γ Λt+2(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k(((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n))∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 + ... =
= Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)
[
(1− τLt+n)wFb+n,t+nLFb+n,t+n(i) + wIb+n,t+nLIb+n,t+n(i) + wUb+n,t+nUb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+(1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) +
+Etω
Y
t
∞∑
n=1
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−1,t+n(i) + Profit
O
n−1,t+n(i)− TOn−1,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
∞∑
n=2
(
TR
PG,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + TR
FF,Y O
n−2,t+n(i) + Profit
O
a+n−2,t+n(i)− TOn−2,t+n(i)
) ∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+ ... (3.169)
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Concentrating on consumptions:
Et
∞∑
n=0
∏n
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)CY,Fb+n,t+n(i)((1 + τCt+n) + pIt+nΥt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)CY,Fb,t (i)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+Et(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)CY,Fb+1,t+1(i)(1 + rt+1)
1
γ Λt+2(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+... (3.170)
We rearrange
C
Y,F
b,t
(i)((1 + τ
C
t ) + p
I
tΥt) +
+C
Y,F
b,t
(i)Etω
Y
t
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1
(i)
(1− ωYt )((1 + τCt+1) + pIt+1Υt+1)
(1 + rt)
+
+EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1
(i)(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt+1)
1
γ Λt+2(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+... (3.171)
Simplifying before recursive substitution:
C
Y,F
b,t
(i)((1 + τ
C
t ) + p
I
tΥt) +
+C
Y,F
b,t
(i)Et
ωYt (1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1
1 + rt
 ∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=2
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1
(i)
(1− ωYt )((1 + τCt+1) + pIt+1Υt+1)
(1 + rt)
+EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1
(i)(1− ωYt )
ωYt+1(1 + rt+1)
1
γ Λt+2
(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)
 ∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k((1 + τ
C
t+n) + p
I
t+nΥt+n)∏n
k=3
(1 + rt+k−1)
 +
+... (3.172)
Now, we can use HOt+1 from retired agents’ optimization:
CY,Fb,t (i)
[
(1 + τCt ) + p
I
tΥt + Etω
Y
t (1 + rt)
1
γ−1Λt+1HOt+1
]
+
+EtC
Y,F
b+1,t+1(i)
(1− ωYt )
(1 + rt)
[
(1 + τCt+1) + p
I
t+1Υt+1 + ω
Y
t+1(1 + rt+1)
1
γ−1Λt+2HOt+2
]
+ ... (3.173)
And, using the Euler-equation again (to have period-t consumption only):
EtC
Y,F
b+n,t+n(i) = C
Y,F
b,t (i)Et
n∏
k=1
(1 + rt+k−1)
1
γ Λt+k (3.174)
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Lastly
C
Y,F
b,t
(i)
[
(1 + τ
C
t ) + p
I
tΥt + Etω
Y
t (1 + rt)
1
γ
−1
Λt+1HOt+1
]
+
C
Y,F
b,t
(i)Et(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1
(1− ωYt )
(1 + rt)
[
(1 + τ
C
t+1) + p
I
t+1Υt+1 + ω
Y
t+1(1 + rt+1)
1
γ
−1
Λt+2HOt+2
]
+
C
Y,F
b,t
(i)Et(1 + rt)
1
γ Λt+1(1 + rt+1)
1
γ Λt+2
(1− ωYt )(1− ωYt+1)
(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)
[
(1 + τ
C
t+2) + p
I
t+2Υt+2 + ω
Y
t+2(1 + rt+2)
1
γ
−1
Λt+3HOt+3
]
+ ...(3.175)
which is equal to
CY,Fb,t (i)HYt (3.176)
where
HYt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1Λt+1
(
(1− ωYt )HYt+1 + ωYt HOt+1
)
(3.177)
Similarly to consumption above, the young agent’s budget constraint contains old-age
income items, i.e. expected revenue from the pension fund, profits from firms and lump-sum
taxes.
IYOb,t (i) = EtωYt
(
(TR
PG,Y O
0,t+1 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
n,t+n (i))Ω
O
t+1 +
∞∑
n=1
∏n
k=2(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=2
(1 + rt+k−1)
(
Profit
O
n−1,t+n(i)− TOn−1,t+n(i)
))
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
(1 + rt+1)
(
(TR
PG,Y O
0,t+2 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+2 (i))Ω
O
t+2 +
∞∑
n=2
∏n
k=3(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=3
(1 + rt+k−1)
(
Profit
O
n−2,t+n(i)− TOn−2,t+n(i)
))
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )(1− ωYt+1)ωYt+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
(
(TR
PG,Y O
0,t+3 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+3 (i))Ω
O
t+3
)
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )(1− ωYt+1)ωYt+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
( ∞∑
n=3
∏n
k=4(1− ωOt+k−1)∏n
k=4
(1 + rt+k−1)
(
Profit
O
n−3,t+n(i)− TOn−3,t+n(i)
))
+ ... (3.178)
Again, we use that TRPG,Y On,t+n (i) = TR
PG,Y O
0,t (i) ∀n > 0, and, the same is true for fully funded
pensions.
Then, using the definition of IOa,t(i) we can rewrite total old-age income as
IY Ob,t (i) = EtωYt
(
(TRPG,Y O0,t+1 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ω
O
t+1 + IOa,t+1(i)
)
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )ωYt+1
1 + rt+1
(
(TRPG,Y O0,t+2 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+2 (i))Ω
O
t+2 + IO0,t+2(i)
)
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )(1− ωYt+1)ωYt+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
(
(TRPG,Y O0,t+3 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+3 (i))Ω
O
t+3 + IO0,t+3(i)
)
+ ... (3.179)
which in a recursive way looks as
IY Ob,t (i) = EtωYt
(
(TRPG,Y O0,t+1 (i) + TR
FF,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ωt+1 + IO0,t+1(i)
)
+
+Et
(1− ωYt )
(1 + rt+1)
IY Ob+1,t+1(i) (3.180)
Furthermore, young-age income is (using a new variable Inct(i))
IYb,t(i) = Et
∞∑
n=0
∏∞
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)n
[
(1− τLWt+n )wFt+nLFb+n,t+n(i) + wIt+nLIb+n,t+n(i) + wUt+nUb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
+
+Et
∞∑
n=0
∏∞
k=1(1− ωYt+k−1)n
[
ProfitYb+n,t+n(i)− TYb+n,t+n(i)
]
∏n
k=1(1 + rt+k−1)
=
= (1− τLWt )wFt LFb,t(i) + wItLIb,t(i) + wUt Ub,t(i) + ProfitYb,t(i)− TYb,t(i) + Et
1− ωYt
1 + rt
IYb+1,t+1(i) =
= Incb,t(i) + Et
1− ωYt
1 + rt
IYb+1,t+1(i) (3.181)
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Thus, the individual consumption function of agent i of cohort b in period t is
HYt CY,Fb,t (i) = IYb,t(i) +
IY Ob,t (i)
1 + rt
+ (1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) (3.182)
Aggregate consumption of the young cohort
In the first step we need to express the total number of young people. If NYb,t is the number
of b-year old workers, the total number of workers is
NYt =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,t (3.183)
Following the previous idea, we sum up all consumptions, incomes and savings:
HYt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tC
Y,F
b,t (i) =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb,t(i) +
1
1 + rt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob,t (i) +
+(1 + rt−1)
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tB
Y
b−1,t−1(i) (3.184)
where we note that the new young workers in time t have zero savings from the previous
period.
HYt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tC
Y,F
b,t (i) =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb,t(i) +
1
1 + rt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob,t (i) +
+(1 + rt−1)
∞∑
b=1
NYb,t
NYb−1,t−1
NYb−1,t−1
BYb−1,t−1(i) (3.185)
Rearranging
HYt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tC
Y,F
b,t (i) =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb,t(i) +
1
1 + rt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob,t (i) +
+(1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1B
Y
b−1,t−1(i) (3.186)
Aggregate values are defined as
CY,Ft ≡
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tC
Y,F
b,t (i) (3.187)
BYt−1 ≡
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1B
Y
b−1,t−1(i) (3.188)
IYt ≡
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb,t(i) (3.189)
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IY Ot ≡
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob,t (i) (3.190)
It is important to note that in each period, independently from the survival proba-
bilities, each young agent saves for the next period, hence, the overall savings BYt−1 =∑∞
b=1N
Y
b−1,t−1B
Y
b−1,t−1(i) is divided among those who remain young and get retired.
As a result, the aggregate consumption functions are
HYt CY,Ft = IYt +
IY Ot
1 + rt
+ (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BYt−1 (3.191)
CY,It = ΥtC
Y,F
t (3.192)
Now we need to aggregate the supporting variables as well. First of all, we rename indi-
vidual contemporary income
Incb,t(i) = (1− τLWt )wFt LFb,t(i) + wItLIb,t(i) + wUt Ub,t(i) + ProfitYb,t(i)− T Yb,t(i) (3.193)
Aggregating
Inct = (1− τLWt )wFt LFt + wItLIt + wUt Ut + ProfitYt − T Yt (3.194)
where
ProfitYt − T Yt = ξ(Profitt − Tt) (3.195)
Aggregating and rearranging
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb,t(i) =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIncb,t(i) + Et
(1− ωYt )
1 + rt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIYb+1,t+1(i)
=
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIncb,t(i) + Et
1
1 + rt
∞∑
b=0
NYb+1,t+1IYb+1,t+1(i) (3.196)
Because IYt+1 contains the income of the new-born people as well, the last term can be
rearranged, using the law of large numbers, as:
Et
∞∑
b=0
NYb+1,t+1IYb+1,t+1(i) = EtIYt+1 − EtNYb,t+1IYb,t+1(i) =
= EtIYt+1
(
1− N
Y
b,t+1
NYt+1
)
= EtIYt+1
(
1− ntN
Y
t
NYt+1
)
(3.197)
Then, total young income is:
IYt = Inct + Et
1− ωYt
(1 + rt)(1 + g
N,Y
t+1 )
IYt+1 (3.198)
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A similar exercise can be done for pension benefits. First, we define IY Ot which can be
rearranged
IY Ot =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob,t (i) = EtωYt
∞∑
b=0
NYb,t
(
(TRFF,Y O0,t+1 (i) + EtTR
PG,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ω
O
t+1 + IO0,t+1(i)
)
+
+
(1− ωYt )
(1 + rt+1)
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tIY Ob+1,t+1(i) =
= EtN
O
0,t+1
(
(TRFF,Y O0,t+1 (i) + TR
PG,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ω
O
t+1 + IO0,t+1(i)
)
+
+Et
1
(1 + rt+1)
∞∑
b=0
NYb+1,t+1IY Ob+1,t+1(i) (3.199)
Now, similarly to total young income, the last term can be expressed as
Et
∞∑
b=0
NYb+1,t+1IY Ob+1,t+1(i) = Et
1− ωYt
1 + gN,Yt+1
IY Ot+1 (3.200)
Also we know that
EtN
O
0,t+1
(
(TRFF,Y O0,t+1 (i) + TR
PG,Y O
0,t+1 (i))Ω
O
t+1
)
= Et(TR
FF,Y O
t+1 + TR
PG,Y O
t+1 )Ω
O
t+1 (3.201)
EtN
O
0,t+1IO0,t+1(i) =
ωYt N
Y
t
NOt+1
IOt+1 = Et
ωYt
(1 + gN,Yt+1 )st+1
IOt+1 (3.202)
Finally, the expected income of the young after getting retired is
IYOt = Et(TRPG,Y Ot+1 + TR
FF,Y O
t+1 )Ω
O
t+1 + Et
 ωYt
(1 + g
N,Y
t+1 )st+1
IOt+1+
Et 1− ωYt
(1 + rt+1)(1 + g
N,Y
t+1 )
IYOt+1 (3.203)
Aggregating the young households’ budget constraints
The individual budget constraint of a young agent is
(1 + τCt )C
Y,F
b,t (i) + p
I
tC
Y,I
b,t (i) + (1− ωYt )BYb,t(i) + ωYt BY ∗b,t (i) =
= Incb,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)BYb−1,t−1(i) (3.204)
Aggregating
∞∑
b=0
NYb,t((1 + τ
C
t )C
Y,F
b,t (i) + p
I
tC
Y,I
b,t (i)) +
∞∑
b=0
NYb,t(1− ωYt )BYb,t(i) +
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tω
Y
t B
Y ∗
b,t (i) =
=
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tInct(i) + (1 + rt−1)
∞∑
b=1
NYb,tB
Y
b−1,t−1(i) (3.205)
where the definition of aggregate savings is:
∞∑
b=1
NYb,tB
Y
b−1,t−1(i) =
∞∑
b=1
(1− ωYt−1)NYb−1,t−1BYb−1,t−1(i) (3.206)
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After aggregation, there is no difference between the BYt and B
Y ∗
t . So, we can easily
express the aggregate budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )C
Y,F
t + p
I
tC
Y,I
t +B
Y
t = Inct + (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BYt−1 (3.207)
B The public pension systems
Pay-as-you-go pension system
In a PAYG regime, all public revenues finance all public expenditures (also pension bene-
fits):
Revt = τ
C
t C
F
t + τ
L
t w
F
t L
F
t + Tt (3.208)
τLt = τ
PI
t + (1− Ξ)(τSSCWt + τSSCFt ) (3.209)
Expt = Govt + w
U
t Ut + TR
PG
t (3.210)
where Ξ is 0 in a PAYG regime, 1 in a fully funded regime, but it can be time-variant as
well.
The number of the just-retired agents (those who were young one period before) is
NO0,t =
∞∑
b=1
ωYt−1N
Y
b−1,t−1 (3.211)
Individual (i)’s pension in the year of retirement t is based on replacement rate νt and the
average of the last Y years’ income:
TRPG,Y O0,t (i) = νtIB
Y
b−1,t(i) (3.212)
where
IBYb−1,t(i) =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
b−1,t−1(i) +
Y − 1
Y
IBYb−2,t−1(i) (3.213)
Aggregating the last expression implies
IBYt =
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1IB
Y
b−1,t(i) =
=
1
Y
wFt−1
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1L
F
b−1,t−1(i) +
Y − 1
Y
∞∑
b=2
NYb−1,t−1IB
Y
b−2,t−1(i) (3.214)
It is also true that
IBYt =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
t−1 +
Y − 1
Y
∞∑
b=2
NYb−1,t−1
NYb−2,t−2
NYb−2,t−2
IBYb−2,t−1(i) (3.215)
which can be rearranged
IBYt =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
t−1 +
Y − 1
Y
(1− ωYt−2)
∞∑
b=2
NYb−2,t−2IB
Y
b−2,t−1(i) (3.216)
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Then
IBYt =
1
Y
wFt−1L
F
t−1 +
Y − 1
Y
(1− ωYt−2)IBYt−1 (3.217)
We need this to aggregate the just-retired pension benefits
NO0,tTR
PG,Y O
0,t (i) = νtN
O
0,tIB
Y
b−1,t(i) = νtω
Y
t−1
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1IB
Y
b−1,t(i) (3.218)
Total pension expenditure of the just retired is simple with the new notations
TRPG,Y Ot = νtω
Y
t−1IB
Y
t (3.219)
Furthermore, total pension expenditure of all retired people is
TRPGt = TR
PG,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)TRPG,Y Ot−1 + (1− ωOt−2)TRPG,Y Ot−2 + ... (3.220)
which can be rewritten as
TRPGt = TR
PG,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)TRPGt−1 (3.221)
Fully funded pension system
In the fully funded regime, pension benefits are not financed from the public budget, but
separately based on individual savings:
Expt = Govt + w
U
t Ut (3.222)
Agent (i) has a private account, where she can accumulate her own pension wealth:
BY ∗b,t (i) = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w
F
t L
F
b,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)B
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) (3.223)
Aggregating
BY ∗t =
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tB
Y ∗
b,t (i) = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w
F
t
∞∑
b=0
NYb,tL
F
b,t(i) + (1 + rt−1)
∞∑
b=1
NYb,tB
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) (3.224)
Then the last term can be rearranged
∞∑
b=1
NYb,tB
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) = (1− ωYt−1)
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1B
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) = (1− ωYt−1)BY ∗t−1 (3.225)
Hence
BY ∗t = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w
F
t L
F
t + (1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)BY ∗t−1 (3.226)
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In the moment of getting retirement the just-retired benefits are calculated based on the
so far accumulated pension wealth, expected life expectancy and the discount rates. In each
period the pension fund transfers this amount, while the rest remains on the account.
(1 + rt−1)BY ∗b−1,t−1(i) = TR
FF,Y O
0,t (i) + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
TRFF,Y O1,t+1 (i) +
+Et
(1− ωOt )(1− ωOt+1)
(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)
TRFF,Y O2,t+2 (i) + ... = TR
FF,Y O
0,t (i)Ω
O
t (3.227)
Aggregating and rearranging
(1 + rt−1)NO0,tB
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) = N
O
0,tTR
FF,Y O
0,t (i)Ω
O
t = TR
FF,Y O
t Ω
O
t (3.228)
(1 + rt−1)
∞∑
b=1
ωYt−1N
Y
b−1,t−1B
Y ∗
b−1,t−1(i) = TR
FF,Y O
t Ω
O
t (3.229)
(1 + rt−1)ωYt−1B
Y ∗
t−1 = TR
FF,Y O
t Ω
O
t (3.230)
Overall total pension expenditure in the fully funded regime can be given in a recursive
way, similarly to that of the PAYG regime, as
TRFFt = TR
FF,Y O
t + (1− ωOt−1)TRFFt−1 (3.231)
Finally, we can express savings in each period after pension benefits were deducted
(1 + rt−1)B
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) = TR
FF,Y O
a,t (i) + (1− ωOt )BO,∗a,t (i) (3.232)
Aggregating and rearranging
(1 + rt−1)
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) =
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tTR
FF,Y O
a,t (i) + (1− ωOt )
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O,∗
a,t (i) =
= TRFFt +B
O,∗
t (3.233)
The left-hand side of the above equation can be rearranged as
∞∑
a=0
NOa,tB
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) = N
O
0,tB
O,∗
−1,t−1(i) +
∞∑
a=1
NOa,tB
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) =
= NO0,tB
O,∗
−1,t−1(i) + (1− ωOt−1)
∞∑
a=1
NOa−1,t−1B
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) (3.234)
Lastly, we use that BO,∗−1,t−1(i) = B
Y,last,∗
b−1,t−1(i) because the initial old pension wealth is equal
to pension savings accumulated over lifetime. Also, we rewrite NOa,t. So the first term of the
above equation becomes
ωYt−1
∞∑
b=1
NYb−1,t−1B
Y,last,∗
b−1,t−1(i) + (1− ωOt−1)
∞∑
a=1
NOa−1,t−1B
O,∗
a−1,t−1(i) (3.235)
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Finally the market clearing equations for old-age pension savings are
(1 + rt−1)ωYt−1B
Y ∗
t−1 + (1 + rt−1)B
O,∗
t−1 = TR
FF
t +B
O,∗
t (3.236)
B∗t = B
Y ∗
t +B
O,∗
t (3.237)
C Normalized equations
Each variable must be detrended; individual variables are normalized with technology (At)
and aggregate variables are normalized with technology and population (Nt), because there
are technology and population growth in the model. This section lists all the final equations
of the model, detrended variable xt is denoted by x˜t.
Demography:
st =
(1− ωOt−1)
(1− ωYt−1 + nt)
st−1 +
ωYt−1
(1− ωYt−1 + nt)
(3.238)
sYt =
1
1 + st
(3.239)
1 + gN,Yt = 1− ωYt−1 + nt (3.240)
1 + gN,Ot = (1− ωOt−1) +
ωYt−1
st−1
(3.241)
1 + gNt = (1 + g
N,Y
t )
1 + st
1 + st−1
(3.242)
Overlapping generations:
HOt ˜CO,Ft = ( ˜TRPGt + ˜TRFFt )ΩOt + I˜Ot +
(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
(
ωYt−1
˜BYt−1 +
˜BOt−1
)
(3.243)
I˜Ot = (1− ξ)
(
˜Profitt − T˜t
)
+ Et
1 + gt+1
1 + rt
1− ωOt
1 + gN,Ot+1
˜IOt+1 (3.244)
HOt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1− ωOt )(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1Λt+1HOt+1 (3.245)
HYt ˜CY,Ft = I˜Yt +
˜IY Ot
1 + rt
+
(1 + rt−1)(1− ωYt−1)
1 + gt
˜BYt−1 (3.246)
ΩOt = 1 + Et
1− ωOt
1 + rt
ΩOt+1 (3.247)
˜CO,It = Υt
˜CO,Ft (3.248)
EtΛt+1 = Et
{
β
1 + Ct+1
1 + Ct
1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
} 1
γ
(3.249)
Υt =
{
χ
1 + τCt
pIt
} 1
γ
(3.250)
HYt = (1 + τCt ) + pItΥt + Et(1 + rt)
1
γ
−1Λt+1
(
(1− ωYt )HYt+1 + ωYt HOt+1
)
(3.251)
˜Inct = (1− τLWt )w˜Ft L˜Ft + w˜It L˜It + w˜Ut U˜t + ξ
(
˜Profitt − T˜t
)
(3.252)
190
I˜Yt = ˜Inct + Et
(1− ωYt )(1 + gt+1)
(1 + rt)(1 + g
N,Y
t+1 )
˜IYt+1 (3.253)
˜IY Ot = Et(1 + gt+1)
(
( ˜TRPG,Y Ot+1 +
˜TRFF,Y Ot+1 )Ω
O
t+1 +
ωYt
(1 + gN,Yt+1 )st+1
˜IOt+1
)
+
+Et
(1− ωYt+1)(1 + gt+1)
(1 + rt+1)(1 + g
N,Y
t+1 )
˜IY Ot+1 (3.254)
˜CY,It = Υt
˜CY,Ft (3.255)
(1 + τCt )
˜CY,Ft + p
I
t
˜CY,It + B˜
Y
t = ˜Inct +
(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
(1− ωYt−1) ˜BYt−1 (3.256)
Formal firms - except labor market:
R
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
)
=
φP
2
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
− 1
)2
(3.257)
1 +
1
ϕ− 1R
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
)
+
1
ϕ− 1R
′
(
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
)
1 + piFt
(1 + piFt−1)γ
−
−Et 1
ϕ− 1
(1 + gt+1)
˜Y Ft+1
Y˜ Ft
R′
(
1+piFt+1
(1+piFt )
γ
)(
1+piFt+1
(1+piFt )
γ
)
1 + rt
=
ϕ
ϕ− 1mc
F
t (3.258)
mcFt =
(
rK,Ft
αF
)αF (
(1 + τSSCFt )w˜
F
t
A˜Ft (1− αF )
)(1−αF )
(3.259)
1
1 + gt
˜KFt−1 = α
Fmc
F
t
rK,Ft
Y˜ Ft (3.260)
mcFt (1− αF )
Y˜ Ft
L˜Ft
− (1 + τSSCFt )w˜Ft = ˜hcFt − Et
˜hcFt+1(1− prF,Ft+1 )
(1 + rt)
(1 + gAt+1) (3.261)
˜profitFt = Y˜
F
t − rK,Ft ˜KFt−1
1
1 + gt
− (1 + τSSCWt )w˜Ft L˜Ft −R(·)Y˜ Ft − ˜hcFt H˜Ft (3.262)
Et(r
K,F
t+1 +Q
F
t+1(1− δ)) = QFt (1 + rt) (3.263)
1 = QFt
(
1− S
(
˜InvFt
˜InvFt−1
)
− S ′
(
˜InvFt
˜InvFt−1
)
˜InvFt
˜InvFt−1
)
+
+Et
1
1 + rt
QFt+1S
′
(
˜InvFt+1
˜InvFt
)(
˜InvFt+1
˜InvFt
)2
(3.264)
˜InvFt
(
1− S
(
˜InvFt
˜InvFt−1
))
= K˜Ft − (1− δ)
˜KFt−1
1 + gt
(3.265)
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Informal firms - except labor market:
R
(
1 + piIt
(1 + piIt−1)γ
)
=
φP
2
(
1 + piIt
(1 + piIt−1)γ
− 1
)2
(3.266)
1 +
1
ϕ− 1R
(
1 + piIt
(1 + piIt−1)γ
)
+
1
ϕ− 1R
′
(
1 + piIt
(1 + piIt−1)γ
)
1 + piIt
(1 + piIt−1)γ
−
−Et 1
ϕ− 1
(1 + gt+1)
˜Y It+1
Y˜ It
R′
(
1+piIt+1
(1+piIt )
γ
)(
1+piIt+1
(1+piIt )
γ
)
1 + rt
=
ϕ
ϕ− 1
mcIt
pIt
(3.267)
mcIt =
(
rK,It
αI
)αI (
w˜It
A˜It (1− αI)
)(1−αI)
(3.268)
1
1 + gt
˜KIt−1 = α
Imc
I
t
rK,It
Y˜ It (3.269)
mcIt (1− αI)
Y˜ It
L˜It
− w˜It = h˜cIt − Et
˜hcIt+1(1− prF,It+1)
(1 + rt)
(1 + gAt+1) (3.270)
˜profitIt = p
I
t Y˜
I
t − rK,It ˜KIt−1
1
1 + gt
− w˜It L˜It −R(·)Y˜ It − h˜cIt H˜It (3.271)
Et(r
K,I
t+1 +Q
I
t+1(1− δ)) = QIt (1 + rt) (3.272)
QIt
(
1− S
(
˜InvIt
˜InvIt−1
)
− S ′
(
˜InvIt
˜InvIt−1
)
˜InvIt
˜InvIt−1
)
+
+Et
1
1 + rt
QIt+1S
′
(
˜InvIt+1
˜InvIt
)(
˜InvIt+1
˜InvIt
)2
= 1 (3.273)
˜InvIt
(
1− S
(
˜InvIt
˜InvIt−1
))
= K˜It − (1− δ)
˜KIt−1
1 + gt
(3.274)
Labor market with wage bargaining:
hcFt = κ
F (prH,Ft )
αHC (3.275)
prH,Ft =
H˜Ft
˜Ut−1
1+gNt
+ prF,Ft
˜LFt−1
1+gNt
+ prF,It
˜LIt−1
1+gNt
(3.276)
L˜Ft = (1− prFt )
˜LFt−1
1 + gNt
+ H˜Ft (3.277)
σF
1− σF
˜hcFt
1− τLWt
1 + τSSCFt
= (1− τLWt )w˜Ft − w˜Ut +
+Et
1 + gAt+1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,Ft+1 )(1− prH,Ft+1 )
(
σF
1− σF
˜hcFt+1
1− τLWt+1
1 + τSSCFt+1
)]
−
−Et1 + g
A
t+1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,Ft+1 )prH,It+1
(
σI
1− σI hc
I
t
)]
(3.278)
hcIt = κ
I(prH,It )
αHC (3.279)
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prH,It =
H˜It
˜Ut−1
1+gNt
+ prF,Ft
˜LFt−1
1+gNt
+ prF,It
˜LIt−1
1+gNt
(3.280)
L˜It = (1− prF,It )
˜LIt−1
1 + gNt
+ H˜It (3.281)
σI
1− σI h˜c
I
t = w˜
I
t − w˜Ut + Et
1 + gAt+1
1 + rt
[
(1− prF,It+1)(1− prH,It+1)
σI
1− σI
˜hcIt+1
]
−
−Et1 + g
A
t+1
1 + rt
[
prH,Ft+1 (1− prF,It+1)
σF
1− σF
˜hcFt+1
1− τLWt+1
1 + τSSCt+1
]
(3.282)
Government46
˜Revt = τ
C
t C˜
F
t + τ
L
t w˜
F
t L˜
F
t + T˜t (3.283)
τLWt = τ
PI
t + τ
SSCW
t (3.284)
B˜t =
1
1 + gt
˜Bt−1 − ˜GBt (3.285)
˜PBt = ˜Revt − ˜Expt (3.286)
˜GBt = ˜PBt − rt−1 1
1 + gt
˜Bt−1 (3.287)
T˜t = ηT + (1− η)
[
ρ ˜Tt−1 + (1− ρ)( ˜GBTargett − ˜GBt)
]
(3.288)
PAYG pension system:47
τLt = τ
PI
t + (1− Ξ)(τSSCWt + τSSCFt ) (3.289)
˜Expt = ˜Govt + w˜Ut U˜t +
˜TRPGt (3.290)
˜IBYt =
1
Y
˜wFt−1
˜LFt−1 +
Y − 1
Y
(1− ωYt−2)
1 + gt−1
˜IBYt−1 (3.291)
˜TRPG,Y Ot = νt
ωYt−1
1 + gt
˜IBYt (3.292)
˜TRPGt =
˜TRPG,Y Ot +
(1− ωOt−1)
1 + gt
˜TRPGt−1 (3.293)
Fully funded pension system:
˜Expt = ˜Govt + w˜Ut U˜t (3.294)
˜BY ∗t = Ξ(τ
SSCW
t + τ
SSCF
t )w˜
F
t L˜
F
t +
(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
(1− ωYt−1)BY ∗t−1 (3.295)
(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
ωYt−1
˜BY ∗t−1 =
˜TRFF,Y Ot Ω
O
t (3.296)
˜TRFFt =
˜TRFF,Y Ot + (1− ωOt−1)
1
1 + gt
˜TRFFt−1 (3.297)
46There is a similar rule for all other fiscal instruments, not only for lump-sum taxes.
47IBYt in the third and fourth equations is normalized by At−1Nt−1.
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(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
ωYt−1
˜BY ∗t−1 +
(1 + rt−1)
1 + gt
˜BO,∗t−1 =
˜TRFFt +
˜BO,∗t (3.298)
B˜∗t =
˜BY ∗t +
˜BO,∗t (3.299)
Monetary policy:
1 + it = (1 + it−1)ρiEt
(
(1 + r)
(
1 + piFt+1
)φpi)1−ρi
e
i
t (3.300)
1 + it = (1 + rt)Et(1 + pi
F
t+1) (3.301)
Market clearing:
U˜t = s
Y
t − L˜Ft − L˜It (3.302)
˜Profitt =
˜profitFt +
˜profitIt (3.303)
B˜t +Q
F
t K˜
F
t +Q
I
t K˜
I
t = B˜
Y
t + B˜
O
t + B˜
∗
t (3.304)
Y˜ Ft = C˜
F
t + ˜Invt + ˜Govt +
˜hcFt H˜
F
t +R
(
P Ft
P Ft−1
)
+ ˜InvFt S
(
InvFt
InvFt−1
)
+
+ ˜InvIt S
(
InvIt
InvIt−1
)
(3.305)
Y˜ It = C˜
I
t + h˜c
I
t H˜
I
t +R
(
P It
P It−1
)
(3.306)
C˜Ft =
˜CY,Ft +
˜CO,Ft (3.307)
C˜It =
˜CY,It +
˜CO,It (3.308)
˜Invt =
˜InvFt +
˜InvIt (3.309)
˜GDPt = C˜t + ˜Invt + ˜Govt (3.310)
C˜t = C˜Ft + p
I
t C˜
I
t (3.311)
Y˜t = Y˜ Ft + p
I
t Y˜
I
t (3.312)
D Steady state of the model
The steady state is solved numerically. First, we specify initial guesses for the following
variables: r, pI , Y
F
Y
, prH,F and prH,I . Then, as a function of initial guesses, we can determine
the variables of production, labor market and bargaining and those of the government and
pension systems. Finally, we turn to the consumption and savings functions. At the end,
using the market clearing equations and some other leftover equations, we can check whether
our initial guesses are correct. First, we calculate each variable in terms of production, then,
after calculating Y˜ itself, we can find the steady-state levels of the variables. Now, we
describe the steps of calculating the model’s steady state in detail.
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First, the demographic equations are:
s =
ωY
(1−ωY +n)
1− (1−ωO)
(1−ωY +n)
(3.313)
sY =
1
1 + s
(3.314)
1 + gN,Y = 1− ωY + n (3.315)
1 + gN,O = (1− ωO) + ω
Y
s
(3.316)
1 + gN = (1 + gN,Y )
1 + s
1 + s
(3.317)
Additionally, the balanced growth trend can be given by:
(1 + g) = (1 + gA)(1 + gN) (3.318)
where gA is the exogenous productivity growth.
Then, we need to guess an initial value for r, pI , Y˜
I
Y˜
, prH,F and prH,I which are verified
by the Newton-Raphson algorithm. Assuming piF = 0 in the steady state implies:
i = r (3.319)
In the steady state the quadratic adjustment costs are zero, so:
QF = 1 (3.320)
QI = 1 (3.321)
and from the no-arbitrage conditions:
rK,F = r + δ (3.322)
rK,I = r + δ (3.323)
Then, we can calculate the marginal costs from the Phillips-curves:
mcF =
ϕ− 1
ϕ
(3.324)
mcI =
ϕ− 1
ϕ
pI (3.325)
Because we have a guess for Y˜
I
Y˜
and pI , formal production share is given by:
Y˜ F
Y˜
= 1− pI Y˜
I
Y˜
(3.326)
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Also, we can express the capital-output ratios from the capital demands:
K˜F
Y˜
= (1 + g)αF
mcF
rK,F
Y˜ F
Y˜
(3.327)
K˜I
Y˜
= (1 + g)αI
mcI
rK,I
Y˜ I
Y˜
(3.328)
and then the investment-output ratios are:
˜InvF
Y˜
=
K˜F
Y˜
(
1− (1− δ) 1
1 + g
)
(3.329)
˜InvI
Y˜
=
K˜I
Y˜
(
1− (1− δ) 1
1 + g
)
(3.330)
˜Inv
Y˜
=
˜InvF
Y˜
+
˜InvI
Y˜
(3.331)
As a next step, from the marginal cost functions we calculate the gross wages (assuming
that A˜F = 1 and A˜I = 1):
(1 + τSSCF )w˜F = (1− αF )
 mcF(
rK,F
αF
)αF

1
1−αF
(3.332)
w˜I = (1− αI)
 mcI(
rK,I
αI
)αI

1
1−αI
(3.333)
Now, we know the ratios of hiring costs to wages (Wage RatioF and Wage RatioI), so
we can endogenously determine κF and κI :
hcF = Wage RatioF (1 + τSSCF )w˜F (3.334)
hcI = Wage RatioIw˜I (3.335)
κF =
hcF
prH,F
αhc
(3.336)
κI =
hcI
prH,I
αhc
(3.337)
Then, using the labor demand equations we can calculate the labor-output ratios:
L˜F
Y˜
=
Y˜ F
Y˜
mcF (1− αF )
(1 + τSSCF )w˜F + ˜hcF − ˜hcF (1−prF,F )
(1+r)
(1 + gA)
(3.338)
L˜I
Y˜
=
Y˜ I
Y˜
mcI(1− αI)
w˜I + h˜cI − ˜hcI(1−prF,I)
(1+r)
(1 + gA)
(3.339)
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Now, the hiring-output ratios are:
H˜F
Y˜
=
L˜F
Y˜
(
1− (1− prF ) L˜
F
1 + gN
)
(3.340)
H˜I
Y˜
=
L˜I
Y˜
(
1− (1− prF,I) L˜
I
1 + gN
)
(3.341)
And, the unemployment-output ratio can be given by using the prH,F equation:
U˜
Y˜
= (1 + gN)
H˜F
Y˜
prH,F
− prF,F L˜
F
Y˜
− prF,I L˜
I
Y˜
(3.342)
The remaining three labor market equations (prH,F and the two wage bargaining equations)
are used by the Newton-Raphson algoritm to verify the initial guesses for Y˜
I
Y˜
, prH,F and
prH,I .
Next, we can calculate profits in total production:
˜profitF
Y˜
= pF
Y˜ F
Y˜
− rK,F K˜
F
Y˜
1
1 + g
− (1 + τSSCW )w˜F L˜
F
Y˜
− ˜hcF H˜
F
Y˜
(3.343)
˜profitI
Y˜
= pI
Y˜ I
Y˜
− rK,I K˜
I
Y˜
1
1 + g
− w˜I L˜
I
Y˜
− h˜cI H˜
I
Y˜
(3.344)
Using the goods market clearing conditions, we can express formal and informal consump-
tion as a share of total production:
C˜F
Y˜
=
Y˜ F
Y˜
−
˜Inv
Y˜
− G˜ov
Y˜
− ˜hcF H˜
F
Y˜
(3.345)
C˜I
Y˜
=
Y˜ I
Y˜
− h˜cI H˜
I
Y˜
(3.346)
As a result, total consumption-output ratio is:
C˜
Y˜
=
C˜F
Y˜
+ pI
C˜I
Y˜
(3.347)
Because all variabels are expressed as a share of production so far, we need the GDP-
production ratio:
˜GDP
Y˜
=
C˜
Y˜
+
˜Inv
Y˜
+
G˜ov
Y˜
(3.348)
(3.349)
We observe all distortionary tax revenues as a share of GDP, hence, we can calculate the
effective tax rates which are consistent with the model’s labor and goods markets.
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Now we can express all other fiscal variables (the initial calibration is done with a PAYG
pension plan):
˜IBY
Y˜
=
1
Y
w˜F L˜
F
Y˜
1− Y−1
Y
(1−ωY )
1+g
(3.350)
˜TRPG,Y O
Y˜
= ν
ωY
1 + g
˜IBY
Y˜
(3.351)
˜TRPG
Y˜
=
˜TRPG,Y O
Y˜
1− (1−ωO)
1+g
(3.352)
˜Exp
Y˜
=
G˜ov
Y˜
+ w˜U
U˜
Y˜
+
˜TRPG
Y˜
(3.353)
Taking into account the data on the government debt to GDP ratio, we calculate the
lump-sum tax to GDP ratio:
G˜B
Y˜
=
(
1
1 + g
− 1
)
B˜
Y˜
(3.354)
P˜B
Y˜
=
G˜B
Y˜
+ r
1
1 + g
B˜
Y˜
(3.355)
R˜ev
Y˜
=
P˜B
Y˜
+
˜Exp
Y˜
(3.356)
T˜
Y˜
=
R˜ev
Y˜
− τC C˜
F
Y˜
− τLw˜F L˜
F
Y˜
(3.357)
Now we express all supporting variables of the households:
I˜O
Y˜
=
(1− ξ)
(
˜Profit
Y˜
− T˜
Y˜
)
1− 1+g
1+r
1−ωO
1+gN,O
(3.358)
ΩO =
1
1− 1−ωO
1+r
(3.359)
Λ = β
1
γ (3.360)
Υ =
{
χ
1 + τC
pI
} 1
γ
(3.361)
HO = (1 + τ
C) + pIΥ
1− (1− ωO)(1 + r) 1γ−1Λ
(3.362)
HY = (1 + τ
C) + pIΥ + (1 + r)
1
γ
−1ΛωYHO
1− (1 + r) 1γ−1Λ(1− ωY )
(3.363)
˜Inc
Y˜
= (1− τLW )w˜F L˜
F
Y˜
+ w˜I
L˜I
Y˜
+ w˜U
U˜
Y˜
+ ξ
(
˜Profit
Y˜
− T˜
Y˜
)
(3.364)
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I˜Y
Y˜
=
˜Inc
Y˜
1− (1−ωY )(1+g)
(1+r)(1+gN,Y )
(3.365)
˜IY O
Y˜
=
(1 + g)
(
(
˜TRPG,Y O
Y˜
+
˜TRFF,Y O
Y˜
)ΩO + ω
Y
(1+gN,Y )s
I˜O
Y˜
)
1− (1−ωY )(1+g)
(1+r)(1+gN,Y )
(3.366)
Using the young agents’ consumption function, budget constraint and the remaining first
order conditions we can express the savings to total production ratio:
HY
˜CY,F
Y˜
=
I˜Y
Y˜
+
˜IY O
Y˜
1 + r
+
(1 + r)(1− ωY )
1 + g
B˜Y
Y˜
(3.367)
˜CY,I
Y˜
= Υ
˜CY,F
Y˜
(3.368)
(1 + τC)
˜CY,F
Y˜
+ pI
˜CY,I
Y˜
+
B˜Y
Y˜
=
˜Inc
Y˜
+
(1 + r)
1 + g
(1− ωY )B˜
Y
Y˜
(3.369)
where we plug the informal consumption to production ratio in, in order to express the
formal consumption to production ratio:
˜CY,F
Y˜
=
˜Inc
Y˜
+
(
(1+r)
1+g
(1− ωY )− 1
)
B˜Y
Y˜
(1 + τC) + pIΥ
(3.370)
Then, plugging this back in the consumption function:
HY
˜Inc
Y˜
+
(
(1+r)
1+g
(1− ωY )− 1
)
B˜Y
Y˜
(1 + τC) + pIΥ
=
I˜Y
Y˜
+
˜IY O
Y˜
1 + r
+
(1 + r)(1− ωY )
1 + g
B˜Y
Y˜
(3.371)
(3.372)
So, the steady-state savings as a share of production are:
B˜Y
Y˜
=
(1+τC)+pIΥ
HY
(
I˜Y
Y˜
+
˜IY O
Y˜
1+r
+
)
− ˜Inc
Y˜(
(1+r)
1+g
(1− ωY )− 1
)
− (1+τC)+pIΥHY (1+r)(1−ω
Y )
1+g
(3.373)
As a next step we can express the steady-state formal and informal consumptions:
˜CY,F
Y˜
=
I˜Y
Y˜
+
˜IY O
Y˜
1+r
+ (1+r)(1−ω
Y )
1+g
˜BYt−1
Y˜
HY (3.374)
˜CY,I
Y˜
= Υ
˜CY,F
Y˜
(3.375)
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and, using the formal goods market clearing condition, the old households’ formal and in-
formal consumption functions are:
˜CO,F
Y˜
=
C˜F
Y˜
−
˜CY,F
Y˜
(3.376)
˜CO,I
Y˜
= Υ
˜CO,F
Y˜
(3.377)
(3.378)
Finally, the retired savings to production look like:
B˜O
Y˜
=
HO ˜CO,F
Y˜
− ( ˜TRPG
Y˜
+
˜TRFF
Y˜
)ΩO − I˜O
Y˜
− (1+r)
1+g
ωY B˜
Y
Y˜
(1+r)
1+g
(3.379)
In the last step we calculate total production based on the unemployment equation:
U˜
Y˜
=
sY
Y˜
− L˜
F
Y˜
− L˜
I
Y˜
(3.380)
Y˜ =
sY
U˜
Y˜
+ L˜
F
Y˜
+ L˜
I
Y˜
(3.381)
Now, the levels of all variables can be lastly expressed. The five remaining equations (see
below) are used to verify the initial guesses for r, pI , Y˜
I
Y˜
, prH,F and prH,I . If the guesses are
correct, the left- and right-hand sides of the remaining equations are equal. Otherwise the
Newton-Raphson method chooses new initial values for these five variables; and, this process
goes on until no new initial values must be chosen.
res1 =
σF
1− σF
˜hcF
1− τLW
1 + τSSCF
−
{
(1− τLW )w˜F − w˜U +
+
1 + gA
1 + r
[
(1− prF,F )(1− prH,F )
(
σF
1− σF
˜hcF
1− τLW
1 + τSSCF
)]
−
−1 + g
A
1 + r
[
(1− prF,F )prH,I
(
σI
1− σI hc
I
)]}
(3.382)
res2 = pr
H,I −
 H˜I
U˜
1+gN
+ prF,F L˜
F
1+gN
+ prF,I L˜
I
1+gN
 (3.383)
res3 =
σI
1− σI h˜c
I −
{
w˜I − w˜U + E 1 + g
A
1 + r
[
(1− prF,I)(1− prH,I) σI
1− σI h˜c
I
]
−
−1 + g
A
1 + r
[
prH,F (1− prF,I) σF
1− σF
˜hcF
1− τLW
1 + τSSC
]}
(3.384)
res4 = B˜ +Q
F K˜F +QIK˜I −
(
B˜Y + B˜O
)
(3.385)
res5 = C˜I − ˜CY,I − ˜CO,I (3.386)
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E Robustness
As we discussed in the paper, three assumptions were made when calibrating the steady
state of the model. First, the bargaining power of workers was to be assumed half in the
informal than in the formal sector. Then, the level of informal firing cost was equal to twice
the value of that of the official economy. Finally, we assumed that all profits minus lump-sum
taxes went to the young.
Table 3.A1 shows the long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a
5 pp increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal in the baseline
model and with lower and higher levels of informal bargaining powers of workers (0.25 and
1
3
respectively). Then, Table 3.A2 shows similar effects when modifying the informal firing
probability by ±2.5 pp. Lastly, Table 3.A3 shows the long-run reactions when only half of
the profits and lump-sum taxes go to the young, and, the other half goes to the old. We can
conclude that the results are highly robust with respect to the assumptions we made.
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Table 3.A1: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal, comparing the
baseline scenario with lower and higher informal bargaining powers of workers
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Table 3.A2: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal, comparing the
baseline scenario with lower and higher informal firing probabilities
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Table 3.A3: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Portugal, comparing the
baseline scenario with a lower fraction of profits and lum-sum taxes to the young
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F Additional results on Portugal
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Figure 3.A1: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Portugal
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Figure 3.A2: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Portugal
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Figure 3.A3: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Portugal
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Figure 3.A4: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Portugal
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Figure 3.A5: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Portugal
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Figure 3.A6: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Portugal
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Figure 3.A7: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full pension reform in Portugal, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
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G Additional results on Italy and Spain
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Figure 3.A8: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Italy
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Table 3.A4: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in Italy, comparing PAYG and fully-funded regimes
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Figure 3.A9: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by modifiying labor income taxes in Italy, comparing
PAYG and fully-funded regimes
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Figure 3.A10: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in Italy, comparing PAYG
and fully-funded regimes
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Table 3.A5: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Italy, comparing the baseline
scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow economy
and unemployment
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Figure 3.A11: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Italy
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Figure 3.A12: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Italy
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Figure 3.A13: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Italy
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Figure 3.A14: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Italy
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Figure 3.A15: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Italy
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Figure 3.A16: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Italy
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Table 3.A6: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away from
the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Italy
Table 3.A7: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full pension reform in Italy, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
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Figure 3.A17: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away
from the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Italy
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Figure 3.A18: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full pension reform in Italy, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
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Figure 3.A19: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Spain
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Table 3.A8: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in Spain, comparing PAYG and fully-funded regimes
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Figure 3.A20: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp in-
crease in the old-age dependency ratio by modifiying labor income taxes in Spain, comparing
PAYG and fully-funded regimes
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Figure 3.A21: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in Spain, comparing PAYG
and fully-funded regimes
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Table 3.A9: Long-run (100-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio in a PAYG regime in Spain, comparing the baseline
scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow economy
and unemployment
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Figure 3.A22: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Spain
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Figure 3.A23: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Spain
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Figure 3.A24: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy in Spain
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Figure 3.A25: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by labor income taxes in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Spain
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Figure 3.A26: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by pension policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Spain
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Figure 3.A27: Short-run (10-year) effects of neutralizing the budgetary impact of a 5 pp
increase in the old-age dependency ratio by other fiscal policies in a PAYG regime with and
without shadow economy and unemployment in Spain
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Table 3.A10: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away
from the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Spain
Table 3.A11: Long-run (100-year) effects of a full pension reform in Spain, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
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Figure 3.A28: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full and a partial (50 per cent) move away
from the PAYG plan towards the fully funded regime in Spain
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Figure 3.A29: Short-run (10-year) effects of a full pension reform in Spain, comparing the
baseline scenario with a model without shadow economy and with a model without shadow
economy and unemployment
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